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I
Introduction

Introduction and Summary of Research Results
This dissertation gives answers to three timely questions in the field of active investing. The discus-
sion about the merits of active investing significantly affects the structure of the asset management
industry. In addition, the emergence of the so-called style or factor investors that base their invest-
ment strategy on the pioneering work of Fama and French (1992) puts further pressure on traditional
active management. Thus, we take the opportunity to shed light on important issues that arise in
this highly competitive discipline.
The three research papers don’t take the recent results in literature for granted. With extensive
data samples and a battery of robust statistical tests we highlight different shades of active and factor
investing. Because we agree with Bailey et al. (2014) on the fact that the increasing computational
power and incentive of institutions to deliver extraordinary results make it crucial to apply the most
advanced statistical testing frameworks.
The first research paper, The Mixed vs the Integrated Approach to Style Investing: Much Ado
About Nothing?, shows that there is no difference in performance between the integrated and the
standard mixed approach to style investing. The standard approach regards factors such as bundles
of securities and mixes different factor portfolios for the multi-factor investment. On the other hand,
the integrated approach regards stocks such as bundles of factors, and invests only in the stocks
that share the best factor characteristics on aggregate. Recent literature argues that the integrated
approach offers lower risks and higher returns. However, their argumentation contradicts the standard
paradigm that higher returns can only be achieved by taking higher risks. We thus build a robust
statistical test framework and compare 104 different factor combinations and portfolio constructions
during the long history from 1963 to 2016. When we naively test the hypothesis, we arrive at the same
conclusion as Bender and Wang (2016), Clarke et al. (2016), or Fitzgibbons et al. (2016). However,
we find that the integrated approach by construction has a higher active risk. When we build a fair
comparison of the two approaches with similar active risks, the advantage of the integrated approach
vanishes, and we can not find statistical evidence for either approach. Still, the integrated approach
can offer implementation advantages, as we can see in the third research paper. We also demonstrate
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that the integrated approach leads to a higher sensitivity to the low-volatility anomaly.
Our second research paper, Is Active Investing a Zero-Sum Game?, explores an extensive dataset
of more than 60,000 equity and fixed income mutual funds among different investment categories. For
our analysis, we build a novel statistical framework that takes the observed cross-sectional and serial
dependence of the mutual funds’ returns into account. At the same time, it adjusts for the multiple
hypothesis problems that arise with different fund providers and investment categories. Our results
show that we cannot reject the hypothesis of a zero-sum game between active and index investing
for a vast majority of investment categories. Thus, we find evidence for the theory of Berk and
Green (2004), who demonstrated that rational markets lead to a zero-sum game after fees. When
we analyze the performance drivers of the difference between active and index investing, we expected
active management to protect investors from sudden volatility shocks. Counter-intuitively, we find
that active management tends to outperform in calm market environments and to be negatively
affected during crisis periods. We also find that active equity relative to index funds show a positive
exposure to small-cap and growth stocks while active fixed income relative to index funds show a
higher sensitivity to credit risk. Contrary to that, index managers exhibit a higher sensitivity to
the traditional market and duration risk premium. When we investigate the role of performance
persistence, fees, and size, we find that active low-fee winner portfolios and active small winner
portfolios tend to outperform index investors. However, their alpha does not survive our robust test
statistics. On the other hand, our results show significant negative alphas as well after the multiple
hypothesis adjustment for active equity retail investors that invested in high-fee losers.
In the third research paper, The Long-Only Integrated Approach to Factor Timing, I try to time
the factors in a realistic long-only setting. It shows that a Markov switching model with one month
lag and two states can generate an alpha of 0.36% per month. The alpha is adjusted for the underlying
factor exposures and thus reflects the timing contribution of the strategy. Hence, this adds evidence to
the recent findings of factor momentum by Arnott et al. (2018). In contrast to their long-short mixed
approach, I show that factor momentum also works in the highly transparent long-only integrated
approach. Moreover, the timing ability exists not only in the US but also in the developed and
emerging markets, among different factor sets, and for holding periods of up to 12 months. Most of
the combinations tested survive the robust alpha test that we developed in the second research paper.
10
One caveat of short-term timing strategies is the high turnover. Trading costs may erase the gains
in markets with high transaction costs. When I reduce rebalancing frequencies in markets with high
transaction costs to limit the turnover, the alphas stay positive and mostly survive the robust test
statistics. However, the significance vanishes when I adjust for multiple hypothesis. Still, I achieve
an alpha of 0.29% per month after transactions costs which looks economically significant. Hence,
there is evidence that the Markov switching strategy may offer a promising source of alpha, which
implies that the market prices of risk adjust only slowly over time.
11
References
Arnott, Robert D., Mark Clements, Vitali Kalesnik, and Juhani T. Linnainmaa, 2018, Factor mo-
mentum, Available at SSRN 3116974.
Bailey, David H., Jonathan M. Borwein, Marcos L. de Prado, and Qiji J. Zhu, 2014, Pseudomathemat-
ics and financial charlatanism: The effects of backtest over fitting on out-of-sample performance,
Notices of the American Mathematical Society 61, 458–471.
Bender, Jennifer, and Taie Wang, 2016, Can the whole be more than the sum of the parts? Bottom-up
versus top-down multifactor portfolio construction, Journal of Portfolio Management 42, 39–50.
Berk, Jonathan B., and Richard C. Green, 2004, Mutual fund flows and performance in rational
markets, Journal of Political Economy 112, 1269–1295.
Clarke, Roger G., Harindra De Silva, and Steven Thorley, 2016, Fundamentals of efficient factor
investing, Financial Analysts Journal 72, 9–26.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1992, The cross-section of expected stock returns, Journal
of Finance 47, 427–465.
Fitzgibbons, Shaun, Jacques Friedman, Lukasz Pomorski, and Laura Serban, 2016, Long-only style
investing: Don’t just mix, integrate, Integrate (June 29, 2016), AQR Capital Management, LLC.
12
II
Research Papers

The Mixed vs the Integrated Approach to Style
Investing: Much Ado About Nothing?
Markus Leippold and Roger Rueegg
This paper is published in:
Leippold, Markus, and Roger Rueegg, 2018, The mixed vs the integrated approach to style in-
vesting: Much ado about nothing?, European Financial Management 24, 829–855.
Copyright by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. DOI: https//:doi.org/10.1111/eufm.12139
I have presented it at:
– UZH Brown Bag Doctoral Lunch Seminar, February 2017, Zürich, Switzerland.
– Citigroup’s 14th Quantitative Research Conference, June 2017, Budapest, Hungary.
– EFMA’s 26th Annual Meeting, June 2017, Athens, Greece.
Abstract
We study the difference between the returns to the integrated approach to style investing and those
to the mixed approach. Unlike the mixed approach, the integrated approach aggregates factor
characteristics at security level. Recent literature finds that the integrated approach dominates
the mixed approach. Using statistical tools for robust performance testing, we demystify these
findings as a statistical fluke. We do not find any evidence favoring the integrated approach. What
we do find is that the integrated approach exhibits a higher sensitivity to the low-risk anomaly.
However, this reduction in risk does not lead to an improvement in performance.
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1 Introduction
Style investing is the investment process that aims to harvest risk premia through exposure to factors.
Factors are the foundation of all portfolios: they are the persistent forces driving the returns of stocks,
bonds, and other assets. There are diverging views on how to build multi-factor portfolios. The
current debate is centered around two approaches. The first approach is to mix where a portfolio
is built by combining stand-alone factor portfolios. The second approach is to integrate where a
portfolio is built by selecting securities that have simultaneously strong exposure to multiple factors
at once. Recent research suggests that a bottom–up or integrated approach provides higher returns
and lower risks than a mixed approach.1 Hence, it seems that the debate about mixing or integrating
has been concluded.
However, such a finding clearly must invite suspicion, as it contradicts the standard paradigm in
finance. Higher returns can only be achieved by taking higher risks.2 We contribute to the recent
literature on style investing by providing a thorough analysis of the differences in the returns and
risk of the mixed and integrated approaches to long-only style investing. We find that the integrated
approach shows superior returns to risk characteristics in only a few combinations of styles. When we
adjust for multiple hypothesis testing, we can no longer reject the hypothesis that the two approaches
are the same. Hence, our findings present a challenge to the previous literature that promotes the
integrated approach.
An early contribution that analyzes an integrated (or bottom–up) approach to style investing is
Haugen and Baker (1996). With a selected set of factors, they show that factor models are surprisingly
accurate in forecasting the future relative returns of stocks. They find high abnormal returns together
with lower risk numbers in stocks with high predicted returns and argue that their result reveals a
major failure in the efficient markets hypothesis. Subsequent contributions on style investing turned
their focus on how to optimally combine individual factor portfolios. Of interest was not whether to
1See Bender and Wang (2016), Clarke et al. (2016), and Fitzgibbons et al. (2016).
2In addition, it contradicts the risk based explanation of why style premia exist. To clarify this point, consider a
combination of value and momentum stocks. Strictly speaking, we thereby avoid overvalued momentum stocks that
are threatened by a sudden market crash. However, bearing the risk of a sudden crash is the most rational explanation
of why the momentum premium exists (see Daniel and Moskowitz (2015)). Hence, we would expect lower returns in
the integrated approach, contrary to what recent publications suggest.
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mix or integrate, but on how to derive optimal factor exposures.3 Factor portfolios were regarded as
given building blocks.
Only recently, the integrated approach regained attention with two recent publications. Clarke
et al. (2016) argue that the mixed approach captures only one-half of the potential improvement over
the market Sharpe ratio. They show that when the group constraint is released and the securities
are viewed as a bundle of styles instead of the styles being regarded as a bundle of securities, one can
capture much more of the excess returns of the factors. The second work promoting the integrated
approach is Bender and Wang (2016). They assert that integration leads to a superior risk–return
trade-off due to the fact that it captures nonlinear cross-sectional interaction effects between factors.
Interestingly, the ETF industry has yet to make up its mind whether mixing or integrating is the
right approach. Table 1 summarizes the most well-known multi-factor ETFs. While the largest ETF,
managed by Goldman Sachs, pursues a mixed approach to factor investing, we find FlexShares, JP
Morgan, and iShares implementing an integrated approach to factor investing. Moreover, AQR, one
of the largest global investment managers with $159.2 billion assets under management as of August
2016, maintain in Fitzgibbons et al. (2016) that a long-only portfolio is more profitable if based on
an integrated approach. Indeed, it is the general tenet of the financial industry that the integrated
approach is superior to the mixed approach. To our best knowledge, the only contrarian view that
we are aware of is the white paper by Fraser-Jenkins et al. (2016). They find that the integrated and
mixed approaches lie on the same return to risk line.
[Table 1 about here.]
Given the inconclusive evidence, we conduct an in-depth analysis of the two long-only method-
ologies of style investing and contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we analyze all the
combinations of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model extended by the momentum and low
volatility factors. Moreover, we analyze an extended period from 1963 to 2016 of all NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ stocks. By doing so, we expand on the previous literature that concentrates on only a few
combinations of styles and markets, mostly on a shorter time period. For example, Fitzgibbons et al.
(2016) analyze the combination of value and momentum from 1993 to December 2015, and Bender
3See, e.g. Blitz (2015) for an overview.
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and Wang (2016) the six possible two- and four-factor combinations of value, low volatility, quality,
and momentum, from 1993 to March 2015. Clarke et al. (2016) analyze the four-factor combination
of low beta, size, value, and momentum, from 1968 to 2014.
Second, and more importantly, we extend the comparison of the two approaches by building a
robust multiple hypothesis framework. While the previous literature reports simple risk and return
differences and finds economically sound advantages to the bottom–up construction, we question these
results. Motivated by Bailey et al. (2014), who argue that shallow statistical analysis can easily lead to
allocating capital to strategies that were false discoveries, we apply a set of robust performance tests
to the hypothesis that the integrated approach offers a better performance than the mixed approach.
To avoid backtest overfitting, we adjust for the number of portfolio combinations tried. Such an
adjustment is common in medical research. Yet, in finance, multiple hypotheses methods have only
recently gained attention.4 Hence, we hope that our study will increase the awareness that the lack
of rigorous statistical procedures might lead to wrong and misleading conclusions. Other papers that
have recognized the importance of multiple hypothesis testing include Leippold and Lohre (2012a,b,
2014).
Our empirical results are as follows. When we follow the argumentation of the previous literature,
we can confirm their results in that the integrated approach is superior. However, when we apply
our battery of more robust statistical tests and include all possible style combinations as well as a
longer time horizon, we must conclude that the performance differences are statistically insignificant.
What we also find is that the risk of the integrated approach may be lower than that of the mixed
approach. Furthermore, it turns out that the integrated approach shows a high sensitivity to the low-
risk anomaly, originally discovered by Jensen et al. (1972). This result confirms our intuition behind
the integrated approach, which is one of avoiding risk through broader diversification. However,
we also find that the lower risk is accompanied by lower returns. Hence, the risk reduction of the
integrated approach does not lead to an improvement of performance. When we further analyze
trading costs and turnover, we find on average a lower turnover in the integrated approach. This
can lead to significant differences in selected portfolio construction techniques and style combinations
when trading costs are high. However, due to the low trading costs nowadays we observe no significant
4See, e.g., Harvey et al. (2016) for a current discussion.
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difference in the most recent past.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the methodology behind our portfolio
construction and hypothesis testing. Section 3 presents our data and factor choice. In Sections 4, we
summarize our empirical findings. In Section 5, we provide a turnover analysis and point at possible
limitations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
We now provide some guidance on the methodology for constructing portfolios in the mixed and inte-
grated approach. Then, we briefly present the statistical framework for testing whether the integrated
approach to style investing offers higher risk-adjusted excess returns than the mixed approach.
2.1 Portfolio construction
We assume that we have i = 1, ..., n securities and f = 1, ..., k styles with the style information matrix
Φ ∈ Rn,k. Each column φf ∈ Rn of Φ contains the style figures for the n securities. For example, for
the style ’value’ these figures are the book-to-market ratios of the companies. Each security obtains
for each factor a score si,f based on the style information. There are two common ways to build this
score, the rank-based and z-score approach. The rank-based score neglects the distribution of φf and
scores the securities among their ranks. We build the score as
sranki,f (φf ) =
rank(φf,i, φf )− 1
n− 1 , (1)
where the operator ’rank’ runs from 1 to n from the smallest to the largest values in φf . The score
is invariant to the numbers of securities and lies between 0 (worst) and 1 (best). On the other hand,
the distribution of φf is taken into account in the z-score approach. Here, the score is defined as
szi,f =
φf,i − µ(φf )
σ(φf )
. (2)
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In the mixed approach, we express the single style portfolios wf ∈ Rn as a function ϕ of the score
vector sjf ,
wf = ϕ(s
j
f ), (3)
where j = {rank, z}. These portfolio weights are then aggregated to the final weights of the mixed
approach by giving a weight of af to each style portfolio:
wmix =
F∑
f=1
afwf . (4)
In the integrated approach, the aggregation of the style information occurs before constructing the
portfolio. For this purpose, we build an aggregated score as follows:
sjagg =
F∑
f=1
afs
j
f , (5)
where we set the weight af of each score equal to the style factor portfolios’ weight of the mixed
approach.5 To build the integrated portfolio, the same portfolio construction function ϕ is applied as
for the single style portfolios, but the input score vector is the aggregated score sjagg:
wint = ϕ(s
j
agg). (6)
The main difference between the mixed and integrated portfolios is that the mixed portfolio starts
with style portfolios based on single scores and then aggregates the information by mixing the style
portfolios. In the integrated approach, the information aggregation occurs before constructing the
portfolio. Basically, we are free to choose the portfolio construction function ϕ and score methodol-
ogy. While for the score methodology, we restrict ourselves to the rank and z-score, we apply four
different portfolios methodologies. The first two are analogous to Fama and French (1992) (TER and
DEC) and, for the benchmark-sensitive investors, we additionally include the portfolio construction
techniques of Bender and Wang (2016) (BW) and Fitzgibbons et al. (2016) (TE) into our analysis.
5Concerning the choice of the style portfolio and score weights af , we follow DeMiguel et al. (2009) and apply the
most naive diversification rule af = 1F .
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Hence, we end of with the following set of portfolio construction methodologies,
P = {TER, DEC, BW, TE}, (7)
which we briefly discuss next.
2.1.1 Tercile and decile portfolios: TER and DEC
The tercile (TER) and decile (DEC) portfolio construction follows closely the style portfolio construc-
tion originally suggested by Fama and French (1992). First, we build the scores with the rank-based
methodology in Equation (1). Second, the function ϕ of Equations (4) and (6) is such that we invest
value-weighted in the upper tercile of the scored companies for the TER and in the upper deciles of
the scored companies for the DEC approach.
To clarify the differences between the mixed and integrated approaches, we provide a stylized
example for the TER portfolios. We assume that there are 10 stocks, from stock A to stock J, with a
given market capitalization (mc) and two factors f = {V,W}, say, ’value’ (V ) and ’momentum’ (M).
Exact numbers are shown in Table 2. The three highest φV and φM figures are highlighted in bold.
The three highest book-to-market ratios are 0.51 for stock A, 0.82 for stock D, and 0.97 for stock I.
The highest returns for the past 12 months disregarding the most recent month are 0.09 for stock
A, 0.14 for stock B, and 0.22 for stock I. We first build the ’value’ and ’momentum’ scores srankV and
srankM as illustrated in Equation (1) and take their the average to arrive at the aggregated score s
rank
agg
shown in Equation (5).
[Table 2 about here.]
For the mixed portfolio, we first apply the portfolio construction function ϕ to the scores srankf
and value-weight the upper tercile of the stocks. This procedure results in the single style portfolios
wV and wW . The final weights are simply the average of the factor portfolio weights and are shown
in column wmix. In contrast, the integrated approach aggregates the information on security level.
We first build the aggregated score srankagg that is the average of the style scores srankV and s
rank
M . Given
the aggregated score, we then value-weight the upper tercile of the stocks as shown in column wint.
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We end up with four groups of stocks. The first group is assigned a weight of zero in either
approach. They show neither superior style characteristics, nor are they on average superior to the
other stocks. The second group of stocks is only represented in the mixed portfolio, but not in the
integrated approach. They show superior style characteristics in one of the two styles. However, the
score in the second style is too small to be considered in the integrated portfolio. The third group of
stocks is not considered in any of the style portfolios, but it shows superior style characteristics when
all styles are aggregated. Stock C is an example of this group. The fourth group of stocks belongs in
both the mixed and integrated portfolios.
The mixed portfolio always holds at least as many stocks as the integrated portfolio. The more
similar the styles, the fewer stocks are included in the mixed portfolio. If each style provides the
exact same ranking of stocks, the weights of the integrated and mixed approaches are equal. With
two (three) styles and without an overlap, it is possible to hold 60 (90) percent of the stocks in the
mixed portfolio. For more than four styles, the mixed portfolio could possibly hold all the stocks
of the universe, while on the other hand the integrated approach holds by definition in any case 30
percent of the stocks in the universe.
2.1.2 Bender and Wang (2016) portfolios: BW
In contrast to the tercile and decile portfolios, the portfolio construction of Bender and Wang (2016)
concentrates on under- and overweighting relative to the market-cap-weighted benchmark. The scores
are built on the z-score methodology in Equation (2). The portfolio construction function ϕ is defined
by first ordering the securities according to the score and grouping them into 20 subportfolio with each
holding 5 percent of the total market capitalization. For each group, a multiplier of 0.05 to 1.95 with
increments of 0.1 is applied to the market-cap weight of the securities. For example, the subportfolio
of companies with the highest (lowest) score gets its market-cap weight multiplied by 1.95 (0.05). In
the last step, the weights are normalized. This procedure results in an over- and underweighting of
the highest and lowest scored companies. For a detailed description of the resulting portfolios, we
refer to the original work of Bender and Wang (2016). Compared to the TEC and DEC portfolios of
the previous section, the BW portfolios invest in all securities in the mixed and integrated approach.
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2.1.3 Target tracking error portfolios: TE
We additionally implement the target tracking error optimization suggested in Fitzgibbons et al.
(2016). The portfolio construction function ϕ is defined as
ϕ(s) := maxw (w − wM )′s s. t.
√
(w − wM )′Σ(w − wM ) ≤ σte, (8)
where we construct the score s with the z-score methodology in Equation (2) for the single style
portfolios of the mixed approach and with the aggregated score in Equation (5) for the integrated
approach. Furthermore, by σte we denote the ex-ante target tracking error, by wM the market-cap-
weighted benchmark, and by Σ the covariance matrix of the returns. Since we deal with a large
covariance matrix, we use the shrinkage methodology of Ledoit and Wolf (2004) based on the most
recent 24 observations. To obtain similar levels of tracking errors as in the BW approach, we set the
ex-ante target tracking error σte to two percent annualized.
2.2 Multiple hypothesis testing
As Bailey et al. (2014) argue, researchers and financial institutions are incentivized to try several
possibilities, but report only the significant results. In our case, we have 5 styles that result in 26
possible combinations. Therefore, our hypothesis is split into 26 individual hypotheses. To make
the case for multiple hypothesis testing, we provide a simple illustration with a momentum-based
strategy. To this end, we consider IBM stock with a history of returns data from January 1960 to
December 2014. We create 20 momentum strategies. The first strategy invests in IBM for the next
month if the previous month was positive, otherwise it steps out of the market. The second strategy
analogously invests in IBM for the next month if the second most recent month was positive, and
disinvests if it was negative. This analysis is conducted for the most recent 20 months, which results
in 20 different momentum strategies. Our main goal is to test whether a specific momentum strategy
shows a significantly higher Sharpe ratio than the buy-and-hold strategy. For the test statistics, we
consider the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008).
When testing 20 different momentum strategies as specified above, we have to be sensitive to
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the fact that the probability of finding no significant results at a confidence level of 5 percent is
(1−0.1)20 or approximately 12 percent. Therefore, the complementary probability of finding at least
one significant momentum strategy by pure luck is roughly 88 percent. By inspection of Table 3,
we find that there are three Sharpe ratios significantly different from the buy-and-hold strategy, two
significantly lower and one significantly higher. In particular, the return of the momentum strategy
with the 16th look-back month shows an annualized return of 7.1 percent with a annual volatility of
16.5 percent. For comparison, the annualized return of IBM over the period June 1963 to December
2014 was lower, at 4 percent, with a higher annualized volatility of 23.8 percent. We can reject the
hypothesis that the Sharpe ratio is equal to the buy-and-hold strategy at a confidence level of 10
percent. However, recalling that we tested 20 different strategies and to be sure that our superior
strategy is not just a statical fluke, we must embed our p-values into a robust multiple hypothesis
framework.
[Table 3 about here.]
There are many ways to deal with the problem of multiple hypothesis testing.6 For our analysis, we
focus on the family wise error rate (FWER), the probability of at least one false discovery. The FWER
is the most common approach to control for multiple hypothesis. For a large number of hypothesis
the FDR was introduced in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and is defined as the expectation of the
proportion of falsely rejected null hypotheses. But Romano and Wolf (2005a) and Romano and Wolf
(2005b) point out that they make the strong assumption that the individual p-values are independent
of each other. Therefore, they propose a resampling-based stepdown multiple testing framework that
considers the dependence structure of the test statistics. Their method comes at a high computational
cost. In Romano and Wolf (2016), the authors refine their method. Not only are they able to reduce
the computational cost, but their method also avoids choosing a fixed significance level α. Hence,
their framework allows for dependence structures in the test statistics without loss in statistical power.
For comparison and as a robustness test, we also focus on the older tests of Bonferroni (1936) and
Holm (1979). The Bonferroni test divides the required significance value by the number of hypotheses.
A confidence level of 5 percent with 20 tries produces a threshold of 0.05/20 = 0.0025. As pointed out
6For a comprehensive overview, we refer to Harvey et al. (2016).
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by Conneely and Boehnke (2007), the Bonferroni adjustment is too conservative for correlated tests.
Holm (1979) developed a sequential Bonferroni method, preserving its flexibility but increasing its
power. Strictly speaking, the test applies the Bonferroni adjustment only on the subset of hypotheses
that are not rejected from the beginning.7
How does our previous conclusion from the analysis of the momentum strategy change if we
adjust the single hypothesis p-values for multiple hypothesis testing? From Table 3, we observe three
significant p-values when we test naively; however, with the multiple hypothesis adjustment, the p-
values are all insignificant. Therefore, we can not reject the hypothesis that one of the momentum
strategies is different from a simple buy-and-hold strategy. Hence, their abnormal performance is
probably a false discovery and nothing but a statistical fluke.
3 Data
We now present our data and factor choices for the multiple hypothesis testing.
3.1 US data from 1963 to 2016
To construct the integrated and mixed portfolios, we use stock return and balance sheet data from
the merged CRSP and Compustat database. The stock universe consists of all NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks with share codes 10 or 11. The data items of the CRSP and Compustat database are
merged by the eight-character CUSIP. We exclude finance, insurance, and real estate companies with
SIC codes between 6000 and 6799. We limit the universe to big stocks as defined by Fama and French
(1992). This universe consists of 810 stocks on average, starting with the 583 largest US companies
in June 1963 and ending with the largest 867 companies in December 2016. At its peak in February
2000, there were 1,548 companies in the universe. The market capitalization breakpoint, which splits
the universe into small and large caps, builds the median of all NYSE stocks. The average market
capitalization over the analyzed period was US $792 million. It reached a minimum of US $63 million
in December 1974 and peaked in June 2014 with US $2,871 million. The universe represents the
7Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) show that under dependency, it is favorable
to control for the FDR, and not for the FWER.
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largest companies in the most important equity market of that time. Consequently, it is a highly
liquid universe, tradeable with small transaction costs.
The CRSP database has a monthly frequency and starts in January 1960. As outlined by Fama
and French (1992), the data of the Compustat database is not reliable before 1962. Therefore, we
use balance sheet information at a yearly frequency from the Compustat database starting at the
earliest possible year, in 1962. Moreover, all data points of the Compustat database are lagged by
6 months to guarantee that the balance sheet data of the companies are available at the date of the
portfolio construction. Considering the lag of 6 months for the balanced sheet data, the backtest
period consists of 63.5 years. It starts in June 1963 and ends in December 2016.
3.2 Factor choices and factor combinations
The most prominent factor model is Fama and French (1992) with the three factors market excess
return (M), ’size’ (S), and ’value’ (V ). Carhart (1997) extended the Fama and French factors with
the ’momentum’ factor (W ) of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The recent literature has put a lot
of effort into detecting other factors that show high abnormal returns. Harvey et al. (2016) find
315 published factors with ostensibly significant excess returns. Among the most recent findings
are the ’quality’ premium as defined by profitability, growth, safety, or payout prevail anomalies.8
Consequently, Fama and French (2015) extended their three-factor model to include certain quality
aspects with the ’profitability’ factor of Novy-Marx (2013) and the ’investment’ factor of Aharoni
et al. (2013). They argue that expected returns are not solely driven by the book to market ratio
(V ), but also by ’profitability’ (R), and ’investment’ (C). Another highly popular anomaly is the
’low-risk’ (L) anomaly, originally discovered by Jensen et al. (1972). Empirically, low-beta stocks
exhibit higher returns than implied by their market beta. Among many other low-risk measures, Ang
et al. (2006) find that stocks with high idiosyncratic risk earn abnormally low average returns.9
Without loss of generality, we focus on the most important and widespread style factors: ’value’,
’profitability’, ’investment’, ’momentum’, and ’low volatility’. We argue that if the integrated ap-
8A good overview of the quality factor is given by Asness et al. (2014).
9Recent overviews on the low-risk anomaly include, e.g., Blitz and Van Vliet (2007) and Baker et al. (2011). As a
result of the high risk-adjusted returns of the low-risk stocks, every index or smart-beta provider offers a low-volatility
product. Data compiled by Bloomberg show that the 10 largest low-volatility or minimum volatility ETFs held $40
billion in assets as of mid-2016.
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proach obtains higher risk-adjusted returns compared to the mixed approach, higher risk-adjusted
returns should also be observed for the combinations of these most popular factors. Moreover, we
concentrate on independent risk factors to arrive at a meaningful analysis. Hence, our analysis is
built on the following set of factors F :
F = {V,R,C,W,L}. (9)
We measure V by book equity as defined in Fama and French (1992) divided by the market capi-
talization of the CRSP database. We lag book equity by 6 months in order to guarantee that the
balance sheet data is published at the date of the portfolio construction. In contrast, the market
capitalization is not lagged. Asness and Frazzini (2013) show that this small detail is superior in
terms of performance and when the portfolio is rebalanced monthly. The factors R, C, and W are
defined as in Fama and French (2015). R is calculated by the ratio of operating profitability divided
by book equity and C by the total book assets of the recent year divided by the actual total book
assets. All these variables are calculated with data from the Compustat database and lagged by 6
months. W is calculated as the total returns over the past 12 months, while the most recent month
is ignored. For L we take the volatility to be the standard deviation of the most recent 36 monthly
returns. The look-back period of 36 months is chosen analogously to Blitz and Van Vliet (2007). We
show the summary statistics of the factors including the size factor in Table 4.
[Table 4 about here.]
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to test all possible available factors. Instead, we want
to give a comprehensive overview of the most popular factors. Moreover the factors should also be
independent of each other. For example, Fama and French (1992) also test the earnings-to-price ratio.
Since this ratio is highly correlated with the book-to-price ratio, we do not include it in our study,
to avoid potential problems arising from multicollinearity. Therefore, before we proceed, we test our
selected factors for multicollinearity by calculating the variance inflation factor (VIF). Table 5 reports
the results. We find that the VIF stays below two, far below the threshold of 10 which, according
to O’Brien (2007), is equivalent to a confidence level of 0.1. Therefore, there is no sign of a linear
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dependency in our factor selection (9).
[Table 5 about here.]
Given the 5 following styles, ’value’ (V ), ’profitability’ (R), ’investment’ (C), ’momentum’ (W ),
and ’low-volatility’ (L), it is possible to build 10 combinations with 2 factors, 10 combinations with
3 factors, 5 combinations with 4 factors, and 1 combination with 5 factors. In all, we end up with 26
possible combinations, denoted by C,
C = {VW ,VC ,VR,VL,WC ,WR,WL,CR,CL,RL,
VWC ,VWR,VWL,VCR,VCL,VRL,WCR,WCL,WRL,CRL,
VWCR,VWCL,VWRL,VCRL,WCRL,VWCRL},
(10)
where we indicate each combination by the acronym formed from its factors’ names.10
4 Robust hypothesis testing
We now run the integrated and mixed portfolios for all 26 combinations of C and all four portfolio
construction methodologies in P in (7). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. We first compare the
Sharpe ratio of the resulting 104 strategies and then concentrate on the variance and the benchmark
orientated figures, namely the information ratio and the tracking error.
4.1 Multiple hypothesis testing for the Sharpe ratio
In Figure 1, we report the Sharpe ratios of all 104 strategies in grey and highlight the differences of
the integrated to the mixed approach in green (positive) or red (negative). The integrated approach
obtains a higher Sharpe ratios in most of the cases. For the BW portfolio construction methodology,
we find the integrated approach to outperform the mixed approach in any of the style combinations.
[Figure 1 about here.]
10For example, the combination of ’value’ (V ), ’momentum’ (M) and ’low-volatility’ (L), is called VWL.
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Bender and Wang (2016) find the highest difference in risk-adjusted returns for the combination
of ’value’, ’low volatility’, ’quality’, and ’momentum’, with 0.84 in the integrated approach and 0.73 in
the mixed approach. We too find the highest Sharpe ratio for the 4-factor combinations. For example
VWCR or VWRL show, from June 1963 to December 2016, very high Sharpe ratios: 0.48 and 0.49. In
contrast, the mixed approach obtains a Sharpe ratio of 0.41 for both combinations. When we regard
the style ‘robust’ as a proxy for ‘quality’, we arrive for the combination VWRL to the same magnitude
of improvement as Bender and Wang (2016). Fitzgibbons et al. (2016) find increasing benefits with
the number of uncorrelated factors combined in the portfolio’s construction for the post-1993 period.
We can also find support for this observation. We find only positive differences for combinations with
more than three styles, while we observe only small improvements for the two-factor combinations.
Next, we perform the single hypothesis robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008). The
robust Sharpe ratio test requires an optimal block size for the dependent block bootstrap.11 Since
we observe the highest autocorrelation for the block sizes five, we use this value for the optimal block
size (bl).12 Figure 2 shows the monthly Sharpe ratio differences of the four portfolio construction
methodologies and the 26 factor combinations in bars as well as their p-values in symbols. The
significant differences at the 95 percent confidence level are highlighted in green (positive) or red
(negative). For the TER (DEC) construction, we observe only one (three) significant single hypothesis
tests. For the benchmark-orientated portfolio construction method BW (TE), we find 16 (15) p-values
to be below the five percent level. Hence, at least under a single-hypothesis test, there seems to be
some pattern emerging in favor of the integrated approach when applying the benchmark-oriented
construction methods.
[Figure 2 about here.]
However, since we deal with four portfolio construction methods and 26 factor combinations, it
is crucial to adjust the single hypothesis p-values in Figure 2 for the numbers of tries. For example,
Clarke et al. (2016) focus on the ex-ante portfolio construction and the comparison of the two ap-
11There are methods to evaluate the optimal block length for a single time series, see Politis and White (2004) and
Patton et al. (2009), or in the bivariate case, see Ledoit and Wolf (2008). But for the multivariate case with more than
two time series, there is no framework available.
12For robustness we also applied a block size of two, that shows the second highest autocorrelation. The different
block size has no impact in all the results presented below and lead to the same conclusions.
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proaches. They make the – in their words – ‘implausible’ assumption that the investor first has the
knowledge of the successful 4 styles as well as their information ratio. We argue that exactly this
implausible assumption is the game changer. First, the expected information ratios are unknown ex
ante. It may well happen that the successful styles of the past will fail in the future. Second, the
investor is not aware which styles or which combination will be successful in the future. Therefore,
the multiple hypothesis framework that we apply next is of crucial importance. We expect the dif-
ferent portfolio construction methods for the same style combination to behave similarly. Since the
framework of Romano and Wolf (2016) accounts for these inherent dependence structures in the test
statistics, it is best suited to adjust the single hypothesis p-values.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Figure 3 provides the adjusted p-values (in symbols) under the multiple hypothesis testing frame-
work. We find that all the significant strategies of the TER and DEC portfolio construction are likely
to be false discoveries. However, for the benchmark-sensitive investors, we still find five combinations
including VW in the framework of BW and five combinations including WL in the TE framework to
survive the adjustment and to perform significantly better.
4.2 Variance, information ratio, and tracking error comparison
We now test the null hypothesis that the variance, the information ratio, and the tracking error
of the integrated and mixed approach are equal for the 26 factor combinations and four portfolio
construction methodologies. Figure 4 reports the differences in the logarithmic variance (top chart),
the information ratios (middle chart), and the logarithmic tracking error (bottom chart) based on
monthly returns using the integrated and mixed approach. For the variance and tracking error
hypothesis testing, we apply the robust variance test of Ledoit and Wolf (2011). Analogous to the
previous section, we chose the block size of five for the dependent block bootstrap that is also required
for the robust variance test. The only difference to the robust hypothesis testing with the Sharpe
ratio is that the analyzed returns are the excess returns above the one-month Treasury bill rate (for
the information ratio) and the excess returns above the market-cap weighted benchmark (for the
variance and tracking error).
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[Figure 4 about here.]
We find eleven combinations for the TER, three for the DEC, 15 for the BW, and one for the
TE approach that exhibit a lower variance in the integrated approach, while only the combination
VR shows a significantly higher variance in the DEC portfolio construction methodology. It is not
surprising that the optimized portfolio construction method TE results in similar risk levels, since
including the information of the covariance matrix during the portfolio construction leads to neu-
tralized bets in the risk dimension. The more factors included in the strategies, the higher is the
percentage of significant differences where we can reject the null hypothesis.
For the portfolio construction methodologies TER and DEC, we observe in general a lower in-
formation ratio compared to the mixed approach. The combination VWL in the DEC and VWCL,
VWRL as well as VWCRL in the TER are significantly lower compared to the mixed approach. On
the other hand, we observe in the benchmark-orientated approaches BW and TE on average an im-
provement in the information ratio. However, none is significantly different from zero. Again, when
we take ’robust’ as a proxy for quality, we can confirm the result of Bender and Wang (2016) that
the integrated approach shows a higher information ratio over time. However, these differences not
significantly different from zero, with adjusted p-values close to one.
For the tracking error, we first observe that the integrated approach obtains a significantly higher
tracking error in all of the combinations. Second, the differences increase with the numbers of factors.
This result comes not as a surprise, since we construct the single style portfolios of the mixed portfolio
in the same way as the final portfolio of the integrated approach. Consequently, the equal-weighted
average of the single style portfolios in the mixed approach shows a significant difference in the active
risk of the two portfolios. This finding is due to the high diversification effect of the single style
portfolios that exhibit a low correlation among each other.
4.3 Similar active risk: a fair comparison
So far, we do find some support, although weak, for the results presented in recent literature, in that
the integrated approach shows a significantly higher Sharpe ratio for some of the style combinations.
However, we also find significantly higher tracking errors compared to the mixed approach and no
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improvement in the information ratio. Hence, a fair comparison between the integrated and mixed
approach demands some further investigation. To this end, we construct the portfolios such that the
same level of active risk is achieved in both methodologies.13
4.3.1 Portfolio construction
To increase active risk in the mixed approach, we change the portfolio construction function from
Equation (3). Instead of investing in the 30 percent best stocks for the single mixed TER style
portfolios, we invest market-cap-weighted in the 20 (two factors), 12.25 (three factors), 10 (four
factors) and 8.75 (five factors) percent best stocks. We expect that this increased concentration
results in higher tracking errors for the mixed portfolios. The DEC portfolio construction approach is
neglected, since it already has a high level of concentration in the integrated approach that is hard to
generate in the mixed approach. For the BW portfolio construction method, we take the multiplier
ranging from 0.05 to 1.95 to the power of two (two factors), three (three factors), five (four factors),
and eight (five factors) for the single style portfolios wf . By doing so, we give a higher overweight to
the five percent market-cap groups with a high score and increase the underweight of stocks with a
small score, relative to the market-cap-weighted benchmark. Analogous to Fitzgibbons et al. (2016),
we increase the ex-ante annual tracking error target to 3.0 (two factors), 3.5 (three factors), 3.8 (four
factors), and 4.0 (five factors) in the TE mixed portfolios. The portfolio construction of the integrated
portfolio remains the same.
4.3.2 Active risk comparison
We now test the hypothesis of equal tracking errors for the 26 factor combinations and three port-
folio construction methodologies presented in the previous section. We show the differences in the
logarithmic tracking error and the multiple hypothesis adjusted p-values in Figure 5.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In contrast to Figure 4, there are not only positive but also negative (significant) differences
13We thank the referee for pointing us into this direction.
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between integrated and mixed approach. Hence, on average, both approaches now have similar active
risk and we are able to conduct a fair reward to risk analysis comparison in a next step.
4.3.3 Hypothesis testing
Adjusting for multiple hypothesis, we test the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratio, variance, or in-
formation ratios are equal for the 26 style combinations and the three portfolio construction method-
ologies TER, BW, and TE from the set P. Results are summarized in Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
For the Sharpe ratio in the top chart, we find no significant difference for any of the 78 combi-
nations tested. We also find that many of the differences decrease and turn to negative numbers.
For example, the BW approach shows only in three out of 26 combinations an improvement in the
Sharpe ratio, while we found five positive significant Sharpe ratios in our first try in Section 4.1.
For the variance in the middle chart we find that 22 in the TER, four in the BW and eleven style
combinations in the TE portfolio construction method show a significantly lower variance over time.
In only seven of the 78 tested combinations, we observe a higher variance over time.
For the information ratio in the bottom chart we find for the TER methodology four out of 26
combinations with a higher information ratio in the integrated approach. In the BW methodology
we find the combination VL to offer a minor improvement in the information ratio, while the other
25 combinations show lower information ratios. On the other hand, for the TE approach we see 19
of the 26 combinations to offer a higher information ratio. We can reject the null hypothesis that the
two approaches are equal only for the five factor combination VWCRL of the BW portfolios. This
combination shows a significant lower information ratio from June 1963 to December 2016.
We conclude that the significant improvements in the Sharpe ratio from Section 4 were due to
the different level in active risk of the integrated to the mixed approach in long-only style investing.
When we adjust the mixed approach such that it exhibits the same level in active risk, we can no
longer reject the null hypothesis that the Sharpe ratio or information ratio is higher in the integrated
approach. We even find one negative significant difference in the information ratio.
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4.4 Asset pricing tests
To gain some further intuition about the differences of the mixed and integrated approach, we ask
whether the return differences can be explained by the risk factors themselves. We therefore run for
every combination in (10) and for the three portfolio construction methodologies TER, BW, and TE
in P the following regression:
rint,t − rmix,t = α+ βMMt + βSSt + βV Vt + βRRt + βCCt + βWWt + βLLt + t, (11)
where rint,t − rmix,t corresponds to the difference in monthly returns between the integrated and
mixed approach, M is the market return, S is the small minus big factor of Fama and French (1992),
and V, R, C, W, and L are the return differences of the upper tercile compared to the lower tercile
within our equity universe defined in Section 3.
[Figure 7 about here.]
The parameter estimations and t-values are presented in Figure 7.14 For the alpha coefficient,
we cannot observe a consistent pattern in the t-statistics. To provide an explanation, we recall our
stylized example in Section 2.1.1. On the one hand, the integrated approach increases the exposure
to factor returns by penalizing negative characteristics. This property follows from aggregating the
characteristics on security level, which keeps us from buying stocks with highly negative characteristics
in one of the factors. For example, stocks B and D are not included in the integrated portfolio, because
they include a negative factor score in one of the styles. On the other hand, the integrated approach
decreases the sensitivity to factor returns by avoiding stocks that have diverging style exposures. For
instance, stock B, which is highly sensitive to the momentum value factor, and stock D, which is
highly sensitive to the value factor, are not included in the integrated approach. But stock C, with
less pronounced style characteristics, is included. The insignificant alpha coefficients provide evidence
that these two effects neutralize each other.
14We use HC3 t-values. The HC3 is a version of the significance tests based on a heteroscedasticity consistent
covariance matrix (HCCM), which are consistent even in the presence of heteroscedasticity of an unknown form. We
highlight t-values above 1.96 in green and below −1.96 in red. Moreover, we cap t-values above and below five to
achieve a better overview.
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When analyzing the different factor sensitivities, we observe that the sensitivity to the market
factor M is low and mostly negative for combinations with three and more factors. The S factor,
which can be seen as a proxy for illiquidity, is mostly negative with high negative t-values. This
implies that the integrated approach loads less on liquidity risk, which may serve as an explanation
of the lower expected returns in the long run of the integrated approach. For the factors V, R, C,
and W, we find no clear pattern for the sensitivities. In contrast, for L we find a consistent positive
sensitivity on the part of combinations with more than three factors, and large t-values. This is in
line with the findings in Jivraj et al. (2016), who find high sensitivities to the low volatility factor
when comparing the integrated and mixed approach for the style combination of value, momentum,
low volatility, and quality. The high sensitivity to the low volatility factor L and the low realized
risks of the low volatility factor over the analyzed time period are an explanation for the generally
lower risk numbers of the integrated approach. The R-squared of the regressions increases with the
number of factors considered, and obtain very high levels with an average R-squared of 0.30 for all
style combination and portfolio construction techniques.
5 Turnover analysis
There are some limitations to our analysis. The first concerns the portfolio construction process.
There are many ways of constructing a factor portfolio. We have focused on the most natural choices,
the tercile portfolios being weighted by market capitalization as well as the benchmark-orientated
approaches of Bender and Wang (2016) and Fitzgibbons et al. (2016). These constructions are close
to the equilibrium portfolio of the CAPM and thereby minimize illiquidity issues. The second concern
relates to potential selection biases. We tried to reduce such a bias by analyzing different factors and
combinations as well. Yet, the set of factors and their definition was not know at the beginning of
our analysis in 1963. Since the selection bias increases with the number of factors considered, results
that depend on a large number of factors must be taken with caution.
A third concern, which is highly relevant from a practical viewpoint, is the turnover of the strate-
gies. Figure 8 illustrates the turnover of the three portfolio construction methods with similar active
risk for both the integrated and mixed approach with netting (mix - net) and without netting (mix
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- gross). The mixed approach with netting views the turnover as if the single style portfolios are
managed in one single mixed portfolio. For the mixed approach without netting, we calculate the
turnover as if the single style portfolios are managed individually.
[Figure 8 about here.]
We observe that the integrated approach offers in general a lower (green) turnover compared to
the mixed approach. When we compare the turnover reduction in the mixed approach with and
without netting, we see that the effect is higher in the benchmark-orientated approaches and smaller
in the decile approach. Finally for the style combinations including ’momentum’ (W ), the turnover
in any of the portfolio constructions is substantially increased, while the combination of the quality
type style factors ’robust’ (R), ’investment’ (C), and ’low volatility’ (L) show much lower turnover
over time.
We now test whether turnover, and therefore trading costs, have an impact on our previous results.
We estimate transaction costs by starting with a one percent one-way transaction cost from 1963 to
1975. After the May Day in 1975 and the deregulation of the commission fees,15 we decrease the
transaction costs from 1976 to 2016 at an exponential decay with a mean lifetime of twelve years.
This results in similar cost levels as used in different studies, such as, e.g., Keim and Madhavan
(1998) and Jones (2002). Moreover, in 2016 the resulting transaction costs are 0.033 percent, which
corresponds to the bid-ask spreads of US index funds at that time.16
[Figure 9 about here.]
Figure 9 shows the difference in the monthly Sharpe (top) and information ratio (bottom) together
with the adjusted p-values of the integrated and mixed approach with netting. Due to the higher
turnover of the mixed approach, we observe significant Sharpe ratio (information ratio) differences
in the combinations WL, VWL, and VWCL (WL and VWL) in the TE portfolios. Also, the reward
to risk figures in the TER and BW increase. However, they are still negative or show high adjusted
15On May 1, 1975, brokerages were allowed to charge varying commission rates. Prior to this change, all brokerages
charged the same price for stock trades.
16The bid-ask spread of index funds corresponds to the expected transaction costs in order to protect current investors
from new subscriptions or redemptions.
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p-values. Due to deregulation and higher volumes, commission fees and slippage decrease steadily
over time. Therefore, we are also interested in the impact of trading costs for the more recent period.
[Figure 10 about here.]
Figure 10 shows the same tests for the period June 1993 to December 2016, with trading costs
starting at 0.23 percent.17 Strikingly, we find that for the period after June 1993, there is no evidence
to reject the null hypothesis that the two approaches have the same return to reward ratio. The
same conclusion holds for the mixed approach without netting. Hence, our analysis of transaction
costs shows, due to the lower turnover, that the integrated approach may well be the better choice, if
transaction costs are high. However, with the substantial decrease of these costs over the last decades,
this advantage has eroded.
6 Conclusion
We rigorously study the difference in returns between the mixed and integrated approaches to long-
only style investing. In the US stock market from 1963 to 2016, we analyze the 26 possible combi-
nations of five styles: value, robustness, investment, momentum, and low volatility under the three
portfolio construction methodologies of Fama and French (1992), Bender and Wang (2016) and a
target tracking error optimization suggested in Fitzgibbons et al. (2016). While the previous litera-
ture concentrates on simple performance comparisons for arbitrary factor combinations and portfolio
constructions, we apply a robust statistical testing framework. In contradiction to recent findings
and the general tenor in the finance industry, we cannot support the hypothesis that the integrated
approach leads to superior reward to risk ratios for any of the 26 tested factor combinations and
portfolio construction methods.
We further find evidence that the integrated approach shows lower variances over time. In contrast
to previous literature that mostly concentrates on a shorter and more recent time horizon, we find
that the lower risk is, on average, associated with lower returns. For the integrated approach, we find
a high sensitivity to the low volatility anomaly. By aggregating style information at security level,
17This breakpoint is also of interest due to the publication of the Fama-French three-factor model at this time and
the studies of Bender and Wang (2016) and Fitzgibbons et al. (2016), which analyze data from 1993 onwards.
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the integrated approach reduces risks and avoids extreme stocks that exhibit a high sensitivity to
only a few (or only one) styles.
Our results confirm that, when naively tested, some factor combinations show superior return
to risk ratios over specific periods. But when we apply a multiple hypothesis framework, we must
conclude that none of the differences are significant. This conclusion also holds when we adjust for
transaction costs. Given the increasing computational power for conducting multiple backtests and
given the fact that financial institutions have incentives to deliver extraordinary results, it is crucial
to apply the most advanced statistical testing frameworks. Ignoring the available tools can lead to
hasty conclusions and mis-allocation of capital to investment strategies that are false discoveries.
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Figure 1. Integrated vs. mixed approach: Sharpe ratios
This figure presents the Sharpe ratios of the mixed and integrated approach in gray and difference between
integrated and mixed approach in green (positive) or red (negative). The analyzed factors are: ’value’ (V ),
’momentum’ (W ), ’investment’ (C), ’profitability’ (R), and ’low volatility’ (L). E.g., the combination of ’value’,
’momentum’ and ’low volatility’ is indicated by VWL. The portfolio construction methodologies tested are all
four strategies from the set P in (7). Portfolios are rebalanced monthly from June 1963 to December 2016.
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Figure 2. Robust Sharpe ratio: single hypothesis test
This figure presents the comparison of the Sharpe ratios of the integrated and mixed approach to long-only
style investing. The analyzed factors are value (V ), momentum (W ), investment (C), profitability (R), and
low volatility (L). The portfolio construction methodologies tested are all four strategies from the set P in
(7). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. We show the difference in the monthly Sharpe ratio (SR diff)
in bars and the p-values of the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) for a block size of five in
symbols. The analysis is based on the monthly excess returns above the one-month Treasury bill rate. The
data starts in June 1963 and ends in December 2016.
44
Figure 3. Robust Sharpe ratio: multiple hypothesis test
This figure presents the comparison of the Sharpe ratios of the integrated and mixed approach to long-only
style investing. The analyzed factors are value (V ), momentum (W ), investment (C), profitability (R), and
low volatility (L). The portfolio construction methodologies tested are all four strategies from the set P in
(7). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. We show the difference in the monthly Sharpe ratio (SR diff) in
bars and the p-values of the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) for a block size of five adjusted
by the multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016) in symbols. The analysis is based on the
monthly excess returns above the one-month Treasury bill rate. The data starts in June 1963 and ends in
December 2016.
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Figure 4. Multiple hypothesis test: variance, information ratio, tracking error
This figure presents the differences in the logarithmic variance in bars (VR diff) and the adjusted p-values of
the robust variance test of Ledoit and Wolf (2011) in symbols in the top chart; differences in the information
ratio relative to the market-cap-weighted benchmark (IR diff) in bars and the adjusted p-values of the robust
Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) in symbols in the middle chart; differences in the logarithmic
tracking error in bars (TE diff) and the ajdusted p-values of the robust tracking error test of Ledoit and Wolf
(2011) in symbols in the bottom chart. The single hypothesis p-values are adjusted for the number of tries
by the multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016). The analyzed factors are ’value’ (V ),
’momentum’ (W ), ’investment’ (C), ’profitability’ (R), and ’low volatility’ (L). The portfolio construction
methodologies tested are all four strategies from the set P in (7). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly
from June 1963 to December 2016. The analysis is based on the monthly excess returns above the one-month
Treasury bill rate.
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Figure 5. Same active risk: robust tracking error test
This figure presents the comparison of the tracking error (TE diff) of the integrated approach with those of the
mixed approach to long-only style investing. The analyzed factors are value (V ), momentum (W ), investment
(C), profitability (R), and low volatility (L). The portfolio construction methodologies tested are the TER,
BW, and TE. The mixed portfolios is constructed with higher concentrated style portfolios to achieve a similar
active risk compared to the integrated approach.The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. We show the difference
in the logarithmic tracking error (TE diff) in bars and the p-values of the robust variance test of Ledoit and
Wolf (2008) adjusted by the multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016) for a block size of five
in symbols. The analysis is based on the monthly excess returns above the market-cap-weighted benchmark.
The analysis starts in June 1963 and ends in December 2016.
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Figure 6. Same active risk: Sharpe ratio, variance, information ratio
This figure presents the difference in the Sharpe ratio (SR diff) and the adjusted p-values of the robust Sharpe
ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) in the top chart; differences in the logarithmic variance in bars (VR diff)
and adjusted p-values of the robust variance test of Ledoit and Wolf (2011) in the middle chart; difference
in the information ratio relative to the market-cap-weighted benchmark (IR diff) in bars and the adjusted
p-values of the robust Sharpe ratio test in the bottom chart. The single hypothesis p-values are adjusted for
the number of tries by the multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016). The analyzed factors
are ’value’ (V ), ’momentum’ (W ), ’investment’ (C), ’profitability’ (R), and ’low volatility’ (L). The portfolio
construction methodologies tested are TER, BW, and TE. The analysis is based on the monthly excess returns
above the market-cap-weighted benchmark. The analysis starts in June 1963 and ends in December 2016.
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Figure 7. Asset pricing tests
This figure presents the ordinary least squares regression results with data from June 1963 to December 2016.
The dependent variable is the difference in the monthly returns of the integrated approach from those of the
mixed approach in long-only style investing. The independent variables are the market portfolio (MKT), the
small minus big (SMB), the value (V ), the profitability (R), the conservative (C), the momentum (W ), and
the low volatility (L) factors. Factor returns are calculated by the difference in the performance of the highest
to the lowest tercile. Except for the factor small minus big, which is defined as in Fama and French (1992),
we only use the big universe to calculate the factor returns. We report the HC3 t-values (t) for the 26 possible
factor combinations of V,R,C, W, and L as well as for the tercile (TER), Bender and Wang (2016) (BW), and
target tracking error optimization (TE) portfolio construction. HC3 test statistics above (green) and below
(red) 1.96 are highlighted and the test statistics are truncated at +/- five for a better overview.
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Figure 8. Turnover Analysis
This figure presents the monthly average turnover of the integrated (integrate), mixed approach with netting
(mix - net) and mixed approach without netting (mix - gross) from June 1963 to December 2016. The portfolio
construction methodologies tested are the TER, BW, and TE. The portfolios are constructed in a way that
the active risk of both, the integrated and mixed approach, are similar over time. A lower (higher) turnover
of the integrated approach compared to the mixed approach with netting is highlighted in green (red).
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Figure 9. Multiple hypothesis test with transaction costs: 1963 - 2016
This figure presents the comparison of the Sharpe (top) and information ratios (bottom) of the integrated
approach with those of the mixed approach to long-only style investing. The analyzed factors are ’value’ (V ),
’momentum’ (W ), ’investment’ (C), ’profitability’ (R), and ’low volatility’ (L). The portfolio construction
methodologies tested are TER, BW, and TE. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. We show the difference
in the monthly Sharpe (SR diff) and information ratio (IR diff) in bars and the multiple hypothesis p-values
of the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) adjusted by the multiple hypothesis framework of
Romano and Wolf (2016) for a block size of five in symbols. The analysis is based on the monthly excess
returns above the one-month Treasury bill rate including trading costs. The analysis starts in June 1963 and
ends in December 2016.
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Figure 10. Multiple hypothesis test with transaction costs: 1993 - 2016
This figure presents the comparison of the Sharpe (top) and information ratios (bottom) of the integrated
approach with those of the mixed approach to long-only style investing. The analyzed factors are ’value’ (V ),
’momentum’ (W ), ’investment’ (C), ’profitability’ (R), and ’low volatility’ (L). The portfolio construction
methodologies tested are the tercile (TER), Bender and Wang (2016) (BW), and target tracking error opti-
mization (TE). The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. We show the difference in the monthly Sharpe (SR
diff) and information ratio (IR diff) in bars and the multiple hypothesis p-values of the robust Sharpe ratio
test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) adjusted by the multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016)
for a block size of five in symbols. The analysis is based on the monthly excess returns above the one-month
Treasury bill rate including trading costs. The analysis starts in June 1993 and ends in December 2016.
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Table 1. Multi-factor ETFs
This table presents the most well known multi-factor ETFs as of end of August 16. Data compiled by
Bloomberg and ETF.com and ordered by assets under management (AuM) as of end of August 16.
Name Asset Manager AuM Inception Approach
Goldman Sachs ActiveBeta U.S. Large Cap Equity ETF Goldman Sachs US $1.15B 01/28/15 mix
FlexShares Morningstar US Market Factor Tilt Index Fund FlexShares US $842.43M 09/16/11 integrate
John Hancock Multifactor Large Cap ETF John Hancock US $236.27 09/28/15 integrate
State Street Multi-Factor Global Equity Fund State Street US $126.39 09/30/14 mix
iShares Edge MSCI Multifactor USA ETF iShares US $110.03M 04/30/15 integrate
JPMorgan Diversified Return U.S. Equity ETF JP Morgan US $81.15M 09/29/15 integrate
The Global X Scientific Beta US ETF Global X US $67.18M 05/12/15 mix
Franklin LibertyQ Global Equity ETF Franklin US $26.19M 06/01/16 integrate
ETFS Diversified-Factor U.S. Large Cap Index Fund ETF Securities US $7.82M 01/28/15 mix
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Table 2. Stylized example
This table presents a stylized example of the calculations of the weights of the mixed and integrated portfolios.
We report the market capitalization (mc), the factor values of value (V ) and momentum (W ), the weights in
the factor portfolio of value (wV ) and momentum (wW ), the score for value (sV ), the score for momentum
(sW ), the aggregated scores for the combination (sVW ), and the resulting weights for the mixed portfolio
(wmix) and the integrated portfolio (wint).
mc φV φW srankV s
rank
W s
rank
agg wV wW wmix wint
Stock A 10.50 0.51 0.09 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.23 0.37 0.30 0.35
Stock B 5.75 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.88 0.50 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.00
Stock C 7.12 0.48 0.02 0.66 0.55 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
Stock D 22.87 0.82 -0.09 0.88 0.11 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.00
Stock E 7.72 0.32 -0.21 0.44 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock F 1.15 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.66 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock G 15.72 0.31 0.01 0.33 0.44 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock H 50.91 0.28 -0.07 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Stock I 12.51 0.97 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.27 0.43 0.35 0.42
Stock J 25.26 0.41 -0.02 0.55 0.33 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3. Multiple hypothesis testing: Momentum strategy
This table presents the comparison of the Sharpe ratios for 20 momentum strategies of IBM compared to
the buy and hold strategy. The momentum strategies invest in IBM for the next month if the xth most
recent month was positive. Otherwise, we step out of the stock for the next month. We show the strategy
for x = 1, ..., 20. The out-of-sample backtest starts in June 1963 and ends in December 2014. We show the
annualized return (Ret p.a.), the annualized volatility (Vol p.a.), the monthly Sharpe Ratio difference (SR-
diff), the bootstrapped p-value of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) with a block size of two, the p-values adjusted by the
frameworks of Bonferroni (Bonf), Holm (1979) (Holm), Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) and Benjamini and
Yekutieli (2001) (BHY), and Romano and Wolf (2016) (RW). The analysis is based on monthly excess returns
above the one-month Treasury bill rate. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level; ** denotes significance at
the 0.05 level; and * denotes significance at the 0.1 level.
x = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ret p.a. 0.051 0.023 0.021 0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.023 0.012 0.041 0.029
Vol p.a. 0.163 0.164 0.158 0.159 0.160 0.176 0.173 0.160 0.166 0.175
SR-diff 0.030 -0.018 -0.021 -0.044 -0.041 -0.069 -0.019 -0.037 0.012 -0.010
pval 0.347 0.576 0.507 0.170 0.203 0.015∗∗ 0.511 0.242 0.708 0.742
Bonf 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.292 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Holm 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.277 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
BHY 0.645 0.752 0.731 0.485 0.506 0.146 0.731 0.537 0.752 0.752
RW 0.985 0.994 0.994 0.904 0.933 0.230 0.994 0.949 0.996 0.996
x = 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Ret p.a. 0.006 0.042 0.004 0.019 -0.013 0.071 0.040 0.026 0.017 0.005
Vol p.a. 0.171 0.171 0.163 0.159 0.175 0.165 0.176 0.163 0.168 0.164
SR-diff -0.047 0.012 -0.051 -0.026 -0.077 0.062 0.009 -0.013 -0.028 -0.049
pval 0.127 0.681 0.100 0.449 0.008∗∗∗ 0.053∗ 0.752 0.691 0.355 0.138
Bonf 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.168 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Holm 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.168 0.958 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
BHY 0.461 0.752 0.461 0.731 0.146 0.355 0.752 0.752 0.645 0.461
RW 0.848 0.996 0.818 0.993 0.141 0.580 0.996 0.996 0.985 0.857
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Table 4. Factors’ summary statistics
This table presents the annualized return (Ret p.a.), annualized volatility (Vol p.a.), Sharpe ratio (SR p.a.),
and maximum draw-down (Max. Draw.) for the value-weighted monthly excess returns above the one-month
Treasury bill rate. The period starts in June 1963 and ends in December 2016. The market includes all
securities. Small: the securities below the NYSE market capitalization median; Big: the securities above the
NYSE market capitalization. The other factors are the top (first-listed), respectively, bottom (second-listed),
terciles in the big universe of securities of the following factors: ’value’ (Value - Growth), ’robustness’ (Robust
- Weak), ’investment’ (Conser. - Aggr), ’momentum’ (Winner - Loser), and ’low volatility’ (LowVol - HighVol).
1963 - 2016 Market Small Big Value Growth Robust Weak Conser. Aggr. Winner Loser LowVol HighVol
Ret p.a. 5.14 6.48 5.07 8.67 4.71 6.39 2.76 7.11 4.90 8.10 2.39 5.50 4.49
Vol p.a. 15.53 21.55 15.13 16.38 16.19 15.22 18.11 15.06 17.90 16.91 19.81 12.70 25.67
SR p.a. 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.53 0.29 0.42 0.15 0.47 0.27 0.48 0.12 0.43 0.17
Max. Draw. 55.23 73.83 55.44 54.11 58.60 53.04 78.59 47.54 63.72 50.39 72.71 48.90 78.84
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Table 5. Variance inflation factors
This table presents the variance inflation factors of the following factors: value (V ), momentum (W ), in-
vestment (C), profitability (R), and low volatility (L). The return series of each factor are computed as the
value-weighted return of the upper tercile less the value-weighted return of the lower tercile of each factor for
the big universe. We show the variance inflation factors for each of the 5 factors as independent variables. The
dependent variable of the model is shown on the horizontal axis, while the independent variables are shown
on the vertical axis.
V C W R L
V - 1.49 1.03 1.36 1.73
C 1.46 - 1.16 1.38 1.48
W 1.74 1.99 - 1.42 1.76
R 1.91 1.97 1.18 - 1.32
L 1.95 1.70 1.18 1.06 -
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Abstract
To study the hypothesis whether active investing is a zero-sum game, we analyze the alpha of
active and index mutual funds from a global sample of more than 60,000 equity and fixed income
funds. Using a new robust statistical test, we cannot reject this hypothesis for the vast majority
of investment categories. We also find that the average active fund has less exposure to traditional
risk factors, but higher sensitivity to alternative risk premia. Fund persistence and the impact of
size and fees adds further support to the hypothesis.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of index investing has led to a seemingly endless debate about the merits of active
portfolio management. Many research papers, investors, and advisors place themselves in either the
active or passive camp. The staunch defenders of active investing argue along the lines of Berk and
Green (2004), who show that rational markets do not contradict the existence of skilled fund managers
who consistently beat the market. They build their argument on a basic principle of economics: agents
earn economic rents if, and only if, they have a competitive advantage. Hence, active investing is a
zero-sum game after fees. Recently, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) have provided empirical support
for the claim that mutual fund managers do have skills.
In contrast, the proponents of passive investing argue along the lines of Fama and French (2010)
in that the high fees of active management turn it into a negative-sum game after costs. Indeed,
French (2008) and Fama and French (2010), among many others, provide ample evidence that actively
managed US equity mutual funds underperform their multi-factor benchmark after fees. In their view,
active investing is at most a zero-sum game before fees, but definitely not after fees. Consequently,
over the recent years, we have witnessed a massive inflow of funds into index investing. These
observations naturally drive us to question the value of active management.
According to the logic of Sharpe (1991)’s active management arithmetic, active investing is doomed
in aggregate, as French (2008) puts it. However, to escape this seemingly irrefutable conclusion,
Sharpe (1991) leaves a back door open by pointing out three potential flaws in his theory. First,
passive managers might not be truly passive. Second, there might be substantial differences among
active managers.1 Third, the summary statistics of active managers might not truly represent the
performance of the actively managed dollar. In our analysis, we shed light on these three potential
pitfalls by first applying a factor analysis not only on active but also on index fund. Second, we
account for the heterogeneity of active asset managers by differentiating between institutional and
1For example, Garleanu and Pedersen (2018) consider a model where managers with larger and more sophisticated
investors are expected to outperform. Their theoretical model is supported, e.g., by the findings of Gerakos et al.
(2016), who show that institutional investors outperform their strategy benchmarks after fees. Their analysis is based
on self-reported but GIPS (Global Investment Performance Standard) compliant data, which still may inherit some
biases, while our analysis is based on publicly available performance data. In addition, Pastor et al. (2015) argue
that the higher competitions in big active mutual fund industries decrease the fund’s ability to outperform passive
benchmarks.
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retail funds, equity and fixed income funds, geographical regions, and investment categories. Lastly,
we analyze the value-weighted performance before and after fees, and we benchmark against multi-
factor models and investable indexes. For this extensive study, we include 61,269 equity and fixed
income funds that held USD 17.8 trillion assets under management by the end of 2016, thereby
substantially increasing the power of our tests.2
Since our preliminary data analysis indicates that there are both serial and cross-sectional de-
pendencies in our fund data, we have developed a robust test for the manager’s alpha, defined as
the excess return relative to an appropriate benchmark. Our test is robust in the sense that it takes
into account potential serial dependence in mutual fund returns.3 We can then use these robust test
statistics for the alphas as input for the appropriate multiple hypothesis adjustments.
As Berk and van Binsbergen (2017) convincingly argue, there is no unique way to measure per-
formance: it depends on the research question. If we want to assess the rationality of fund investors
and the degree of competition in different markets, then the appropriate measure is the fund’s net
alpha. If, however, we want to measure the manager’s skill, then the appropriate measure is the
value-weighted gross alpha, or if we want to test whether active and index investing is a zero-sum
game after costs, then we must use the value-weighted net alpha. Unlike most of the previous stud-
ies, which prominently focus on active US mutual funds without differentiating between retail and
institutional funds, we use the richness of our dataset to explore the performance of active funds from
many different perspectives.4
The choice of benchmark is just as critical as the measurement of performance. Typically, re-
searchers use a well established multi-factor model to proxy for the alternative opportunity set avail-
able to investors. However, multi-factor models include long–short portfolios with often very high
turnover, generating considerable transaction costs. Furthermore, also as argued by Berk and van
2Of these funds, 56,136 are actively managed, and 5,133 are index funds.
3In a simulation study, we find that the conventional inference techniques are liberal in rejecting the null hypothesis,
while we observe still liberal but accurate empirical rejection probabilities for our robust alpha test based on block
resampling. Other papers that conduct bootstrapped inference, such as Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French
(2010), sample one-period returns and, therefore, lose any information about the potential dependence over time.
Hence, the simulation results convince us that our statistical framework is the appropriate choice to carry out our
research task.
4Recently, Ferreira et al. (2013) analyze the performance of 16,316 open-end actively managed equity funds in 27
countries from 1997 to 2007. They find that equity mutual funds around the globe, in general, underperform. Banegas
et al. (2013) focus on 4,200 European equity mutual funds and find that European equity funds outperform the market.
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Binsbergen (2017), we might have a situation in which we are measuring the performance of a fund
at a time when the fund manager would not have known about some factors, as they were identified
only much later.
Nevertheless, Fama and French (2010) argue that benchmarking against multi-factor models leads
to the same conclusions as benchmarking against index funds, because the value-weighted portfolio of
index funds exhibits close to zero alphas. Although we agree with their arguments for the US equity
market, our single fund analysis reveals that many index funds also exhibit negative alphas relative
to a multi-factor benchmark, depending on the asset class and the market. Also, there is no general
agreement on the factors that should be included in a benchmark, leading to a severe selection bias.
Therefore, to measure fund performance, we abandon multi-factor models as a benchmark in favor
of suitably defined investable benchmarks, which allow a fair comparison of active and index funds.
Of course, we still need multi-factor models to understand the potentially different risk and style
exposures of active and index funds.
Under the assumption that index investors try to replicate the market portfolio and believe in the
efficient market hypothesis, we compare the average dollar weighted return of active investors that
build an opinion with the average dollar weighted return of an investor who has no opinion about the
securities within a certain investment category.5 Using such an approach, we also take into account
the costs of replicating the market portfolio that arise due to management fees, transaction costs,
and we also guarantee that factors with a low market capitalization receive a lower weight.
In our preliminary analysis, we find significant evidence for serial and cross-sectional dependence
in our mutual fund data. Therefore, we use a statistical framework with two key elements. First,
we develop a robust statistical test for the mutual funds’ alpha, which takes into account serial
dependence. Second, we use these test statistics as input for the multiple hypothesis testing methods
of Barras et al. (2010) and Romano and Wolf (2016), which are robust to the presence of (mild)
cross-sectional dependence. In a simulation study, we find that the standard inference techniques are
liberal in rejecting the null hypothesis, while we find accurate empirical rejection probabilities for
5Similarly, Fama and French (2010) use such an equilibrium accounting perspective to argue that the actively
managed mutual fund industry does not cover the costs they impose on investors. However, they only concentrate on
one portfolio, formed by value-weighting the funds in the “Active US Equity” category, and compare it to the market
portfolio.
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our block resampling based alpha test. Other papers that conduct bootstrapped inference, such as
Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010), sample one-period returns and, therefore, lose
any information on the potential serial dependence; nor do they allow for multiple hypotheses.6
When applying our robust multiple hypothesis alpha test to single funds against multi-factor
benchmarks, we find that a large fraction of active equity mutual funds deliver negative alphas
after fees. Therefore, we provide international evidence for the results of Fama and French (2010).7
Surprisingly, however, when we apply the same tests to index funds, we find that they also show
negative alphas after costs. While most of the literature concentrates on the equity market, we also
conduct a multi-factor analysis of the fixed income mutual funds. In contrast to the equity market,
we find that there is a substantial portion of active USD fixed income funds with a positive alpha.
Given that we observe substantially negative alphas for index funds in both the equity and fixed
income markets, we question the plausibility of using multi-factor benchmarks.8 Therefore, in a
further step, we analyze the net alphas of single active funds against investable benchmarks. We
find that most of the active funds exhibit zero alpha. While for institutional equity funds in the
US, we find a negligible proportion of negative-alpha funds, this proportion is higher for retail equity
funds. Again, we observe a large fraction of index funds with negative alphas under an investable
benchmark. We suspect that this negative performance may be caused by the negative performance
of small funds.
Since Berk and Green (2004) argue that fund size is a crucial element in the analysis of fund
performance, we value-weight the alpha of active funds within the Morningstar investment categories.
The multiple hypothesis test of Barras et al. (2010) cannot be applied to value-weighted alphas.
Therefore, we switch to the method of Romano and Wolf (2016). We find that there are significant
negative alphas after cost for the institutional “US Equity Large Cap Blend” and retail “Canada Fixed
Income” categories. This finding corroborates the conclusion of Fama and French (2010) for these
specific investment categories. However, for all of the other categories, our results support Berk and
6The Matlab code of the robust statistical framework for the alpha is available from the authors on request.
7In particular, we find the highest proportion of funds with positive alphas against the multi-factor benchmark for
institutional investors to be in Europe and Japan, which confirms the findings of Banegas et al. (2013).
8Index funds should have zero alpha on average if the multi-factor benchmark were appropriate. Of course, there
is still an on-going debate about which multi-factor model best describes the investment opportunity set. For our
analysis, we relied on the most common models.
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Green (2004) and Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) in that we cannot reject the hypothesis that it
is a zero-sum game after costs.9 Furthermore, we see periods in which the average active managers
underperform the index alternatives, such as, before the dot-com bubble burst, during the financial
crisis, or in the very recent period from 2014 to 2016. However, we can also observe periods in which
active managers, on average, outperform, such as, from 2000 to 2007 or from 2009 to 2014.
Analyzing the drivers of the difference in the performance of active and index funds, we find that
the equity and fixed income active managers have less exposure to traditional risk factors such as
market and duration risk. Instead, active equity funds have a small cap and growth stock bias and
active fixed income funds load on credit risk. Surprisingly, when the market is affected by unexpected
volatility shocks, active management tends to underperform the average index investor. In periods
of calm markets and when the implied volatility decreases, active managers tend to outperform.
We explain this finding as being due to active managers who prefer to sell insurance and generate
exposures to risk premia that perform well in good times but may cause substantial losses in bad
times. The significant higher exposure to small cap companies for equity and credit risk for fixed
income managers supports this hypothesis.10
Our data also allows us to shed light on the difference between retail and institutional funds. We
find that after fees, there are a majority of unskilled mutual funds for the retail segment. In contrast,
we see a more balanced proportion of skilled and unskilled funds for the institutional sectors and
outside of the US. Thus, our results provide direct evidence for Garleanu and Pedersen (2018), who
argue that more sophisticated investors outperform small investors because of the higher economies
of scale in searching for skilled active managers.11 Moreover, our results endorse the hypothesis of
Gennaioli et al. (2015), who claim that trust is an essential component of the high fees in asset
9Furthermore, our findings resonate well with Pastor et al. (2015), who argue that in markets in which the mutual
fund industry is big, such as the “US Equity Large Cap Blend,” active alphas tend to be negative, and the equal-weighted
alpha within investment categories exceeds the value-weighted alpha.
10Agarwal and Naik (2004) find similar return patterns for hedge funds. Thus, mutual funds try to profit from the
same opportunities as hedge funds but have of course a narrower set of investment opportunities, due to regulatory
restrictions. However, our results seem to contradict some of the previous findings, such as those of Moskowitz (2000)
and Kosowski (2011), among others. They find that actively managed mutual funds tend to perform better than their
passive benchmarks in bad times. However, these papers do not cover the recent financial crisis.
11Also, our empirical analysis supports the findings of Gerakos et al. (2016), who show that institutional investors
outperform their strategy benchmarks after fees. Their analysis is based on self-reported but GIPS (Global Investment
Performance Standard) compliant data, which still may inherit some biases, while our analysis is based on publicly
available performance data.
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management, and who argue that active retail managers profit from pandering to trusting investors
by buying hot assets, which explains the tendency for active retail mutual funds to have positive
exposure to growth stocks.
We further demonstrate, along the lines of Carhart (1997), that the average active retail investor
can significantly improve their performance over the period ranging from 1993 to 2016, provided the
worst-performing active mutual funds of the past year are neglected. However, when the investor
concentrates only on the top performing funds, the overall performance cannot be significantly im-
proved. In addition, we explore the role of fund size and fees on fund performance. Sorting active fund
portfolios according to their performance persistence, fees, and size, we find that winner portfolios
with low-fee and small funds tend to outperform but their alpha does not survive our test statistics.
However, for both equity and fixed income retail funds, we find that a fund investor is well advised
to avoid high-fee and small losers, as they generate significantly negative alphas.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and performs a
preliminary analysis, which motivates the design of our empirical tests. Section 3 presents our robust
alpha test and the multiple hypothesis framework. In Section 4, we first compare the performance
of single index and active mutual funds when benchmarked against factor models and an investable
index. In Section 5, we provide a comparison of the value-weighted performance of active and index
mutual funds portfolios across investment categories and asset classes. We analyze the drivers of
the difference in the performance of active and index funds, and we explore the role of performance
persistence, fund size, and fees. Section 6 concludes.12
2 Preliminary analysis
After describing our data, we analyze the potential time and cross-sectional dependencies in mutual
fund returns to guide the formulation of appropriate test statistics for our hypotheses.
12All Matlab code used in this paper is available from the authors on request.
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2.1 Data
Our mutual fund sample is drawn from the Morningstar database and ranges from December 1991 to
December 2016. We include a total of 61,269 funds from different asset classes.13 Table 1 shows the
summary statistics of cross-sectional monthly attributes across asset classes. For the active funds,
we analyze in all 14,969 institutional and 46,300 retail funds, while we have 56,136 active and 5,133
index funds. In general, there are fewer index funds, but they show higher average total net assets
(TNA) and net returns, and also lower fees and about the same average years in the database. As
expected, the institutional funds charge lower fees than their retail counterparts.
[Table 1 about here.]
As of December 2016, the total net assets of equity retail funds amounted to USD 9 trillion, those
of fixed income retail funds to USD 3.7 trillion, and those of equity institutional funds and fixed
income institutional fund to USD 3.1 trillion and USD 2 trillion, respectively. Since institutional
investors often invest their money through mandates, there are fewer institutional funds than retail
funds. The assets under management for index funds have been steadily increasing over our sample
period. By the end of 2016, we find the highest concentration of index funds for equity funds, with
28% for retail and 32% for institutional funds. Looking at the fixed income funds, we find 18% of
the retail and 13% of the institutional funds were index funds. For a more detailed description of the
data and the data cleaning procedures, we refer to Appendix A.
2.2 Dependency analysis
It is well known that statistical inference for econometric models is severely complicated by the ex-
istence of serial and cross-sectional dependencies. Fama and French (2010) find that cross-sectional
dependence can materially change the inference and, therefore, propose an appropriate adjustment
for their single fund analysis.14 At the same time, they correctly point to a potential caveat in
13In comparison, Pastor et al. (2015) explore 3,126 actively managed US equity-only mutual funds while Berk and van
Binsbergen (2015) use 5,974 actively managed funds. Hence, we add to the existing literature by providing evidence
based on our new dataset. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply a robust multiple
hypothesis framework to active and index mutual funds in an international context.
14See also Chen et al. (2017).
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their resampling approach. Because they perform a random sampling of months, they lose any
effects of autocorrelation. Similarly, neither does Barras et al. (2010) take into account serial depen-
dence, claiming that they find such an effect only for a few mutual funds.15 Moreover, while high
cross-sectional dependencies could potentially bias their estimators, they find a low average pairwise
correlation of 0.08 in their sample and argue that the cross-sectional dependencies are sufficiently
low to allow consistent estimators. Given that we analyze not only the returns of single funds as in
Barras et al. (2010) and Fama and French (2010) but also of mutual fund portfolios, and compare
them against multi-factor and investable benchmark models, we must test for time dependence in a
variety of settings. Therefore, we take a closer look at our data.
To compare active and index investing, we construct two types of different benchmark models.
First, we apply the commonly used multi-factor models. In particular, for the equity analysis, we use
the regional five-factor model with “market,” “size,” and “value” factors as given in Fama and French
(1992) and add the “momentum” factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) as well as the “betting
against beta” factor of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014).16 For the fixed income analysis, we apply a
four-factor regional model including the “shift,” “twist” and “butterfly” factors, as well as MSCI Inc.’s
credit risk factor, measured as the BBB–AAA spread.17 Second, we focus on the investable one-
factor benchmark model, which we build as the value-weighted return of the index funds within the
investment category of the analyzed time-series.18
We first test for serial dependence, applying the classical Ljung–Box (LJ) test and, as a robustness
check, the distribution-free test of Genest and Rémillard (2004).19 For both tests we must fix the
number of lags L, for which we use the automatic block-length selection for the dependent bootstrap
of Politis and White (2004) and the correction of Patton et al. (2009). We find that most mutual
funds show an optimal block size of two or three. Therefore, we set the lag L to three for the two
15However, recently, Zhang and Yan (2018) find that the standard bootstrap can be misleading.
16The regional factors were retrieved from the homepage of Kenneth French, while the “betting against beta” factor
is provided for each region on the homepage of AQR.
17The factors “shift,” “twist,” and “butterfly” represent the risk for a change in the level, steepness, and curvature of
the term structure. See DeMond et al. (2012) for a description of the factors.
18For the investable one-factor model, we require at least 12 monthly returns and for the multi-factor models at least
36 monthly returns.
19Much criticism has been leveled at the possible low power of the LJ test. The LJ test is based on autocorrelations
and, hence, it is not a real test of independence. The test developed by Genest and Rémillard (2004) uses ranks and,
therefore, is distribution-free and does not depend on the underlying distribution of the observations.
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tests.
[Table 2 about here.]
Table 2, Panel A, presents the number and percentage of funds that have a p-value below 5% based
on the standard LJ test and the test of Genest and Rémillard (2004). Both tests provide us with a
similar pattern. We find that for single equity funds, the percentage of rejected null hypotheses of no
serial dependence over time ranges from 14% to 23%, with a slightly higher rejection rate for retail
funds. Similarly, the percentage of fixed income funds rejecting the null ranges between 12% and 22%.
For fund portfolios, the rejection rates can even be as large as 80%, although the number of portfolios
is rather small and, hence, the results have to be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, it becomes
clear that single fund and portfolio residuals are not serially independent. Furthermore, when we go
into more detail, we find that the single mutual funds with the longest available time-series show a
higher percentage of rejections. For example, the 2% oldest equity and fixed income single mutual
funds, benchmarked against the investable model, exhibit statistically significant serial dependence
in 40% and 63% of the cases.20 Overall, signs of serial dependence can be found in roughly every fifth
single mutual fund, and every third mutual fund portfolio. This evidence clearly justifies the need to
control for dependence over time when we analyze the alpha of single and portfolios of mutual funds
against different benchmark models.
We next test for cross-sectional dependence, which might occur if mutual funds “herd” in their
holdings, as is shown by Wermers (1999). To detect cross-sectional dependence in our data, we apply
the test of Pesaran (2004).21 To compute the test statistic, we concentrate on funds that have more
than one time period in common. Panel B of Table 2 presents the average pairwise correlation of the
residuals together with the p-values of the Pesaran (2004) test. We find that we can reject the null
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence at the one percent significance level for all single and
portfolio fund categories.
When we compute the average pairwise correlation in our single fund sample, we find the same
20We do not report these more detailed results here, but they can be obtained from the authors.
21Compared to the well-known Lagrange multiplier test of Breusch and Pagan (1980), this test is correctly centered
for a large sample and comparably short time-series, which is precisely the case here, since we have a broad cross-section
of mutual funds but a comparably small time-series. Also, Pesaran (2004) finds that the test has satisfactory power
even under weak cross-sectional dependence.
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value for our US equity fund sample as Barras et al. (2010), i.e., an average of 0.08. For the single
mutual funds with the investable benchmark models, we find average correlations between 0.04 for
retail equity and 0.15 for institutional fixed income funds. For the multi-factor benchmarks, the
correlation turns out to be considerably higher: 0.22 for retail equity funds and 0.62 for retail fixed
income funds. On the portfolio level, we find average pairwise correlations of 0.13, 0.09, and 0.43 for
the investment categories, equity, and the fixed income mutual fund portfolio, respectively. Although
Barras et al. (2010) are not overly concerned with cross-sectional dependencies, we cannot merely use
their reasoning given the elevated levels of average pairwise correlation, especially for fixed income
funds.
3 Robust alpha test and multiple hypotheses
The above empirical evidence dictates that statistical tests must take into account both serial and
cross-sectional dependence. To control for serial dependence, we propose a robust alpha test based on
a studentized block bootstrap, which improves the accuracy of an inference for dependent time-series
data compared to other methods.22 To compute the bootstrapped t-statistics and p-values we closely
follow Ledoit and Wolf (2008, 2011), who study the related problem of testing whether two Sharpe
ratios or two variances are equal. We outline the mathematical details of the bootstrapped standard
error of the estimated alpha in Appendix B. Once we have calculated the bootstrapped t-statistics and
p-values in Equations (B.12) and (B.13), we can use them as input for multiple hypothesis testing.
While we control for serial dependence for the single-hypothesis alpha test, we control for cross-
sectional dependence for the multiple-hypothesis method. Depending on whether we analyze single
funds or portfolios of funds, we control either the false discovery rate (FDR) or the family-wise error
rate (FWER).23 As Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) argue, investors do not rely on a single active
manager but instead diversify between different managers. Therefore, in their view, it is favorable
to control the amount of falsely rejected hypotheses (FDR) instead of investing only in the best
22See, e.g., Lahiri (2003), Haerdle et al. (2003), and Ledoit and Wolf (2008, 2011).
23The FWER dates back to Bonferroni (1936), and is defined as the probability of at least one false discovery.
Romano and Wolf (2005a,b) introduce a stepwise multiple testing procedure that not only has higher statistical power
than the tests of Bonferroni (1936) and Holm (1979) but also allows for cross-sectional dependence. The FDR is defined
as the expectation of the proportion of falsely rejected null hypotheses. For a larger number of hypotheses, Benjamini
and Hochberg (1995) and Benjamini and Yekutieli (2001) show that it is favorable to control for the FDR.
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strategies, as is the case when controlling the more conservative FWER. This diversification argument
of Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) no longer holds for portfolios of funds. Therefore, we control for
the FDR when analyzing single funds and for the FWER when analyzing portfolios of funds.
For the FDR, we rely on the approach of Barras et al. (2010). A strength of their approach is
that it regards each fund in isolation. However, this advantage comes at the cost that a high cross-
sectional dependence could potentially bias their estimators. Thus, we conduct a set of Monte Carlo
simulations for the multi-factor model in the fixed income market, where the findings in Panel B of
Table 2 have indicated a high degree of cross-sectional dependence. In unreported results, we find
that the average estimates are less stable but still close to the estimates where we assume independent
residuals.24 Therefore, we are confident that, for our application, we have consistent estimators also
for the markets with a higher degree of herding. However, we must be aware that for the single fixed
income market outside of the US, we have a higher estimation error.
While for the analysis of single funds, we have a large number of hypotheses, we only have a few
hypotheses for the analysis of portfolios of mutual funds. Hence, we prefer to control for the FWER,
applying the state of the art multiple hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2016), which
provides an efficient way to calculate the adjusted p-values. Since for the fund portfolios we have
no missing values or disconnected time-series, as is the case for single funds, we can jointly sample
blocks of fund and benchmark returns, thereby taking fully into account cross-sectional dependence.
As for the FDR, we sample the test statistics with our robust alpha test, which allows us to take into
account the serial dependence structure.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 summarizes the motivation for our estimation strategy. Our test based on the block
bootstrapped alpha is, in combination with the FDR (for single funds) and the FWER (for fund
portfolios), a suitable method taking into account both serial and cross-sectional dependence simul-
taneously, as evidenced by our preliminary analysis. Also, both frameworks take into account the
characteristics of the data. For the single fund analysis with a large cross-section and a small overlap
of the time-series, we regard each fund in isolation and therefore prefer to control the FDR. For the
24These results can be obtained from the authors.
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portfolio analysis with a small cross-section and fully connected time-series, we focus on the more
restrictive FWER and jointly block bootstrap the entire data sample. To explore the accuracy of our
test, we present the results of a simulation exercise in Appendix C. We find that our robust alpha test
is still liberal but more accurate since it also corrects for the serial dependence observed in the data.
The standard inference tests are too liberal in rejecting the null hypothesis. Thus, when we apply the
standard tests or sample only one return each time instead of a block of returns, we generate more
type I errors (false positive findings) than expected by the test.25
4 Single mutual funds
We first analyze the distribution of the single fund alphas measured against the regional multi-factor
benchmark models. While such a comparison is not suited to identifying skilled managers, it gives
us an idea about the risk drivers and style exposures of the different funds. Later, we compare the
single funds’ alphas benchmarked against an investable index.
4.1 Multi-factor benchmark
For equity funds, the five-factor model is used as the multi-factor benchmark. It is based on the
three-factor model of Fama and French (1992) but includes the “momentum” and “betting against
beta” factors. For fixed income funds, we rely on MSCI’s four-factor model with the corresponding
regional factor returns. As the first step, we calculate our robust alpha, where for each individual
fund, we apply the optimal block size with the method of Politis and White (2004) and Patton et al.
(2009).26 For the multiple-hypothesis adjustment, we control for the FDR using Barras et al. (2010)
and compute the proportion of negative, zero, and positive alphas after fees. It is important to
emphasize that we equal-weight each fund, since the method of Barras et al. (2010) regards each fund
in isolation and does not allow value-weighted adjustments. Table 4 reports the results.
[Table 4 about here.]
25We also note that even if there is no serial dependence, our block-bootstrapped alpha test statistic is accurate.
26For robustness, we also applied a block size of six, which yields the same results.
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For equity funds, we find that the proportion of active funds with zero alpha is 62.3% for retail
and 77.4% for institutional funds. As expected, the proportion of zero alpha funds for index investors
is higher, at 68.4% for retail and 79.5% for institutional funds. We also find that the percentage of
funds with a significantly positive alpha is the highest for active institutional funds, 3.5%, while for
all the other categories there are between 1.4% and 1.9% single mutual funds with a positive alpha.
The proportion of funds with a negative alpha is the highest for active retail funds, 35.9%, while
active institutional funds have 19.1% of their managers generating a negative alpha. Surprisingly,
we also find that 29.7% of the retail and 19.1% of the institutional index funds provide a negative
alpha. At the same time, we observe 19.1% of the institutional active funds with a negative alpha.
Hence, for institutional funds, we put both active and index managers at a similar disadvantage by
using a multi-factor benchmark if we were to interpret the resulting alpha as skill. Moreover, for the
US market, there are more institutional index funds (33.1%) than institutional active funds (30.7%)
having a negative alpha.
Focusing on US institutional active equity funds, we find that our 69.3% zero funds compares
well with the 75.4% of Barras et al. (2010, Table II). At the same time, we have a higher fraction
of negative alpha funds, 30.7% against their 24%. Considering the impact of luck in the left tail,
however, the proportion of significantly negative alphas (FDR 10 alpha < 0) drops to 3%, which is
considerably smaller than their 13.6%. Interestingly, the proportion of significantly negative alphas
for index funds only drops to 17.2%. From this perspective, index funds seem to perform even worse
than active funds, when benchmarked against a multi-factor model.
For fixed income funds, we observe that for retail active funds, there is an equal number of negative
and positive alphas (around 16%), while for retail index funds we find a smaller fraction of negative
alpha funds in favor of a higher fraction of zero alpha funds. For institutional funds, we find more
positive than negative alpha funds. Hence, as with equity funds, retail funds seem to perform worse
than institutional funds if benchmarked against multi-factor models. For the regions outside the US,
we do not find active funds in the fixed income universe with a negative alpha. For the US, the shares
of negative, zero, and positive alphas are of similar magnitudes.
While these comparisons are informative about the style and risk exposure of the different funds,
they neither represent manager skill since the alphas are not value-weighted, nor do they provide
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useful information for return-chasing fund investors since multi-factor models provide only an unfair
benchmark.27 The inappropriateness of multi-factor benchmarks for performance measurement be-
comes most evident from the observed negative alphas of the index funds. If multi-factor benchmarks
were fair, then index funds should have zero alpha on average.
4.2 Investable benchmark
Given the above concerns, we next construct investable benchmarks based on Morningstar’s invest-
ment categories. We rely on these categories as they are well established in the industry, and their
definition perfectly serves our intention to benchmark active funds.28 To construct an investable
benchmark, we value-weight all index funds within a given category. By value-weighting the index
funds in each category, we obtain the investable benchmarks which we use for calculating the alphas
of active funds. To make the analysis comparable to the previous section, we only include those
Morningstar’s investment categories that include the investment regions US, Global, Europe, Japan,
and Asia ex-Japan for the equity funds. For the fixed income market, we include the categories in
US dollar US, Swiss Franc CHF, Europe EU, and Sterling GBP. We first calculate the p-values from
our robust alpha test, after fees and with active funds benchmarked against the corresponding value-
weighted category index. We then compute the estimated percentage of negative, zero, and positive
alpha funds using the method developed by Barras et al. (2010).
[Table 5 about here.]
Table 5 shows the results using the same categorization as in Table 4. Strikingly, we find much
higher averages of zero alpha active funds for both retail and institutional funds. In particular, for
the US and the Global categories, the difference is substantial. For instance, with an investable index
as benchmark, the fraction of zero alpha active US institutional funds rises from 69.3% to 80.1% and
the proportion of significant negative alphas decreases from 25.3% to 0.2%. At the same time, the
27See, Berk and van Binsbergen (2015).
28We acknowledge that there are many routes to take for benchmarking fund portfolios. In practice, when investors or
active managers focus on a specific investment category, they do not compare themselves with the multi-factor models
in general, rather, they compare themselves with other funds within the same category. As Morningstar states on its
website, “the classifications were introduced in 1996 to help investors make meaningful comparisons between mutual
funds.” While the investment objective stated in a fund’s prospectus does not always reflect how the fund actually
invests, Morningstar places funds in a given category based on their portfolio statistics and securities holdings.
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proportion of significantly positive alpha funds remains at 0.0%. Hence, the large fractions of zero
alpha funds after fees support the equilibrium argument of Berk and Green (2004).29
What surprises us in Table 5 is the remarkably large fraction of index funds with a negative alpha,
especially in the US. The average of zero alpha index funds is below the average of zero alpha active
funds. This observation may be due to the fact that, so far, we have ignored fund size in our analysis,
since the framework of Barras et al. (2010) does not allow us to value-weight the funds’s alphas. Fund
size, however, is a crucial element in the argumentation of Berk and Green (2004). Therefore, we
now analyze the funds’ performance while taking into account fund size.
5 Value-weighted portfolios of mutual funds
As Berk and Green (2004) argue, funds managed by skilled managers attract greater portfolio flows
than funds managed by unskilled managers. Hence, if we want to measure the skill of a fund manager,
or if we want to test whether active investing is a zero-sum game, we must measure performance on
a value-weighted basis and against an investable benchmark.30
5.1 Investable benchmark
For the performance analysis of fund portfolios, we focus again on the same investable benchmarks as
we used in Section 4.2. Since we require connected time-series for our multiple hypothesis adjustment,
we focus on the periods from 1993 to 2016 and 2000 to 2016, which allows us to include more
investment categories for the more recent time periods. Given that index mutual funds only emerged
recently, we observe for the period starting in 1993 at least one index fund for four institutional and
17 retail categories. For the more recent period starting in 2000, we obtain 30 investment categories
29Also, in Table 4, the proportion of active fixed income funds with significantly positive alphas is surprisingly high.
With the investable index as benchmark, these numbers turn out to be much more moderate, pointing at the potential
problem of defining appropriate multi-factor benchmarks. Hence, switching to an investable benchmark allows a much
more realistic assessment of actively managed funds.
30As an additional exercise, we also benchmarked our portfolios of funds against multi-factor models using the same
categorization as in the previous section. For active institutional US equity funds, our results show a significantly
negative alpha and, therefore, are in line with Fama and French (2010). However, except for active institutional Global
funds, all other active alphas are insignificant. In contrast, we find again some significantly negative alphas for index
funds. For fixed income funds, we find for active institutional funds a significantly positive alpha. Since we have argued
above that multi-factor benchmarks are not suitable for performance measurement, we do not report these results here.
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for the retail segment and 12 investment categories for the institutional segment. Hence, we end up
with 63 categories. By value-weighting the index funds in each category, we obtain the investable
benchmarks which we use for calculating the alphas of active funds.
[Figure 1 about here.]
In Figure 1, we plot the robust p-values against the net and gross alphas for each of the avail-
able investment categories. As argued in Section 3, we adjust the p-values for multiple hypothesis
testing using the method of Romano and Wolf (2016). After fees, we find the “US Equity Large Cap
Blend” category for institutional funds and the “Canada Fixed Income” category for retail funds to
significantly underperform the alternative of the value-weighted index funds for both periods. For
the negative alpha of the “Euro Fixed Income” retail category and the period from 1992 to 2016 we
also find a significant p-value. Hence, only for three investment categories can we reject the zero-sum
game hypothesis of Berk and Green (2004). Furthermore, our finding that “US Equity Large Cap
Blend” institutional funds underperform after fees is perfectly in line with the argument of Pastor
et al. (2015), in that higher competition in big active mutual fund industries leads to diminishing
returns to scale. Before fees, there are no investment categories with significantly negative alphas.
However, we find “US Fixed Income” from 1992 to 2016, and “Global Equity Large Cap,” “Emerg-
ing Markets Equity,” and “Europe Equity Large Cap” from 2000 to 2016 for institutional, and also
“Global Equity Large Cap” from 1992 to 2016 and “Global Equity” from 2000 to 2016 for retail funds
to significantly outperform the value-weighted index funds.31
In Figure 2, we show the cumulated aggregated alpha of active index funds over time.32 Equal
weighted, all investment categories for equity funds provide a positive alpha over time, even after fees.
Value weighted, the aggregated alphas remain positive before fees, but they are zero for institutional
funds and slightly negative for retail funds after fees. For the fixed income mutual funds, we find
that the value-weighted alpha across investment regions is positive for the equal and value-weighted
31We remark that the choice of a block size of three is a conservative choice. As a robustness check, when we apply
a block size of six or nine, the p-values increase slightly. The “Euro Fixed Income,” “Emerging Markets Equity,” and
“Europe Equity Large Cap” categories, which all exhibit a p-value just below 10% for the block size of three, start to
show insignificant p-values, further supporting the theory of a zero-sum game after fees.
32We first compute the value-weighted alpha within an investment category against the value-weighted benchmark
of the index funds and then aggregate the investment categories with equal and value-weights. We also split into retail
and institutional funds before and after fees. For the equity mutual funds, we find that active mutual funds provide a
superior alpha than index funds in every analysis before fees.
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aggregation of the investment categories. For the institutional funds after fees, we also observe
positive alphas over time. There are three major periods where active managers underperformed
their index counterpart: equity funds before the burst of the dot-com bubble, both equity and fixed
income funds in the financial crisis, and a slight underperformance in the recent past, especially after
fees.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The fact that the equal-weighted alpha across investment regions is higher than the value-weighted
alpha adds evidence to the theory of Pastor et al. (2015) in the sense that the higher competition
in big active mutual fund industries decrease the fund’s ability to outperform passive benchmarks.
For the fixed income mutual funds, however, we observe that both weightings lead to roughly the
same alpha over time. This pattern could indicate that the competition in the fixed income segment
remains low, regardless of fund size, due to the higher complexity of the product. In addition,
Garleanu and Pedersen (2018) argue that small investors tend to underperform because of their
higher search costs and fees, while large investors are expected to outperform after a certain size
because of their economies of scale and lower fees. For equity funds, we can confirm their theory.
We observe higher aggregated alphas for institutional funds after costs, but similar alphas for retail
equity managers before costs. Since retail funds can pool the investments of small investors, and
mutual funds often manage retail and institutional money in the same aggregated fund, we expect
this pattern. However, for fixed income funds, we find that retail funds achieve a much lower alpha
after fees than their institutional competitors.
What is surprising in Figure 2, however, is the existence of three major periods where active
managers underperformed their index counterparts: before the burst of the dot-com bubble, in the
financial crisis, and in the recent past. Since we would have expected that active management pays
in turbulent times, we will further explore this observation in the next section.
5.2 Drivers for the difference in performance of active and index funds
To gain further intuition about what drives a wedge between the performance of the average active
fund and that of the average index fund, we ask whether the multi-factor model of Section 4.1 provides
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some explanation for the difference in returns between the value-weighted portfolios of active and
index mutual funds. Alerted by our observation from Figure 2, we enrich our regressions with the
volatility index (VIX) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) as a fear gauge to proxy for
market uncertainty.33
Table 6 shows the results for both active equity and fixed income funds when measured against the
investable benchmark. Overall, the average values of R2 absorb a significant fraction of the variance
of the alpha before fees, in particular for fixed income funds and US institutional equity funds. For
the equity funds in Panel A, we observe that the gross alpha loads profoundly and significantly on
the SMB factor. Also, especially in the US, the performance difference loads negatively on the HML
factor. The exposure is more pronounced for retail funds. Institutional funds, in contrast, have a
much lower exposure to growth stocks. Overall, active funds seem to have a prominent small-cap
bias and favor growth over value stocks. Furthermore, they tend to load positively on the momentum
factor and negatively on the betting-against-beta factor.
[Table 6 about here.]
Concerning the VIX, we find that the difference in performance of active and index investing
shows a negative sensitivity to changes in the VIX, which is often statistically significant. At first
sight, this finding seems to run against our intuition, as we would expect active managers to use their
skill to anticipate sudden uncertainty shocks. However, active managers that protect their portfolio
against adverse shocks must pay an insurance premium in the long term. Such protection would
generate relative losses to the market return in good times. Therefore, our result suggests that active
managers prefer to run a short exposure to general market volatility, i.e., they tend to prefer small
gains by selling insurance.
In Table 6, Panel B, we see that fixed income managers have a negative exposure to the shift
factor. Consequently, they are less affected by rising interest rates. In exchange, they load on other
risk factors to compensate for the lower expected returns. In particular, they load significantly on
33We downloaded the time-series of the VIX index of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) from Bloomberg.
In unreported results, we find that a high level of proxied uncertainty, e.g., by earnings-per-share volatility or dispersion
of returns within a fund category, is in general favorable for the performance of actively managed funds. However,
these effects are not significant.
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the credit risk factor. As in Panel A for equity funds, fixed income managers also have a negative
exposure to changes in the VIX. Therefore, they lose money if the VIX increases sharply, as it did
during the latest financial crises, which also explains the large drop in the cumulative alpha in Figure
2 towards the end of 2008.
5.3 Persistence analysis
From an investor’s perspective, it may be disappointing that active fund investing is, by and large, a
zero-sum game after costs. How then can a fund investor do better and profit from actively managed
funds? An initial idea is provided by Carhart (1997). He finds that US equity mutual funds with a
substantial underperformance over the past year persist to underperform over the next year relative
to a multi-factor benchmark. In contrast to the outperformance of the best mutual funds, he cannot
explain the persistence in the worst mutual funds.34 Thus, it would be of interest to know whether
a fund investor is better-off if avoiding the losers of the past year.
To simulate the returns to an average active investor who trades according to this simple rule, we
build momentum portfolios of active funds as follows. Every year in December, we first sort the active
funds within each investment category based on their t-value for the value-weighted alpha measured
against the investable benchmark.35 Then, we invest in the value-weighted portfolio of the x% best
performing active funds and normalize the weights each month. We repeat the same exercise for
the x% worst performing funds. If one month there is no data for a particular fund, it disappears
from the portfolio. To aggregate the performance numbers of the different investment categories,
we value-weight the net returns by the total active assets.36 We assume that funds do not charge
transaction costs for incoming and outcoming investors.
[Table 7 about here.]
34Among others, Huij and Derwall (2008) find persistence in the US fixed income mutual funds market.
35To compute the alpha, we require at least ten of the twelve most recent monthly returns. When we sort by the
t-value for the alpha, we consider the market risk of the fund and look at both the relative performance and the
consistency of the relative performance against the benchmark.
36For x% we chose steps of 10% starting with all mutual funds to the best 10% mutual funds. We disregard data
points where we have less than ten active mutual funds, and to calculate the benchmark return for the alpha we must
have at least one index fund within the category for the past twelve months to start the out-of-sample backtest. For
some small investment categories, over the year the number of funds drops below ten. In this case, we apply the next
less restrictive filter.
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Table 7 presents the momentum portfolio returns when selecting the best performing (Panel A)
and the worst performing funds (Panel B). In Panel A, we find that the performance increases the
more we focus on the best performing funds. For equity funds, the alpha after fees climbs from −0.23%
(−0.60%) to a remarkable 0.62% (−0.02%) for institutional (retail) funds. For retail fixed income
funds, alpha increases from −0.75% to −0.40%, but decreases for institutional fixed income funds
from 0.26 to 0.16.37 However, all these results are statistically insignificant, as the robust p-values
remain high or even increase. Hence, after fees, even the best performing funds constitute a zero-sum
game for the fund investor. This absence of persistence supports the theoretical argument of Berk
and Green (2004) that persistence should not exist since new money flows into well-performing funds
and there are diseconomies of scale, or because successful funds capture excess returns by raising
fees.38
In Panel B of Table 7, we form portfolios by selecting the x% worst performing funds. We find
that the value-weighted performance decreases drastically. For instance, for institutional equity funds
it drops from -0.23% to -0.94%. However, only for retail funds does the negative performance of the
10% worst performing funds survive our robust alpha test adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing.
For equity retail funds, the performance drops to -1.39% at the 5% significance level and, for fixed
income retail funds, it drops to -0.84% at the 10% significance level. Hence, while Carhart (1997)
shows for US equity funds and under a multi-factor benchmark that the persistence is significant for
the worst performing funds, we can confirm this result only for retail equity and fixed income funds.
Investing in these funds, obviously, is not a zero-sum game after costs. For institutional funds, we
do not find such evidence. At the same time, Table 7 confirms Carhart (1997) in that we do not find
any unexplainable persistence in overperforming funds.
Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008) find a negative relation between alpha and size and a positive
relation with past return. Thus, on average, they find that future alpha is smaller for large funds
but past returns are associated with higher future alpha, and predictability exists. Recently, Elton
37Interestingly, for fixed income institutional funds, we observe substantially lower betas the more we exclude badly
performing funds from the portfolio, indicating that the best performing fixed income funds run a slightly different
exposure than their investable benchmark suggests.
38As an additional exercise, we also explored the persistence of gross alphas. In unreported results, we find that the
alphas increase substantially, but still they do not survive our statistical test, not even for the 10% best performing
funds.
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et al. (2012) show that alpha persistence does not disappear for larger funds. To explore the interplay
between size and predictability, we perform a bivariate sort on size and persistence.
[Table 8 about here.]
Table 8 presents the alphas after fees for the different portfolios sorted according to fund size and
the previous year’s performance. We find that, except for fixed income retail funds, small winner
funds perform better than their larger counterparts. They produce the highest alphas relative to
their investable benchmarks. However, this outperformance is statistically insignificant. At the same
time, we identify the small loser funds as the funds with the worst performance. For retail equity and
fixed income funds, the negative alphas of small (and medium) loser funds become even statistically
significant. Unsuccessful and small funds will continue to be unsuccessful, and they do so in a
statistically significant way, while large funds tend to underperform but not significantly so. These
findings resonate well with Berk and Green (2004)’s hypothesis that fund performance is inversely
related to size due to diseconomies of scale.
5.4 Impact of fees
For US equity funds, Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) find a puzzling underperformance of mutual
funds that charge higher fees. Their finding contradicts the argument of Habib and Johnsen (2016)
that higher fees act as a signal for the unobservable quality of the costly research by active managers.
However, higher fees can also be seen as a sure loss for investors, since they directly reduce the
portfolio return when the quality of the manager is unobservable. Thus, higher fees imply lower net
returns if the costly research of the active manager does not improve performance. To shed more light
on this debate, we explore the impact of fees by proceeding analogously to the persistence analysis
of the previous section.
[Table 9 about here.]
Using an investable benchmark, Table 9 presents the performance of active fund portfolios that
include the x% least expensive (Panel A) and the x% most expensive (Panel B) funds of the preceding
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year. In Panel A, the alpha against the investable benchmark increases for institutional equity funds
from −0.23% to 0.83% and from −0.60% (−0.75%) to 0.30% (−0.40%) for retail equity (fixed income)
funds. Hence, even the alpha of retail equity funds gets into positive territory if we exclude those
funds that charge the highest fees. Again, although a fund investor can improve the performance in
their fund portfolio by including only the least expensive funds, these improvements are statistically
insignificant. For institutional fixed income funds, the alpha first increases but then decreases for
the fund portfolio with the 20% and 10% lowest fees. Interestingly, the betas of these portfolios are
substantially below one.
Panel B of Table 9 shows the performance of the portfolios with the x% most expensive funds. If
the argument of Habib and Johnsen (2016) were valid and high fees were a signal of quality, we would
expect increasing alphas the more we filter out the cheaper funds. However, we observe the opposite.
The portfolios with the 10% most expensive funds perform poorly. For instance, the performance of
the portfolio of the 10% institutional equity funds drops to –1.14%, compared to the 10% cheapest
fund with an alpha of 0.83%. For equity retail funds, the underperformance of high-fee funds becomes
significant already when we look at the 90% most expensive funds. For the 10% most expensive retail
funds, we get a highly significant alpha of –2.83%, compared to the 10% least expensive retail funds
with an alpha of 0.30%. Hence, if we only consider the universe of the most expensive equity retail
funds, active investing definitely is no zero-sum game.
[Table 10 about here.]
Given the evidence that past winners and low fee funds generate a higher average alpha over time,
we next ask whether the same pattern emerges when we control for performance persistence and fees
simultaneously. Hence, we build nine portfolios that arise from the bivariate sort and the 30th and
70th percentiles for each criterion.39 Table 10 shows the results. All active alphas are positive for the
low-fee and winner portfolios except for the fixed income retail investor. Furthermore, for all sorted
portfolios, the alpha in the top right (low fee and winner) corner is always larger than the alpha in
the lower left (high fee and loser) corner. These alphas are insignificant, except for the equity retail
funds. Here, the high-fee and loser portfolio has a highly significant negative alpha. Overall, we find
39For some small investment categories, there are time periods where none of the mutual funds belong to a particular
group. In such a case, we invest in the value-weighted portfolio of all active funds within this category.
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that both high performance and low fees over the past year have a positive impact on the alpha in
the next year. The result is robust in the bivariate sort of the two criteria. Especially for retail funds,
an investor is well advised to avoid high-fee loser funds as the negative alphas are highly significant
under our testing framework.
[Figure 3 about here.]
To shed further light on which funds charge higher fees, Figure 3 shows the average active fees
of the highly competitive US equity market over time together with the relative share of index funds
in terms of assets under management. As expected, we find a substantial difference between the fees
charged by retail and institutional funds, depending on the fund’s age. Young retail funds charge the
highest fees. However, the size of their fees has drastically decreased since the recent financial crisis,
converging to the level of the fees charged by older retail funds. Interestingly, over the whole period,
young institutional funds have charged fees similar to their older competitors. The gap between
old retail and old institutional funds has been somewhat steady over the years, slightly narrowing
recently. We also find that expense ratios are lower for large funds.40 As Figure 3 suggests, over the
years, the level of fees for active funds has tended to decrease further. Thus, we find further evidence
for the zero-sum game hypothesis of Berk and Green (2004) in the sense that active managers start
to adjust their fees due to the unabated growth of index funds.
5.5 How different are the results without the robust alpha test?
In our preliminary analysis, we demonstrated that fund returns are serially dependent. Furthermore,
the simulation study in Appendix C indicated that our robust alpha test based block resampling is
still liberal, but closer to the nominal level of the test. Consequently, we expect that the additional
discoveries under the alternative test statistics are false positives. Still, it is natural to ask how our
test, applied to our fund data, compares to other tests if we ignore serial dependence, and whether it
would make a material difference to our empirical results.
40By the end of 2016, we find that the average expense ratio of the equal-weighted portfolio compared to the value-
weighted portfolio is 21% higher for institutional equity funds, 37% higher for retail equity funds, 17% higher for
institutional fixed-income funds, and 34% higher for retail fixed-income funds. Since institutional funds are usually
larger than retail funds, this gap is consistent with the finding of Elton et al. (2012) that expense ratios are lower for
larger funds.
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We find that for the analysis of a single fund’s performance compared to the investable benchmark,
and in the single hypothesis setting, our robust alpha test decreases the proportion of unskilled
(skilled) funds from 11.2% (5.4%) for the standard test to 9.0% (4.3%) at the 5% significance level.
Hence, using the robust block-sampling test decreases the proportion of nonzero-alpha funds by almost
20%, compared to the standard test. For the fund portfolios, the decrease is almost 31%.
[Table 11 about here.]
For multiple hypothesis testing using FDR for single mutual funds, the impact of using our
robust test is substantial. The decrease in nonzero-alpha funds when using our robust alpha test is
69% compared to the standard test and 60% compared to the standard resampling test at the 5%
significance level. At the 10% significance level, the proportion of unskilled funds drops from 7% to
3.8% and from 1.6% to 0.8%, which corresponds to a decrease of nonzero-alpha funds of roughly 50%.
Similarly, for the FWER applied to fund portfolios, we get a reduction of 27% when we use block
resampling to take into account serial dependence. These differences are substantial and represent
false discoveries due to the ignoring of serial dependence by the standard resampling. Admittedly, the
proportions of skilled and unskilled funds are small. However, for an investor selecting a specific fund
investment, discriminating between a skilled and unskilled fund or between fund portfolios with zero
and nonzero alphas is absolutely crucial. Using our test statistics, we adequately take into account two
prominent features of the data: serial and cross-sectional dependence. Thereby, we avoid potential
distortions in the test statistics.
6 Conclusion
Analyzing a rich dataset from Morningstar covering 61,269 mutual funds from different regions and
asset classes from 1992 to 2016 and comparing their returns to those from common multi-factor
models, we find that a large fraction of active equity managers show zero alphas after fees. However,
when we conduct a fair performance evaluation for equity and fixed income mutual funds, we find
significant negative alphas after fees only for the “US Equity Large Cap Blend” for institutional funds
and “Canada Fixed Income” for retail funds. For the vast majority of categories, we cannot reject
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the hypothesis that active investing constitutes a zero-sum game after costs. Indeed, we even find
categories such as “US Fixed Income” and “Global Equity Large Cap” for institutional investors with
significant p-values before fees.
At first glance one would expect active managers to invest more carefully and take fewer risks.
We have confirmed this hypothesis by the fact that active management takes a more conservative
position with respect to the traditional risk factors, such as market and duration risk. However,
we find that active equity and fixed income mutual funds are affected by adverse volatility shocks,
suggesting that active managers sell protection in order to collect the insurance premium. Also, we
find that, averaging over the different regions, the active investor has a higher sensitivity than index
funds to alternative risk premia such as small cap and credit risk.
Sorting active fund portfolios according to their performance persistence, fees, and size, we find
that low-fee winner portfolios and small winner portfolios tend to outperform but their alpha does not
survive our test statistics. These results give further support to the zero-sum game argument of Berk
and Green (2004). Our analysis also highlights some substantial differences between institutional and
retail funds. In particular, our empirical results suggest to active retail investors that they should
avoid avoid high-fee losers and small losers. Their alphas are negative and statistically significant,
surviving our robust test statistics adjusted for multiple hypotheses.
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A Description of the data
We summarize the steps for the data cleaning of the Morningstar database and provide summary
statistics for the different asset classes and investment categories.
A.1 Raw Morningstar data
Our mutual fund sample is from the Morningstar database.41 We focus on all funds with an Invest-
ment Type flagged by “Open-End Fund” or “Exchange-Traded Fund” including non-survivors from
December 1991 to December 2016. We downloaded the following fields for each share class.
For the description of a share class, we retrieved the Name, ISIN, and Base Currency. It is
common to name a share class starting with the name of the asset manager, followed by a description
of the strategy, and an ending for the share class. For example, for the equity fund “Blackrock S&P
500 Index,” there is a share class “Blackrock S&P 500 Index Institutional” for institutional and the
“Blackrock S&P 500 Index Investor A” for retail clients.
The most specific categorization in Morningstar is the Morningstar Category, which is derived
by analyzing the underlying portfolio holdings. In all, we find 504 different groups for the retail
equity and fixed income funds. The Global Category combines several Morningstar categories, and
we see a total of 68 groups for retail equity and fixed income funds. For example, the Global Category
category “Europe Equity Large Cap” includes Morningstar categories, such as “EAA Fund Europe
Large-Cap Blend Equity,” “EAA Fund Europe Large-Cap Value Equity,” “EAA Fund Europe Large-
Cap Growth Equity,” but also “US Fund Europe Stock” or “Canada Fund European Equity.” Since
we have within this broader categorization a higher chance of finding both index and equity funds, we
concentrate on the Global Category. The Global Broad Category Group further aggregates the Global
Category into the major asset classes. Since we focus on the comparison of active and index funds,
we concentrate on the Global Broad Category Group “Equity” and “Fixed Income” funds. We thereby
41Recent work in Kosowski et al. (2006); Fama and French (2010); Barras et al. (2010) concentrates mostly on the
survivor-bias-free CRSP US Mutual Fund Database. As shown by Elton (2001), the CRSP database also suffers from
a survivorship bias: the so-called omission bias. Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) find that neither the CRSP nor the
Morningstar database are free from errors. Thus, we must be careful, and we find the same errors as reported in this
previous paper.
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disregard categories such as “Allocation,” “Money Market,” or “Commodities” because for them there
are insufficiently many index funds to make a fair comparison.
For the computation of the returns, we downloaded the following fields for each fund: Monthly
Return USD, Monthly Gross Return USD, and Net Assets - share class (Monthly) USD. The Monthly
Return USD includes management, administrative, and other costs that are deducted from the NAV,
such as the 12b-1 fee. All income and capital gains are reinvested monthly. The Monthly Gross
Return USD is based on the Monthly Return USD and adds the most recent net expense ratio. The
Net Assets - share class (Monthly) USD is the monthly total net assets of a share class.
To distinguish between active and index funds, we make use of the Index Fund field. Those funds
that track a particular index based on full replication or based on a representative sampling are flagged
by Morningstar as index funds. Next, to filter the institutional and retail funds, we downloaded the
field Institutional, which defines any fund as institutional if it either says “institutional” in the name
of its share class, has a minimum investment above USD 100,000, or the prospectus says that it is
for institutional investors only.
A.2 Data cleaning
For each fund, we retrieved its monthly net return, gross return, and total net assets, all in US dollars.
We only included an observation if all three items were available. Often, and as reported in Berk and
van Binsbergen (2015), we observe that net assets are reported quarterly or are missing for a specific
month. In this case, we roll the assets under the assumptions of zero net flows, so as to increase
the available data points and avoid disconnected time-series. Besides, for some institutional mutual
funds, we observe zero fees because they are paid in separate contracts with the asset manager. Thus,
we only include funds where the sum of the gross returns is larger than the sum of the net returns to
exclude zero-fees funds. To avoid the incubation bias, we include funds only if they reach 5 million
December 2016 US dollars in AUM.
We also see conversion errors, where funds assets suddenly increase by a high factor and then
decrease again by a similar factor. First, we observe this behavior in emerging market currencies
before 1999. Thus, we concentrate in the period before 1999 only on the developed currencies, Pound
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Sterling, US Dollar, Euro, Singapore Dollar, Australian Dollar, Swedish Krona, South African Rand,
Swiss Franc, Japanese Yen, New Zealand Dollar, Canadian Dollar, Norwegian Krone, Danish Krone.
Also, we see that for some funds, the assets change by a factor higher than 100 and decrease in the
next period to the same level as before the outlier. For these cases, we smooth the net assets over
time if we see that the assets change by a factor higher than 10 and we decrease them in the next two
periods by a factor of more than 0.5. But there are funds where this increase is verified by attaining
the same fund levels in the future. Therefore, we only correct the assets if the same level is not
exceeded in its future assets.
We also delete obvious mistakes, such as when an index fund shows high fees in the past and
suddenly changes to a low fee. In this case, we keep only the low fee period, since we interpret this
as being that either the fees were not correct or the fund changed from active to index. When we
build the value-weighted portfolio for the investment categories, we also remove funds that show a
beta below 0.05 relative to the average return of all the funds within the same investment category.
Because of the low sensitivity to the average fund, these funds are not following a strategy similar to
that of the rest of the group.
A.3 Aggregation of the share classes
Each line in the Morningstar dataset corresponds to a share class. In all, we obtain 435,453 lines
of different share classes. Thus, we must aggregate the same share classes to avoid multiple tries
of investment strategies by the same provider. First, we tried to use the fields Administrator and
Ticker of Fund’s Oldest Share Class; however, they are often missing. For this reason, we aggregated
alphabetically subsequent mutual funds that are in the same Morningstar Category with the corre-
sponding Index Fund flag and have a similar name. While Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) use the
last word of the fund’s name for the share class, we use the ratio provided by the SequenceMatcher
of the diﬄib library in Python, which is based on the algorithm developed by Ratcliff and Metzener
(1988) and, additionally, cleans the “junk” elements. We define two names to be similar if this ratio
is above 0.8.
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A.4 Summary statistics of investment categories
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the cross-sectional monthly attributes across asset classes.
Table A.1 provides a more detailed view of all the investment categories, where we find both index
and active mutual funds. For the active funds, we analyze a total of 14,969 institutional and 46,300
retail funds, of which 56,136 are active funds and 5,133 are index funds. In general, there are fewer
index funds, but they have higher average total net assets (TNA) and net returns, and also lower fees
and about the same average number of years in the database. As expected, the institutional funds
charge lower fees than their retail counterparts.
[Table A.1 about here.]
B The robust alpha test
Consider a fund with time-t return yt and a set of K benchmark factor returns xtk, k = 1, ...,K. A
total of T returns are observed. We assume that these observations are generated by a stationary
multivariate return distribution with mean vector µ and covariance matrix Σ:
µ =

µy
µx1
...
µxK

and Σ =

σ2y σyx1 · · · σyxK
σx1y σ
2
x1 · · · σx1xK
...
...
. . .
...
σxKy σ
2
xKx1
· · · σ2xK

, (B.1)
with the observed means µˆ and sample covariance matrix Σˆ. By defining a vector µX = (0, E[x1], · · · , E[xK ])′,
we can express the fund’s alpha as
α = E[y]− µ′XΣ−1XXyX , (B.2)
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with
ΣXX =

1 E[x1] E[x2] · · · E[xK ]
E[x1] E[x
2
1] E[x1x2] · · · E[x1xK ]
...
...
. . .
...
E[xK ] E[xKx1] E[xKx2] · · · E[x2K ]

and yX =

E[y]
E[x1y]
...
E[xKy]

. (B.3)
Then, we test for the hypothesis
H0 : α = 0 against H1 : α 6= 0. (B.4)
Furthermore, we define ζk = E[yxk], γk = E[x2k], ξkj = E[xkxj ], j > k, and the combined vector
ν = (µy, · · · , µxk , · · · , ζk, · · · , γk, · · · , ξkj , · · · )′ ∈ R1+3k+k(k−1)/2 with sample counterpart νˆ. Now,
we can express the true alpha as a function f of ν:
α = E[y]− µ′XΣ−1XXyX = f(ν); (B.5)
and the estimated alpha as function of νˆ: αˆ = f(νˆ). As mentioned in Ledoit and Wolf (2008), under
mild regularity conditions,
√
T (νˆ − ν) d−→ N(0,Ψ), (B.6)
where Ψ is an unknown symmetric positive semi-definite matrix. By the delta method, we obtain
√
T (αˆ− α) d−→ N(0,O′f(ν)ΨOf(ν)) (B.7)
with
O′f(ν) =
(
∂f(v)
∂µy
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂µxk
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂ζk
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂γk
, · · · , ∂f(v)
∂ξkj
, · · ·
)
.′ (B.8)
Given a consistent estimator Ψˆ of Ψ, we can compute a standard error for αˆ by
s(αˆ) =
√
O′f(ν)ΨˆOf(ν)
T
. (B.9)
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To test the null hypothesis in Equation (B.4), we focus on the bootstrap inference for time-series
data outlined in Ledoit and Wolf (2008). In particular, we denote the optimal block length by b and
define l = floor(T/b). As shown in Kuensch and Goetze (1996), the bootstrapped estimator of Ψˆ∗ is
Ψˆ∗ =
1
l
l∑
j=1
ηjη
′
j , (B.10)
where
z∗t =
(
y∗t − µˆy∗, ..., x∗tk − µˆx∗, ..., ytxtk − ζˆ∗k , ..., x∗tk2 − γˆ∗k , ..., x∗tkx∗tj − ξˆkj , ...
)
,
ηj =
1√
b
b∑
t=1
z(j−1)b+t.
(B.11)
Next, the studentized statistics are
d˜∗m =
|αˆ∗m − αˆ|
s (αˆ∗m)
, (B.12)
and the p-value is
PV =
{d˜∗m ≥ dˆ}+ 1
M + 1
, (B.13)
where dˆ is the original studentized test statistic that was computed from the observed returns. We
use Newey–West standard errors to calculate the original standard errors. Regarding the optimal
block, we suggest using either the method of Politis and White (2004) and Patton et al. (2009) for
the univariate case, or the method of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) for the bivariate case. For our empirical
analysis, we would like to compare up to 30 different investment categories and, so far, there is no
available method to make this comparison. Consequently, we will further discuss the optimal block
size to use in our simulations in Appendix C.
C Accuracy of the robust alpha test
We now present the results of a simulation study to show the difference between our robust alpha test
and the standard hypothesis tests.42 For this purpose, we first simulate a single hypothesis setting.
42Other papers that extensively use bootstrap techniques often do not perform such a simulation study to validate
their approach.
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For realistic time-series, we select the first ten US mutual funds of the Morningstar database within
the category “US Equity Large Cap Blend” that offer the entire return history from 1992 to 2016
(T=300). As benchmark models, we focus on the one-factor “CAPM,” i.e., the market excess return,
the three-factor “FF3,” and the five-factor “FF5” model. For the data generating process (DGP), we
sample from the realized returns with a circular block bootstrap and block sizes of 1, 3, and 6. We
selected this grid of block sizes based on our analysis in Section 2, where we observe that most of
the optimal circular block sizes range from one to six. This grid corresponds to time periods of one,
three, and six months. The block sizes of three and six are the ones that take the evidence of serial
dependence from Section 2 into account. A block size of one generates independent data, and we
employ this block size only for reasons of comparison. For each fund, we simulate 1,000 paths and
set the alpha under the null hypothesis to the true observed alpha of the data. The bootstrapped
p-values (Boot) are then calculated as illustrated in Appendix B by employing M = 1,000 and the
optimal block size by the method of Politis and White (2004) and the correction of Patton et al.
(2009). We compare the robust p-values with those from the standard inference methods; that is,
based on the normal distribution (Standard), Newey–West (NW), and HC3 standard errors.
[Table C.1 about here.]
Table C.1 shows the empirical rejection probabilities of the falsely rejected null hypothesis com-
pared to the nominal levels α = 10%, α = 5%, and α = 1%. Because the null hypothesis is true
for all the simulations, the true rejection probabilities should be equal to the nominal levels of the
test. If a test shows a higher percentage of rejections, then we regard this test as too liberal. While
we observe that the standard inference tests based on the normal distribution, the Newey–West, and
HC3 standard errors are too liberal in rejecting the null hypothesis, the bootstrapped solution (Boot)
presented in the previous section is close to the nominal levels. We highlight in bold the empirical
rejection probabilities that are closest to the desired level. We observe the HC3 standard errors to
be in some cases closer to the desired level than are those of the block bootstrapped method, but
only in the case where we apply the standard but less realistic bootstrap with a block size of one
where we lose any dependence over time. However, as we demonstrate in Section 2, the optimal block
size, and thus a realistic assumption for the DGP is, in general, around three or six, for which our
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bootstrapped test is tailored to be more accurate.43
Since there is still the open question of the optimal block size in the multiple hypothesis setting
when controlling the FWER, as illustrated in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b, 2016), we conduct a second
simulations study. Unlike the single mutual fund analysis, where we regard each fund in isolation
and then apply the multiple hypothesis framework of Barras et al. (2010), in this case, we must
consider the cross-dependence structure, and jointly sample the funds and benchmark returns. For
this purpose, we focus on the 17 portfolios within the “Inv. Categories” setting from Section 2 with
the investable one-factor benchmark model that is based on the value-weighted return of index funds.
Also, instead of calculating the Type I Errors as in the single hypothesis setting, we compute the
empirical rejection probabilities based on the FWER, as illustrated in Romano and Wolf (2005a,b,
2016). To find the optimal block size that is closest to the nominal levels of the test, we focus on the
following grid of block sizes: 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12. Regarding the DGP, we keep the grid from our first
simulation study.
[Table C.2 about here.]
Table C.2 shows the empirical rejection probabilities based on the FWER. Likewise, for the
FWER, we find the bootstrapped robust alpha test to achieve the desired levels at optimal block
sizes three or six. Given that for a block size of three we observe accurate rejection probabilities,
in the multiple comparisons of portfolios, we will, in the remainder of the paper, present the results
based on the optimal block size of three. Finally, the more conservative block sizes six and nine are
applied for robustness checks.
43A similar observation was also made in Ledoit and Wolf (2008) for testing the Sharpe Ratio and in Ledoit and
Wolf (2011) for the variance.
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Figure 1: Value-weighted alpha of active mutual funds within investment categories
Multiple hypotheses adjusted p-value (y-axis) and annualized value-weighted alpha of active versus index
funds (x-axis) for all investment categories as defined by the “Global Category” of Morningstar. Top (bottom):
analysis after (before) management fees. We form the four groups with the combinations retail and institutional
as well as the periods 1992–2016 and 2000–2016.
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Figure 2: Aggregated value-weighted alpha of active minus index
Cumulated logarithmic alphas for the active equity (top) and fixed income (bottom) mutual funds. The alpha
is the value-weighted return of the active funds against the value-weighted return of the index funds within the
same investment category. The figure shows the aggregated alpha with equal-weights (EW) and value-weights
(VW) across the Morningstar investment categories. We analyze both institutional and retail funds. We also
regard the portfolios before (Gross) and after (Net) costs. We include all mutual funds within Morningstar
where net and gross returns and assets under management are available, and where we have at least one index
fund within the same investment category. The analysis is in US dollars.
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Figure 3: Active equity fees of young and old funds in the US
Average active fee over the last year (top) of US equity funds with a track record of more than five years (>5y)
and with a track record of at most one year (<1y), and the percentage of index funds (bottom) within all US
equity mutual funds. We distinguish between retail and institutional funds.
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Table 1: Mutual fund database summary statistics
Total number, average number (Avg Number), the average total net assets in million USD (Avg TNA), average
annual net return in USD (Avg Net Ret), average annual fee in USD (Avg Fees ann), and the average years of
a fund in the database (Avg Years) over the time period from December 1991 to December 2016 of all available
funds in the Morningstar database flagged by Open-End or Exchange-Traded funds. We only include funds
within the “Global Broad Category Group” equity (Equity) and fixed income (Fixed Income) for which we
provide the category statistics. The average corresponds to the mean of cross-sectional monthly attributes.
in USD Total Number Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Fees ann Avg Years
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index
Equity Inst. 8,488 691 2,506.1 199.5 255.3 910.0 8.85% 8.95% 0.86% 0.15% 7.4 7.2
Retail 26,741 3,551 9,147.8 950.6 453.6 732.2 8.16% 8.27% 1.18% 0.31% 8.6 6.7
Fixed Inst. 5,566 224 1,440.3 57.8 333.2 663.0 4.97% 5.19% 0.54% 0.19% 6.5 6.5
Income Retail 15,341 667 4,545.6 152.6 346.7 817.6 4.87% 5.20% 0.88% 0.25% 7.4 5.7
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Table 2: Dependence analysis
Results of dependence analysis. Panel A shows the total number of funds within each category and the
percentage of mutual funds with a significant serial dependence according to the Ljung–Box (LJ) and Genest
and Rémillard (2004) (GR) tests. For the latter, we use 1,000 simulations. Panel B shows the average
correlations (AvgCorr) and the p-values for the cross-sectional dependence test of Pesaran (2004). We analyze
the residuals of single mutual funds (Single) and portfolios of mutual funds (Portfolio), split into equity (Equity)
and fixed income (FixedInc) mutual funds. For the portfolio of mutual funds, we additionally analyze all 63
investment category portfolios (InvCat) from Figure 1. For the benchmark model, we use the investable one-
factor model with the value-weighted return of the index funds within the same category as the analyzed single
mutual fund or portfolio of mutual funds (Inv), the equity five-factor model (FF5) with the regional factors
“market,” “size,” and “value” of Fama and French (1992), and also “momentum” of Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993) and “betting against beta” of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), and the regional four-factor fixed income
model (FI4) with the “shift,” “twist” and “butterfly” factors, as well as the difference between the BBB and
AAA credit spread.
Panel A: Serial dependence
Single Portfolio
Equity FixedInc InvCat Equity FixedInc
Inv FF5 Inv FI4 Inv FF5 FI4
Retail Total 24,456 12,816 14,579 4,719 47 5 4
GR<5% 17% 20% 22% 16% 28% 60% 25%
LJ<5% 19% 23% 19% 18% 19% 80% 25%
Inst. Total 7,025 3,817 4,815 1,528 16 5 4
GR<5% 14% 15% 15% 18% 31% 0% 0%
LJ<5% 15% 18% 19% 21% 44% 20% 25%
Panel B: Cross-sectional dependence
Single Portfolio
Equity FixedInc InvCat Equity FixedInc
Inv FF5 Inv FI4 Inv FF5 FI4
Retail AvgCorr 0.04 0.22 0.11 0.62 0.14 0.11 0.44
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Inst. AvgCorr 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.60 0.12 0.06 0.41
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Table 3: Overview of the statistical methodology
Whether different statistical methodologies can cope with potential dependencies in the data, serial dependence
(Time) and cross-sectional dependence (Cross). To obtain the p-values needed for applying the two multiple-
hypothesis tests, the FDR of Barras et al. (2010) and the FWER of Romano and Wolf (2016), use either
the normal distribution (Standard), Newey–West (NW), HC3, the standard resampling (Robust-SR), or the
block resampling (Robust-BR) standard errors. For the NW standard errors we use the automatic bandwidth
selection procedure described in Newey and West (1994) based on the Bartlett kernel. The HC3 standard
errors are consistent even in the presence of heteroscedasticity of an unknown form. The last two columns
show what the data tells us concerning the dependencies for single funds and for the fund portfolios.
Dependence: Dependence:
Serial Cross-sectional Serial Cross-sectional
Methodology: FDR FWER Evidence/Data:
Standard: × X not applicable Single funds: X X
NW: X X not applicable Portfolios: X X
HC3: × X not applicable
Standard-RS: × X X
Block-RS: X X X
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Table 4: Single mutual equity and fixed income funds against multi-factor benchmark
Proportion (in percentages) of zero, positive, and negative alpha funds, and significant p-values based on the
FDR at the 10% significance level for funds with a positive and negative alpha. The alpha is after fees and
relative to a multi-factor benchmark and across the equity investment regions US, Global, Europe, Japan, and
Asia ex-Japan, as well as for the USD, CHF, EUR, and GBP fixed income markets. The results are based on
the method of Barras et al. (2010), while we apply our robust alpha test to compute the single mutual funds’
p-values. We show the results for the five-factor equity benchmark model based on the regional MKT, SMB,
HML, WML, and BAB factors. For the fixed income benchmark, we include the four local factors “shift,”
“twist,” and “butterfly,” as well as the AAA–BBB credit spread.
Panel A: Retail funds
Equity - 5 factors Fixed Income - 4 factors
US Global Europe Japan Asia Avg. USD CHF EUR GBP Avg.
A
ct
iv
e
Zero alpha 55.1 39.6 66.2 67.9 83.0 62.3 38.9 71.0 77.8 83.3 67.8
Positive alpha 0.0 0.0 3.0 5.7 0.0 1.7 23.3 3.3 22.2 16.7 16.4
Negative alpha 44.9 60.4 30.8 26.4 17.0 35.9 37.8 25.7 0.0 0.0 15.9
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.6
FDR 10 alpha<0 30.9 64.9 16.5 15.2 0.0 25.5 36.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 9.4
In
de
x
Zero alpha 61.9 30.1 76.5 73.7 100.0 68.4 41.6 93.3 71.6 100.0 76.6
Positive alpha 0.0 0.0 3.6 5.9 0.0 1.9 29.2 6.7 28.4 0.0 16.1
Negative alpha 38.1 69.9 19.9 20.4 0.0 29.7 29.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.3 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
FDR 10 alpha<0 25.3 79.6 0.0 6.6 0.0 22.3 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8
Panel B: Institutional funds
Equity - 5 factors Fixed Income - 4 factors
US Global Europe Japan Asia Avg. USD CHF EUR GBP Avg.
A
ct
iv
e
Zero alpha 69.3 53.5 78.5 88.2 97.4 77.4 38.5 77.4 60.1 82.7 64.7
Positive alpha 0.0 0.0 8.2 9.4 0.0 3.5 40.7 22.6 39.9 17.3 30.1
Negative alpha 30.7 46.5 13.3 2.4 2.6 19.1 20.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.2
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 10.6
FDR 10 alpha<0 3.0 38.0 0.6 0.5 0.0 8.4 18.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.5
In
de
x
Zero alpha 66.9 55.7 91.9 92.5 90.6 79.5 57.5 71.4 56.5 95.0 70.1
Positive alpha 0.0 0.0 6.8 0.0 0.0 1.4 21.3 26.2 43.5 0.0 22.7
Negative alpha 33.1 44.3 1.4 7.5 9.4 19.1 21.3 2.4 0.0 5.0 7.2
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
FDR 10 alpha<0 17.2 37.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.9 15.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.8
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Table 5: Single mutual equity and fixed income funds against investable benchmark
Proportion (in percentage numbers) of zero, positive, negative alpha funds, and significant p-values based on
the FDR at the 10% significance level for funds with a positive and negative alpha. The alpha is after fees
and relative to the investable value-weighted portfolio of index funds within the same Morningstar investment
category. The results are based on the method of Barras et al. (2010), while single mutual funds’ p-values are
derived from our robust alpha test.
Panel A: Retail funds
Equity - Investable Fixed Income - Investable
US Global Europe Japan Asia Avg. USD CHF EUR GBP Avg.
A
ct
iv
e
Zero alpha 71.9 78.3 78.0 87.3 94.3 82.0 63.3 58.2 53.1 95.9 70.5
Positive alpha 0.0 12.2 8.6 0.0 0.0 4.2 19.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.7
Negative alpha 28.1 9.5 13.4 12.7 5.7 13.9 17.6 41.8 46.9 4.1 24.9
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4
FDR 10 alpha<0 6.3 0.8 2.1 2.0 0.0 2.2 8.3 7.4 35.3 0.0 10.6
In
de
x
Zero alpha 64.2 62.8 88.0 100.0 100.0 83.0 58.2 89.0 73.8 97.1 80.2
Positive alpha 2.5 30.3 4.1 0.0 0.0 7.4 21.2 0.0 11.1 0.0 7.9
Negative alpha 33.3 6.9 7.9 0.0 0.0 9.6 20.7 11.0 15.1 2.9 11.8
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.4 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2
FDR 10 alpha<0 26.1 1.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 5.7 2.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 2.0
Panel B: Institutional funds
Equity - Investable Fixed Income - Investable
US Global Europe Japan Asia Avg. USD CHF EUR GBP Avg.
A
ct
iv
e
Zero alpha 80.1 81.2 83.5 89.6 100.0 86.9 55.2 75.4 60.1 100.0 75.5
Positive alpha 0.0 14.3 13.3 2.7 0.0 6.0 33.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.9
Negative alpha 19.9 4.5 3.2 7.7 0.0 7.1 11.4 24.6 39.9 0.0 16.6
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7
FDR 10 alpha<0 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 4.9 0.0 13.2 0.0 3.7
In
de
x
Zero alpha 53.1 44.6 92.9 100.0 94.4 77.0 95.6 90.8 78.6 100.0 88.4
Positive alpha 6.1 44.1 7.1 0.0 2.8 12.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8
Negative alpha 40.8 11.4 0.0 0.0 2.8 11.0 2.2 9.2 21.4 0.0 8.8
FDR 10 alpha>0 0.0 48.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.7 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4
FDR 10 alpha<0 34.6 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
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Table 6: Performance drivers of active minus index
Results from regressing the difference between value-weighted active investing and index investing, before fees.
For the benchmark model, we include the difference between the VIX index and the regional equity model
with the regional MKT, SMB, HML, WML, and BAB factors. For the regional fixed income model, we add
the VIX index to the four local factors shift, twist, and butterfly (BFLY), as well as the AAA–BBB credit
spread (SPR). Coefficient estimates are multiplied by 100 and HC3 standard errors are in parentheses. By ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ we denote p-values below 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. The last rows report the adjusted R2
values.
Panel A: Equity funds
Retail Asia ex- Institutional Asia ex-
US Global Europe Japan Japan US Global Europe Japan Japan
Const. −0.01 0.27∗∗∗ 0.04 0.10 −0.15 −0.06∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.07 0.07 0.17
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.20) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.15)
MKT −2.41∗∗ −7.07∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗ 1.88 3.97 −0.25 −2.80∗∗ 1.34 2.37 −4.71∗
(1.09) (1.90) (1.60) (2.56) (6.05) (1.08) (1.28) (1.90) (1.62) (2.49)
SMB 13.77∗∗∗ 14.87∗∗∗ 23.14∗∗∗ 7.58∗∗ 6.73 26.39∗∗∗ 14.72∗∗∗ 35.59∗∗∗ 15.63∗∗∗ 22.50∗∗∗
(1.84) (2.93) (3.10) (3.77) (4.94) (1.53) (2.04) (4.33) (3.29) (4.98)
HML −6.93∗∗∗ −3.85 −8.32∗∗∗−12.41∗∗∗ 13.73∗∗∗ −3.95∗∗ −0.57 2.15 −1.19 22.73∗∗∗
(1.74) (2.69) (2.29) (3.27) (4.95) (1.77) (2.25) (3.09) (3.07) (5.42)
WML 2.73∗ 4.78∗∗∗ 2.75∗ 12.47∗∗∗ −0.47 2.09∗ 2.01 5.88∗∗∗ −1.54 0.20
(1.42) (1.61) (1.57) (3.26) (4.25) (1.26) (1.28) (1.83) (2.46) (3.79)
BAB 0.41 −9.50∗∗∗ −6.51∗∗∗ −3.00 5.51 0.39 0.28 −6.59∗∗∗ −8.60∗∗∗−12.41∗∗
(1.52) (2.61) (1.75) (2.55) (6.61) (1.34) (1.99) (2.28) (2.39) (5.84)
∆VIX −3.46∗∗∗ −7.16∗∗∗ −2.94∗ −3.38 7.63 −2.39∗∗ −3.57∗∗∗ −3.68∗∗ −3.48∗ −4.02
(0.98) (2.00) (1.75) (2.36) (6.11) (1.05) (1.34) (1.69) (1.80) (3.51)
R2 0.51 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.08 0.73 0.18 0.45 0.22 0.21
Panel B: Fixed income funds
Retail Institutional
USD CHF EUR GBP USD CHF EUR GBP
Const. 0.05∗∗∗ 0.02 0.03∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ −0.00 0.02 0.08∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.04)
SHIFT −0.91∗∗∗ −2.21∗∗∗ −2.73∗∗∗ −2.48∗∗∗ −0.71∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −2.26∗∗∗ −0.23
(0.09) (0.27) (0.17) (0.48) (0.17) (0.09) (0.24) (0.36)
TWIST −0.33∗ −0.82 −0.09 −1.40 −1.33∗∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.27 1.11∗
(0.17) (0.57) (0.26) (1.45) (0.29) (0.16) (0.45) (0.59)
BFLY −0.30 0.99∗ 0.76 2.40 −0.72 −0.31 0.85 1.09
(0.32) (0.51) (0.60) (2.26) (0.59) (0.28) (0.96) (1.23)
SPR 1.27∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.27 3.81∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ −0.11 1.60∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.14) (0.22) (0.90) (0.33) (0.06) (0.30) (0.47)
∆VIX −1.86∗∗ −2.97∗∗∗ −1.17 −5.34∗ −1.40 −0.17 −2.86∗∗ −0.90
(0.73) (1.01) (0.81) (2.91) (1.19) (0.24) (1.20) (1.78)
R2 0.82 0.59 0.81 0.72 0.63 0.25 0.63 0.49
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Table 7: One-year persistence of the alpha after fees
Annualized alpha after fees (in %), the corresponding block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value
(in brackets), and the beta for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds benchmarked against
the value-weighted performance of index funds. In Panel A, each row from 100% to 10% corresponds to the
value-weighted portfolio including only the x% best active mutual funds of the past year based on the t-value
for the alpha. In Panel B, we report the same numbers but for the x% worst active mutual funds of the past
year. Every December, we rebalance the momentum portfolios. The data sample ranges from 1993 to 2016.
Alphas with p-values below 10% are in italics and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Panel A: Value-weighted performance of the x% best performing funds
All 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
E
qu
it
y
Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.12 −0.12 −0.10 −0.01 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.40 0.62
(0.78) (0.94) (0.94) (0.95) (0.98) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.73) (0.65)
beta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.46 −0.44 −0.41 −0.44 −0.40 −0.31 −0.27 −0.13 −0.02
(0.30) (0.52) (0.52) (0.53) (0.52) (0.53) (0.64) (0.71) (0.91) (0.97)
beta 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
F
ix
ed
In
co
m
e
Inst. alpha 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.33 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.22 0.13 0.16
(0.75) (0.68) (0.59) (0.59) (0.66) (0.68) (0.68) (0.75) (0.75) (0.75)
beta 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.80 0.78
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.73 −0.70 −0.70 −0.67 −0.62 −0.56 −0.55 −0.58 −0.40
(0.21) (0.24) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.22) (0.26)
beta 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.91 0.89
Panel B: Value-weighted performance of the x% worst performing funds
All 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
E
qu
it
y
Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.24 −0.30 −0.32 −0.40 −0.51 −0.51 −0.65 −1.01 −0.94
(0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.64) (0.60) (0.56) (0.58) (0.46) (0.24) (0.43)
beta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.63 −0.72 −0.77 −0.80 −0.79 −0.88 −1.04 −1.08 −1.39
(0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.19) (0.17) (0.04)
beta 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98
F
ix
ed
In
co
m
e
Inst. alpha 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.23 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.14 −0.08 −0.26
(0.77) (0.78) (0.96) (0.85) (0.96) (0.96) (0.94) (0.96) (0.96) (0.80)
beta 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.98
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.77 −0.84 −0.93 −0.96 −0.96 −0.96 −0.84 −0.93 −0.84
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.11) (0.09)
beta 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.00
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Table 8: Bivariate sorts on the performance and size of the past year
Annualized alpha after fees (in %) and block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value (in brackets)
for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds against the investable benchmark. The portfolios
of active mutual funds are double-sorted based on the performance (rows) and the size (columns) of the past
year. The nine portfolios arise from the 30th and 70th percentiles within the investment category of each
fund. For each panel we distinguish between equity (top) and fixed income (bottom) funds. We rebalance the
portfolios every year starting in December 1992 to December 2016. Alphas with p-values below 10% are in
italics and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Institutional Retail
Small Medium Big Small Medium Big
Equity Winner 0.71 0.83 −0.05 Winner 0.09 −0.45 −0.28
(0.76) (0.54) (0.96) (0.89) (0.60) (0.74)
Average 0.65 −0.11 −0.22 Average −1.15 −0.96 −0.66
(0.74) (0.96) (0.93) (0.17) (0.17) (0.44)
Loser −0.76 −0.42 −0.65 Loser −1.78 −1.53 −0.99
(0.69) (0.93) (0.70) (0.07) (0.05) (0.30)
Fixed Income Winner 0.59 −0.25 0.25 Winner −0.61 −0.49 −0.56
(0.60) (0.86) (0.84) (0.20) (0.27) (0.27)
Average −0.31 −0.14 0.37 Average −1.00 −0.86 −0.93
(0.86) (0.92) (0.80) (0.13) (0.21) (0.27)
Loser −0.66 −0.13 0.20 Loser −1.25 −1.05 −0.79
(0.63) (0.92) (0.92) (0.06) (0.12) (0.27)
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Table 9: Portfolios filtered by the fee of the past year.
Annualized alpha after fees (in %), the corresponding block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value
(in brackets), and the beta for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds against the investable
benchmark. Panel A shows the value-weighted performance of portfolios consisting of the x% least expensive
active mutual funds of the past year. Panel B shows the performance of the x% most expensive active mutual
funds. Every December, the portfolios are rebalanced to exclude a certain percentage of active funds. The
data sample ranges from 1993 to 2016. Alphas with p-values below 10% are in italics and p-values below 5%
are in bold.
Panel A: Value-weighted performance of the x% least expensive funds
All 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
E
qu
it
y
Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.13 −0.11 −0.05 −0.04 0.09 0.04 0.17 0.49 0.83
(0.66) (0.82) (0.84) (0.96) (0.96) (0.86) (0.96) (0.74) (0.26) (0.15)
beta 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.50 −0.44 −0.40 −0.33 −0.24 −0.15 −0.04 0.03 0.30
(0.23) (0.35) (0.42) (0.48) (0.58) (0.66) (0.80) (0.97) (0.97) (0.62)
beta 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96
F
ix
ed
In
co
m
e
Inst. alpha 0.26 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.35 0.39 0.25 0.01
(0.69) (0.61) (0.61) (0.56) (0.52) (0.52) (0.46) (0.37) (0.61) (0.96)
0.88 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.72
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.71 −0.66 −0.63 −0.61 −0.56 −0.55 −0.53 −0.42 −0.40
(0.17) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.22) (0.25) (0.26) (0.28) (0.36) (0.36)
0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94
Panel B: Value-weighted performance of the x% most expensive funds
All 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10%
E
qu
it
y
Inst. alpha −0.23 −0.36 −0.52 −0.50 −0.48 −0.78 −0.65 −0.94 −0.88 −1.14
(0.50) (0.36) (0.30) (0.32) (0.34) (0.20) (0.32) (0.22) (0.30) (0.20)
beta 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04
Retail alpha −0.60 −0.99 −1.28 −1.53 −1.70 −1.82 −1.94 −2.10 −2.48 −2.83
(0.15) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
beta 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01
F
ix
ed
In
co
m
e
Inst. alpha 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.10 0.10 0.15 0.06 0.08 −0.11 −0.26
(0.66) (0.60) (0.77) (0.95) (0.95) (0.92) (0.97) (0.97) (0.97) (0.84)
0.88 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.88
Retail alpha −0.75 −0.83 −0.91 −0.92 −0.95 −1.02 −1.02 −1.08 −1.37 −1.46
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14)
0.97 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.00
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Table 10: Bivariate sorts on the performance and fee of the past year
Annualized alpha after fees (in %) and block-bootstrapped multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value (in brackets)
for the value-weighted performance of active mutual funds against the investable benchmark. The portfolios
of active mutual funds are double-sorted based on the performance (rows) and the fee (columns) of the past
year. The nine portfolios arise from the 30th and 70th percentiles within the investment category of each
fund. For each panel we distinguish between equity (top) and fixed income (bottom) funds. We rebalance the
portfolios every year starting in December 1992 to December 2016. Alphas with p-values below 10% are in
italics and p-values below 5% are in bold.
Institutional Retail
High Fee Medium Low Fee High Fee Medium Low Fee
Equity Winner −0.03 −0.19 0.44 Winner −1.78 −1.03 0.14
(0.99) (0.99) (0.92) (0.08) (0.16) (0.93)
Average −1.15 −0.16 −0.14 Average −2.13 −1.24 −0.18
(0.33) (0.99) (0.99) (0.00) (0.06) (0.93)
Loser −1.61 −1.41 0.25 Loser −2.38 −1.55 −0.43
(0.33) (0.23) (0.99) (0.00) (0.05) (0.81)
Fixed Income Winner 0.10 0.33 0.17 Winner −0.85 −0.60 −0.42
(1.00) (0.77) (0.91) (0.37) (0.35) (0.37)
Average 0.17 −0.01 0.49 Average −1.20 −0.96 −0.74
(1.00) (1.00) (0.57) (0.35) (0.22) (0.37)
Loser −0.07 0.04 0.40 Loser −1.17 −0.79 −0.71
(1.00) (1.00) (0.91) (0.22) (0.35) (0.37)
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Table 11: Percentage of rejections under the standard and robust alpha tests
Rejections (in %) based on the normal distribution (Standard), Newey–West (NW), HC3, standard resampling
(Robust-SR), and the block resampling (Robust-BR) standard errors. For the single mutual fund analysis,
we show the percentage of rejections for all 52,526 active mutual funds for the single hypothesis and for the
multiple hypothesis analysis based on controlling the FDR. For the portfolios of mutual funds, we compare
the percentage of rejections for the 63 portfolios where we adjust for multiple tries based on the FWER. For
the standard tests, the FWER method of Romano and Wolf (2016) is not applicable since it requires the
bootstrapped t-values.
Single Mutual Funds Portfolios of Mutual Funds
Single Hypothesis Unskilled Skilled Unskilled Skilled
<5% <10% <5% <10% <5% <10% <5% <10%
Standard 11.2 16.2 5.4 8.1 17.5 20.3 7.8 11.1
NW 12.3 17.5 5.8 8.7 19.0 20.3 4.8 7.9
HC3 10.4 15.3 5.0 7.7 17.5 20.3 7.8 11.1
Robust - SR 11.1 16.4 5.3 8.1 19.0 20.3 4.7 7.9
Robust - BR 9.0 13.9 4.3 6.9 15.9 18.7 1.6 6.3
Multiple Hypothesis FDR FWER
Unskilled Skilled Unskilled Skilled
<5% <10% <5% <10% <5% <10% <5% <10%
Standard 4.1 7.9 1.4 2.2 not applicable
NW 4.9 9.3 1.3 2.2 not applicable
HC3 3.2 6.4 1.3 1.8 not applicable
Robust - SR 3.3 7.0 0.9 1.6 6.4 9.5 0 0
Robust - BR 1.4 3.8 0.3 0.8 4.7 6.4 0 0
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Table A.1: Summary statistics for mutual fund investment categories
Average number (Avg Number) of funds, average total net assets in million USD (Avg TNA), average annual
net return in USD (Avg Net Ret), average number of years the fund is in the database (Avg Years), and the
first appearance of an index fund, for the time period from December 1991 to December 2016, for all available
investment categories (Global Category) within the Morningstar database. We only include funds within the
“Global Broad Category Group” equity or fixed income that are flagged as “Open-End” or “Exchange-Traded”
funds. The average corresponds to the mean of cross-sectional monthly attributes.
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Mexico Fixed Income Retail 182.3 2.0 233.7 137.4 -1.89% 1.28% 5.8 7.5 May 09
Global Equity Large Cap
Inst. 363.2 25.8 435.8 685.3 6.73% 6.17% 7.1 6.0 Jul 94
Retail 1,093.9 57.6 466.4 603.6 6.22% 5.99% 7.5 5.6 Jan 92
Mexico Equity
Inst. 22.7 6.2 80.0 26.4 8.93% 9.33% 6.8 6.7 Feb 04
Retail 26.0 10.6 70.7 297.7 7.01% 9.55% 7.0 8.5 Feb 04
Global Fixed Income
Inst. 329.7 21.6 295.9 241.4 4.36% 3.85% 5.2 5.2 Apr 03
Retail 1,104.1 33.9 201.9 242.3 2.63% 2.68% 5.5 4.4 Apr 05
Europe Equity Large Cap
Inst. 211.9 24.5 126.2 427.5 6.97% 6.34% 6.0 6.0 Jan 98
Retail 812.6 73.8 237.7 425.9 6.71% 7.33% 7.9 6.6 Jan 92
Euro Fixed Income
Inst. 349.7 19.1 298.7 638.7 2.43% 3.40% 6.0 6.6 Apr 04
Retail 1,103.6 23.7 354.7 241.2 3.83% 5.71% 8.3 5.6 Jan 92
US Equity Small Cap
Inst. 234.2 13.3 252.6 459.8 11.88% 11.12% 9.6 9.5 Oct 92
Retail 456.0 43.0 280.5 580.4 10.78% 10.85% 11.0 10.2 Jan 92
Global Equity
Inst. 165.0 2.1 251.2 236.9 3.86% 0.04% 5.5 5.1 Jun 07
Retail 382.6 19.5 706.9 224.1 6.68% 5.65% 9.0 5.7 Aug 95
High Yield Fixed Income Retail 954.2 16.7 307.3 197.2 4.57% 3.24% 5.1 3.6 Dec 07
Other Fixed Income
Inst. 214.3 4.2 237.7 78.5 2.16% 3.09% 4.3 4.1 Apr 05
Retail 651.8 10.8 202.0 59.6 2.12% 2.39% 4.6 3.3 Apr 05
US Equity Mid Cap
Inst. 188.1 10.8 254.7 848.5 10.89% 11.92% 9.0 7.5 Dec 92
Retail 487.2 39.3 450.5 778.7 10.02% 11.00% 10.5 7.5 Jan 92
Other Europe Equity
Inst. 78.7 10.5 95.9 665.1 7.49% 6.10% 6.5 7.0 Dec 98
Retail 547.9 68.6 281.7 209.3 9.03% 8.24% 9.1 8.0 Jan 92
Financials Sector Equity
Inst. 22.2 2.4 25.7 46.4 5.59% 3.74% 7.3 10.1 Mar 04
Retail 113.0 32.8 138.8 114.9 5.29% 5.60% 8.7 6.9 Feb 01
Africa Fixed Income
Inst. 73.7 1.6 131.6 11.0 3.69% 3.65% 5.6 6.6 Jan 09
Retail 90.5 1.7 90.7 22.5 5.02% 5.81% 6.3 3.4 Nov 08
Islamic Equity Retail 70.5 9.5 76.4 31.0 3.65% 3.29% 6.8 7.3 Feb 07
Other Sector Equity
Inst. 69.1 1.6 56.2 24.4 4.08% 4.84% 5.3 4.4 Mar 07
Retail 262.4 40.7 124.0 136.6 4.46% 2.02% 6.2 5.1 Nov 05
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Table A.1 (continued)
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Africa Equity
Inst. 106.9 6.8 70.7 12.3 0.66% 2.53% 5.5 4.4 Nov 07
Retail 145.6 17.6 94.6 71.4 12.94% 13.52% 7.3 6.5 Apr 03
Technology Sector Equity
Inst. 38.9 5.3 57.3 29.2 8.94% 7.29% 6.5 9.6 Apr 04
Retail 165.8 20.7 295.4 182.8 12.51% 11.56% 9.3 8.0 Jan 92
Energy Sector Equity
Inst. 40.5 1.9 103.9 145.9 6.84% 9.06% 5.7 7.8 Nov 04
Retail 120.9 22.2 219.4 249.5 6.83% 7.39% 8.0 6.7 Jul 00
US Equity Large Cap Growth
Inst. 255.3 6.2 378.6 757.8 6.57% 5.32% 8.8 7.2 Jun 98
Retail 551.4 21.8 1’229.6 809.9 8.65% 9.82% 11.0 8.1 Dec 92
US Equity Large Cap Value
Inst. 194.3 4.8 415.7 863.6 7.10% 7.16% 8.3 8.0 Aug 98
Retail 381.8 21.8 1’006.4 758.0 8.62% 10.15% 10.6 6.9 Dec 92
US Fixed Income
Inst. 403.3 16.5 573.4 1’387.8 4.92% 5.35% 9.7 8.6 Jan 92
Retail 843.9 50.5 540.4 1’540.5 4.59% 5.26% 10.6 7.6 Jan 92
Other Europe Fixed Income
Inst. 81.6 13.3 233.5 1’000.8 5.85% 6.63% 6.8 7.7 Nov 01
Retail 263.2 7.7 327.7 185.2 4.30% 5.32% 8.2 6.9 Mar 98
US Equity Large Cap Blend
Inst. 233.1 54.6 289.9 2’019.1 8.68% 9.27% 8.4 9.8 Jan 92
Retail 692.4 146.2 629.6 1’912.6 7.84% 8.98% 9.1 8.7 Jan 92
Asia Equity
Inst. 23.4 1.2 86.3 750.2 3.19% 3.91% 6.1 10.2 Jun 00
Retail 111.5 6.2 142.0 758.8 4.66% 2.69% 9.1 6.7 Jan 92
Real Estate Sector Equity
Inst. 163.0 12.9 221.8 359.3 9.28% 8.21% 7.1 6.0 Feb 04
Retail 268.8 26.8 162.3 628.0 9.86% 10.51% 8.2 6.3 Jun 96
Inflation Linked
Inst. 108.6 8.2 303.9 222.0 3.07% 3.46% 6.5 4.8 Feb 04
Retail 160.9 15.8 284.4 391.6 4.03% 4.60% 7.8 6.2 Dec 98
Emerging Markets Fixed Income
Inst. 457.1 2.5 261.1 205.3 -0.82% 4.03% 2.8 1.8 Jun 13
Retail 457.5 9.2 174.8 500.0 5.40% 7.32% 5.5 3.8 Mar 04
Emerging Markets Equity
Inst. 231.6 10.6 372.5 495.3 8.64% 8.56% 6.3 4.7 Jul 00
Retail 417.3 29.5 214.4 427.7 7.69% 7.13% 7.5 5.1 May 92
Asia ex-Japan Equity
Inst. 115.1 10.1 155.3 169.1 12.09% 11.28% 6.0 7.3 Apr 03
Retail 282.9 16.4 176.6 96.0 5.82% 7.09% 7.3 6.3 Nov 94
Greater China Equity
Inst. 94.1 2.3 71.7 43.5 10.84% 11.45% 5.2 4.5 Apr 09
Retail 234.5 94.5 188.5 1’084.6 10.27% 10.73% 5.7 4.1 Jan 01
Japan Equity
Inst. 85.5 10.8 129.3 253.5 1.78% 2.31% 5.7 5.4 May 00
Retail 300.9 37.6 262.0 301.1 3.84% 3.28% 6.9 5.9 Feb 98
UK Equity Large Cap
Inst. 59.1 8.1 324.4 542.7 5.32% 4.55% 6.1 6.4 Jan 06
Retail 170.6 36.8 423.9 445.4 3.86% 3.52% 6.3 7.3 Nov 99
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Table A.1 (continued)
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Global Equity Mid/Small Cap
Inst. 103.3 3.3 344.8 223.4 11.47% 13.73% 4.9 4.3 May 09
Retail 288.3 9.8 230.3 223.5 4.34% 6.45% 6.4 5.2 Jul 06
Asia Fixed Income
Inst. 30.6 2.5 85.6 292.8 3.89% 1.81% 4.6 9.9 Apr 05
Retail 268.6 6.8 163.8 110.8 5.72% 4.50% 4.9 3.7 Jan 06
Cons. Goods & Serv. Sect. Eq.
Inst. 16.5 9.8 85.4 23.7 8.22% 7.30% 5.3 9.7 Mar 04
Retail 97.0 32.0 98.2 210.0 7.41% 6.28% 7.1 7.4 Jul 00
Sterling Fixed Income
Inst. 51.7 6.1 275.6 98.6 2.63% 2.04% 5.5 7.1 Apr 05
Retail 169.7 15.3 447.3 457.7 1.72% 2.18% 6.2 5.8 Apr 05
Europe Equity Mid/Small Cap
Inst. 130.1 1.3 103.5 64.1 7.95% 6.91% 2.7 2.7 Dec 12
Retail 350.2 7.8 133.1 49.7 7.57% 8.75% 7.6 6.8 Jun 01
Latin America Equity
Inst. 31.3 1.0 127.5 4.6 1.41% -0.42% 4.1 7.6 Aug 07
Retail 86.1 10.3 140.3 764.1 8.07% 10.33% 8.1 6.3 Aug 00
Natural Resources Sector Equity
Inst. 37.5 2.0 117.1 45.8 7.65% 8.22% 6.8 8.5 Mar 04
Retail 107.5 14.5 167.2 162.9 7.63% 6.51% 8.9 6.6 Apr 94
Brazil Equity Retail 51.4 6.2 54.5 21.9 -0.17% 3.29% 6.5 4.9 Aug 07
India Equity
Inst. 33.7 1.0 89.1 26.0 16.92% 17.15% 1.3 2.4 Sep 08
Retail 169.7 9.4 169.3 233.7 8.36% 7.66% 7.5 5.2 Jan 07
Utilities Sector Equity
Inst. 15.0 1.6 64.8 143.5 8.51% 8.42% 8.6 9.9 May 04
Retail 32.6 8.1 644.6 308.8 7.38% 8.80% 11.3 8.1 Jan 92
Healthcare Sector Equity
Inst. 32.8 4.5 77.9 62.1 9.76% 6.76% 6.5 9.7 Mar 04
Retail 173.5 22.2 415.9 342.7 7.25% 7.11% 8.3 6.1 Jun 00
UK Equity Mid/Small Cap
Inst. 32.5 1.0 151.4 61.7 0.89% -0.62% 1.2 1.9 Feb 15
Retail 143.2 4.6 328.5 112.0 6.56% 6.65% 6.5 5.7 Jan 06
Communications Sector Equity
Inst. 4.6 4.9 9.5 8.9 7.25% 6.67% 6.0 9.5 Apr 05
Retail 39.5 13.7 148.8 73.3 5.73% 8.87% 7.9 9.1 Oct 01
Korea Equity
Inst. 83.5 5.3 33.9 29.9 6.93% 6.05% 4.5 4.4 Mar 07
Retail 280.0 41.0 96.9 57.1 13.67% 13.23% 8.9 5.7 May 01
Asia Pacific Fixed Income
Inst. 21.6 1.1 108.7 22.3 3.05% 3.75% 3.7 5.5 Sep 06
Retail 120.9 9.6 39.6 130.1 2.60% 3.34% 7.2 5.9 May 05
Thailand Equity Retail 117.5 8.8 47.0 49.0 17.88% 17.17% 10.9 9.3 Jan 01
Other Asia Equity Retail 78.6 3.5 89.8 30.7 1.46% 1.06% 5.2 6.3 Jan 08
Precious Metals Sector Equity Retail 76.8 5.9 196.1 376.0 12.31% 10.76% 9.6 6.1 Jan 92
Canadian Equity Large Cap
Inst. 4.7 2.8 34.0 216.2 5.03% 11.24% 4.9 6.5 Apr 03
Retail 159.2 13.3 368.8 379.4 8.61% 8.79% 11.1 6.6 Jan 92
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Table A.1 (continued)
in USD Avg Number Avg TNA Avg Net Ret Avg Years First Index
Active Index Active Index Active Index Active Index Fund
Thailand Fixed Income Retail 82.8 1.0 126.6 165.0 3.60% 6.25% 7.2 10.8 Mar 06
South American Equity Retail 35.4 1.2 39.0 16.9 4.51% 4.32% 9.3 6.8 Jan 06
Other Equity
Inst. 14.6 1.8 33.3 367.9 7.26% 5.58% 5.1 6.5 Sep 09
Retail 42.5 25.3 132.9 240.9 8.27% 7.27% 8.8 6.6 Apr 96
Industrials Sector Equity
Inst. 6.0 5.7 31.7 16.8 7.59% 6.41% 6.6 9.0 Jan 06
Retail 29.2 23.9 123.6 188.6 8.96% 10.50% 8.9 7.6 Oct 01
Australia & New Zealand Eq.
Inst. 4.9 1.0 73.5 56.7 14.47% 13.70% 7.8 4.0 Dec 08
Retail 10.0 1.9 149.3 42.1 8.03% 8.92% 8.0 3.8 Feb 05
Canada Fixed Income Retail 88.9 12.9 296.2 1’064.0 4.91% 5.94% 9.5 6.5 Jan 92
Singapore Equity
Inst. 3.4 1.0 61.6 13.4 15.31% 14.31% 5.5 6.4 Apr 09
Retail 7.6 3.0 110.9 159.1 10.64% 10.25% 7.4 8.9 May 02
Canadian Eq. Mid/Small Cap Retail 81.1 2.8 179.6 111.6 5.84% 1.42% 7.5 5.4 Apr 07
Taiwan Equity
Inst. 3.0 1.0 23.6 4.3 37.40% 29.26% 1.7 2.3 Dec 08
Retail 135.2 9.9 55.9 363.3 10.42% 9.17% 11.1 7.4 Jul 03
Australia Fixed Income Retail 6.7 1.2 195.8 26.5 3.24% 3.96% 2.8 3.8 Jun 10
Malaysia Fixed Income Retail 52.9 1.0 64.5 205.8 1.81% 0.75% 6.5 9.3 Oct 07
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Table C.1: Empirical rejection probabilities: Type I errors
Empirical rejection probabilities for the nominal levels α = 10%, α = 5%, and α = 1% for the standard (Stand),
Newey–West (NW) with a bandwith of 4 × (T/100)2/9, HC3, and our bootstrapped (Boot) significance test
that evaluates the optimal block size by the method of Politis and White (2004) and the correction of Patton
et al. (2009). The data was generated by sampling from the realized returns with a circular bootstrap (Boot-x)
and block sizes of x = {1, 3, 6}. The simulation study includes ten US mutual funds that exhibit the entire
return history from 1992 to 2016 in the Morningstar database. We sample 1,000 paths for each fund and
DGP and set the alpha under the null hypothesis to the true observed alpha. We show the results for the
one-factor “CAPM,” three-factor “FF3,” and five-factor “FF5” model with the factors “market,” “size,” and
“value” of Fama and French (1992), and also the “momentum” of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and “betting
against beta” factor of Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). We highlight the p-values closest to the nominal value of
the test. Because the null hypothesis is true for all of the simulations, the true rejection probabilities should
be equal to the nominal level of the test.
Nominal CAPM FF3 FF5
DGP Level Stand NW HC3 Boot Stand NW HC3 Boot Stand NW HC3 Boot
Boot-1 α = 0.10 0.112 0.109 0.099 0.102 0.114 0.113 0.099 0.105 0.120 0.117 0.096 0.106
α = 0.05 0.061 0.059 0.049 0.053 0.062 0.060 0.050 0.056 0.064 0.061 0.046 0.053
α = 0.01 0.012 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.011 0.013
Boot-3 α = 0.10 0.142 0.119 0.125 0.111 0.137 0.123 0.120 0.106 0.135 0.118 0.111 0.105
α = 0.05 0.084 0.065 0.070 0.058 0.078 0.068 0.066 0.060 0.076 0.062 0.058 0.054
α = 0.01 0.024 0.017 0.017 0.013 0.025 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.013
Boot-6 α = 0.10 0.158 0.126 0.141 0.115 0.140 0.124 0.124 0.112 0.148 0.126 0.123 0.114
α = 0.05 0.098 0.071 0.085 0.063 0.078 0.071 0.066 0.062 0.088 0.071 0.068 0.062
α = 0.01 0.036 0.021 0.029 0.017 0.025 0.021 0.020 0.018 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.015
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Table C.2: Empirical rejection probabilities: Family wise error rates (FWER)
Empirical rejection probabilities for the nominal levels α = 10%, α = 5%, and α = 1% and the multiple
hypothesis framework of Romano and Wolf (2005a,b, 2016) controlling the FWER based on the bootstrapped
(Boot-x) significance test with block sizes of x = {1, 3, 6, 9, 12}. The DGP is a circular bootstrap (Boot-x)
with an optimal block size of x = {1, 3, 6}. The simulation study includes the 17 retail investment categories
with a history from 1993 to 2016 from Section 2 with the investable one-factor benchmark model that is based
on the value-weighted return of index funds. For each portfolio and DGP we sample 1,000 paths and set the
alpha under the null hypothesis to the true observed alpha. We highlight the p-values closest to the nominal
value of the test. Because for all the simulations the null hypothesis is true, the true rejection probabilities
should be equal to the nominal level of the test.
DGP Nominal Level Boot-1 Boot-3 Boot-6 Boot-9 Boot-12
Boot-1 α = 0.10 0.132 0.119 0.096 0.071 0.050
α = 0.05 0.066 0.052 0.039 0.026 0.020
α = 0.01 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.002
Boot-3 α = 0.10 0.145 0.124 0.098 0.082 0.059
α = 0.05 0.081 0.062 0.048 0.040 0.030
α = 0.01 0.028 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.002
Boot-6 α = 0.10 0.132 0.114 0.087 0.066 0.046
α = 0.05 0.073 0.051 0.036 0.022 0.012
α = 0.01 0.020 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.001
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The Long-Only Integrated Approach to Factor Tim-
ing
Roger Rueegg
Abstract
This paper develops a novel framework to factor timing in the long-only integrated approach to
style investing. A Markov switching strategy generates a timing-alpha of 0.36% per month, which
solidifies the recent evidence of momentum in factor returns. The timing ability persists among
different factor sets, in both developed and emerging markets, and for holding periods of up to
twelve months. Also, it remains significant when we apply robust test statistics and adjust for
multiple tries. Even though the strategies are subject to high turnover, trading costs can be
contained with lower rebalancing frequencies.
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1 Introduction
Can we successfully time the factors in a transparent long-only setting? A promising paper by Arnott
et al. (2018) shows that one-month factor momentum among 51 proven factors generates high ab-
normal returns. Their approach to style investing involves investments in long-short single-factor
portfolios. However, the clear majority of investors face short-sell constraints. Moreover, recent liter-
ature concentrated on reducing the large number of proven factors to overcome the multidimensional
challenge formulated by Cochrane (2011). Hence, it is of interest as to whether a more realistic timing
framework with short-selling constraints and a focus on a small set of surviving factors can generate
significant timing alphas.
Consequently, we present the long-only integrated approach to factor timing. We thereby regard
factors such as stock characteristics and provide a highly transparent framework that allows us to
include realistic transaction costs. We show that modeling factor momentum with a Markov switching
strategy that predicts the optimal factor-weights generates on average a monthly alpha of 0.36%. The
alpha exists not only in the US but also in the global developed and emerging markets, among different
factor sets, and for holding periods of up to twelve months. The alpha arises solely because of the
timing ability because we adjust for the underlying factor exposures. In our setting, we find that
the Markov switching model with two states and one month lag dominates a standard momentum
strategy which invests in the optimal weights of the most recent month. However, the alpha of the
one-month momentum strategy is also economically meaningful with an average alpha of 0.23% per
month.
A key limitation of research on market timing is that timing ability can only be shown in retro-
spect. The first lesson that investment practitioners learn is that 100% of the promoted out-of-sample
backtests worked in the past; however, only a few will generate high risk-adjusted returns in real-time,
while the majority of the strategies will fail. As highlighted by Bailey et al. (2014) and Bailey and
Lopez de Prado (2014), the reason is that the out-of-sample backtests are prone to severe selection
biases. To reduce the resulting bias in our analysis, we show that the timing ability of the Markov
switching strategy is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests. First, we analyze different factor sets
that select from the following well-known style factors: value, profitability, investment, momentum,
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low volatility, low beta, unexpected earnings, and short-term reversal. Second, we show the strat-
egy’s timing ability with three different investment universes: in the long and short-term for the US,
and for the most recent investment period for the global developed and emerging markets. Since
McLean and Pontiff (2016) demonstrate that the post-publication factor return is 58% lower, we pay
particular attention to the most recent period when the factors were already published.
We further show that the timing ability is significant under the robust alpha test of Leippold and
Rüegg (2018).1 Moreover, the Markov switching strategy improves the annualized Sharpe ratio by
0.23 in absolute terms compared to the value-weighted market portfolio. The difference is significant
even under the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008). When we next compare the
information ratio of the Markov switching timing strategy with the naive diversification strategy that
equal-weights the factors over time, we find an average annual improvement in absolute terms of 0.53.
In recent years multiple hypothesis tests, which are vital in clinical trials, have gained popularity
among the finance community.2 Consequently, we show that the timing ability also survives the
multiple hypothesis adjustments of the state-of-the-art multiple hypothesis framework of Romano
and Wolf (2016).3
A caveat of short-term timing strategies are the high turnovers. The resulting transaction costs
may erase the gains from the winning bets. Based on a one-month holding period, we find an average
two-sided turnover of 122% per month for the Markov switching strategy. Consequently, for markets
with high transaction costs, the high costs push the one-month holding strategy into negative territory.
However, we find that longer holding periods can contain the turnover and transaction costs while
preserving the timing ability. Thus, accounting for higher transaction costs in the developed markets
we prefer a quarterly rebalancing, and for the significant higher fees in the emerging markets a semi-
annual rebalancing. From the tested combinations and after including conservative transaction costs
we find that only the factor set in the US with value, profitability, investment, momentum, and
low beta survives the multiple hypothesis adjustments. However, the strategies still earn an average
monthly alpha of 0.29% and offer a promising improvement of the investment return.
1The test statistics rely on the block-resampling suggested by Lahiri (2003) for time series and on the robust Sharpe
ratio test by Ledoit and Wolf (2008).
2See Leippold and Lohre (2012) as an early application of multiple hypothesis tests in this area, or Harvey et al.
(2016) on factors.
3The major advantage of their test framework is that it allows for cross-dependence of the test statistics.
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As a positive side-effect of our approach, we can find the ex post optimal factor weights for the
integrated approach. In our long-only setting, we see that the low-risk anomaly helps to achieve
higher Sharpe ratios. But, the low-risk factors are not included in the solutions with the highest
information ratio. Also, we highlight that the naive diversification with equal-weights in value,
profitability, and momentum attains the highest information ratio for many factor sets in the US and
developed markets. Moreover, we find that the optimal factor weights change with the holding period.
Momentum (WML) receives a much lower optimal weight with lower rebalancing frequencies, whereas
the profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factor gain importance in the optimal constant
weights.4
Our work is contributing to the puzzling evidence of cross-sectional momentum as an important
investment style. The first findings of momentum go back to Levy (1967) and Jegadesh and Titman
(1993) on individual stock level. Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) next show that stock momentum
arises from industry momentum, whereas the most recent paper by Arnott et al. (2018) suggest
that industry momentum may be explained by factor momentum. The literature on timing ability
concentrates on both fundamental and technical predictors. An early paper by Kao and Shumaker
(1999) shows a multivariate macroeconomic analysis of timing the value and growth stocks. Asness
et al. (2000), Cohen et al. (2003), Asness et al. (2013), and Arnott et al. (2016) demonstrate that
valuation spreads may indicate crowding in factors with a corresponding negative outlook for the
affected factors. Nalbantov et al. (2006) by applying support vector regressions with technical and
economic variables succeed in timing the size and value premium in the US.5 Arshanapalli et al. (2007)
use fundamental and macroeconomic factors to show that a multi-style rotation strategy based on the
four style combinations with large versus small and growth versus value outperforms the buy-and-hold
portfolio. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) find that ex ante risk adjustments double the Sharpe ratio
of momentum. Besides, a recent paper by Hodges et al. (2017) demonstrates that combining different
well-known predictors improves the timing ability. In contrast to the successful timing literature,
Asness (2016) concludes that the factor timing performance was not convincing historically.
Based on a realistic example, we illustrate in Section 2 our novel solution on how to time the
4See Table 3 for the definition of the factors.
5Examples of technical variables are the value-growth spread or the volatility of the S&P 500, and of the economic
variables are the oil price or the yield curve spread.
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factors in the long-only integrated approach to style investing. Section 3 describes the empirical
analysis and performs robust performance tests of our approach. In Section 4, we focus on various
robustness tests. Section 5 summarizes the results.
2 The integrated approach to factor timing
There are two approaches to multi-factor investing. To illustrate the differences, we outline in Figure 1
the two frameworks. For the standard mixed approach, we first create factor portfolios F1, F2, and
F3. The ultimate goal in the mixed approach is now to predict the factor portfolios’ returns rF1 ,
rF2 , and rF3 . Based on the predicted factor returns rˆF1 , and rˆF2 , rˆF3 , we then build the portfolio by
optimally mixing the individual factor portfolios. In contrast, in the integrated approach, we first
build a normalized factor score for each security and factor. Next, we build the overall score that is
the weighted sum of the individual factor scores. In the last step, we build the portfolio with the
overall score as the decisive criteria. Thus, the ultimate goal with this approach is to predict the
factor score weights that lead to the overall ranking of the securities.
[Figure 1 about here.]
For our study, we rely on the long-only integrated approach to factor investing. Because we
argue that the integrated approach offers implementation advantages when it comes to timing in a
realistic long-only setting. First, returns based on factors are not only the result of a metric but also
the outcome of a specific portfolio construction technique. Therefore, when we apply the integrated
approach to factor investing, we first fix the final portfolio construction technique and then predict
the optimal building blocks that lead to the actual investment. Whereas in the standard mixed
approach, it is an open issue how one constructs the portfolios once the prediction of the factor
returns is available. Second, when we predict the optimal portfolio constituents, we implicitly include
the interaction effects of the factors.
Let us assume that we focus on the standard US universe from the merged CRSP and Compustat
database with the five factors HML, RMW, and CMA from the five-factor model of Fama and French
(2015), the momentum factor WML of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and the low beta factor BETA
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of Fama and MacBeth (1973).6 In our analysis, we intentionally disregard the SMB factor, because
we focus on the large-cap universe. In the integrated approach, we first create the factor scores fm,i
for factors m = 1, ..., F and securities i = 1, ..., N . To compute the factor score, we first rank the
universe of stocks in ascending order according to the metrics of the five factors. We then normalize
them from zero (worst) to one (best). In the next step, we build an overall score for each company,
where we weight each factor score with a fixed weight wm for each factor characteristic. To create
the final portfolio, we value-weight the securities above the 70th percentile.7
Now, the goal of this approach is to predict the optimal weight of each factor score to finally get
an overall score. To find the optimal weights over time, we first define a fixed grid of possible weights
from minus one to plus one with a step size of 1/x. We then take all the K possible combinations
of these factor weights for the predefined set of factors. With five factors and a step size of 0.5
(x = 2) we obtain weight vectors such as {1, 1, 1, 1, 1} or {0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5} that lead to the same
results. To remove these redundancies, we further normalize all long and short exposures within a
combination to ±1 and focus on the unique combinations. This cleaning results in an aggregated
weight of the factors of plus (minus) one if there are only factors with a positive (negative) weight, or
a weight of zero if there are both negative and positives weights in the combination. In our example
with F = 5 factors and a step size of x = 2 this results in K = 1, 743 combinations and a grid of
weights that lie in ±{1, 0.66, 0.5, 0.4, 0.33, 0.29, 0.25, 0.22, 0.2, 0.17, 0.14, 0.13, 0.11, 0}. The number of
combinations grows exponentially with the size of the factor set. For example, for six factors and the
same step size, we count 9,493 possible compositions.
With the grid of possible combinations, we compute for each period the out-of-sample returns
of the different strategies. Out of the 1,743 combinations, there are several special cases. The
combination with all weights equal to zero is the market strategy. Since we in this case select all
the stocks without an opinion about the future impact of the individual factors. The combinations
with a plus (minus) one and else zeros are the standard long (short) factor portfolios because they
concentrate on a single metric only. In contrast to Fama and French (1993) we rebalance the portfolio
6See Table 3 for the definition of the factors.
7This is the standard way to build the factor portfolios as first demonstrated by Fama and French (1993). Also, it
is a model-free approach that still takes the size of the companies into account, and hence reduces size biases.
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in every period.8
Because of the discretization, we can now find the optimal weights under perfect foresight. To
compute the optimal weights over time, we take the average weight of the strategies that are equal to or
above the q percentile of the period. When we set q = 100 we obtain the special case, where we receive
the weights of the best strategy only. However, we expect a higher stability in our prediction, when we
average among the best strategies within a period. Thus, analogous to the portfolio construction, we
concentrate on the best 30% best strategies within a holding period and set q = 70.9 Figure 2 shows
the optimal weights of the factors HML, RMW, CMA, WML, and BETA over time for q ∈ {70, 100}.
By construction, the weights for q = 100 swing between plus and minus one. Whereas the averaging
of the best 30% of the strategies in the case with q = 70 lead to a higher stability of the weights over
time.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Further, we show in Figure 3 the log-cumulated alpha of the strategies with perfect foresight for
q ∈ {70, 100}. The strategies with perfect foresight always invest in the optimal portfolio weights as
shown in Figure 2. The alpha is computed against the market portfolio. For comparison, we also
plot the alpha over time of the strategy that ex post shows the highest Sharpe ratio over time but
applies only constant weights over time. For the analyzed period from June 1963 to December 2016,
this is the combination that puts 40% on value as well as momentum, and 20% on profitability. We
see that the strategy that invests in the average 30% best strategies over time (q = 70) exhibits, by
construction, a lower alpha, yet it is still highly positive and stable over time. Therefore, we expect
that the loss in alpha is compensated by a higher stability in the out-of-sample forecast of the timing
strategies that we present in the next section. The strategy with the highest ex post Sharpe ratio
over time only achieves a marginal outperformance of the perfect foresight strategies because it holds
the weights constant over time. Thus, the differences between the perfect foresight strategies and the
highest Sharpe ratio strategy represents the total possible outperformance when we apply timing.
We now focus on the different possibilities to ex ante predict the optimal weight of the factor scores.
8Fama and French (1993) only rebalance in June of each year.
9See Section 4.4 for robustness checks for the choice of q.
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The goal is to receive a proportion of this theoretical outperformance, by using only information that
is known at the time of the rebalancing.
[Figure 3 about here.]
2.1 Naive diversification
The naive diversification strategy (ND) equal weights the factor scores over time. As shown in
Benartzi and Thaler (2001) or DeMiguel et al. (2009) the 1/N heuristic has a long history in asset
allocation and is the natural benchmark strategy to beat for the strategies presented next that time
the weights. Also, it is like the integrated strategies presented in Bender and Wang (2016) or Leippold
and Rueegg (2018). In our example with five factors, we consequently set the factor score weights to
one third at each point in time.
2.2 One-month momentum
Motivated by the findings of Arnott et al. (2018) that find short-term persistence in the factor returns
in the mixed approach, we create the one-month momentum strategy (1M) in our integrated setting.
This strategy invests in the optimal weight of the previous month. Because we expect that the
optimal weights of the previous month are close to the best solution of the succeeding month. While
Arnott et al. (2018) regard sets of up to fifty factors and then select the best factors over time,
we only concentrate on small factor sets of three to six factors. Because our intention is not to
select the best factors over time, but to optimally weight an already pre-defined small set of relevant
factors.10 Consequently, once we agreed on a small set of factors, we answer the open question if
factor momentum also occurs in the optimal weights over time.
2.3 Markov switching
Ever since Hamilton (1989) suggested to describe the business life cycle as a Markov switching au-
toregressive process, the model has been used in numerous empirical studies both in finance and
10Arnott et al. (2018) show that the factor momentum is also robust for a small set of factors. Hence, it is not only
able to select factors, but also to time small factor models.
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economics.11 We are interested in whether a more general model that takes the interaction effects
into account does a better job in predicting the optimal weights compared to the 1M strategy pre-
sented in the previous section.
Given a time-series of optimal weights wt, t = 1, . . . , T , on F factors, the conditional expected
weight in a regime switching model with S states are generally given by
E (wt+1 | st = i) =
S∑
j=1
pij · µ(st+1 = j), (1)
where pij denotes the probability of moving from state i to state j in the next time step. The
conditional covariance matrix of the weights wt+1 includes a second-order term that accounts for the
moves in the conditional means as the regime changes,
Σ(st = i) =
S∑
j=1
pijΣ(st+1 = j) +
S∑
j=1
piipijϑϑ
>, (2)
where ϑ = E (wt+1 | st+1 = i) − E (wt+1 | st+1 = j). The distribution of wt+1 conditional on st is a
mixture of S normal distributions. Therefore, the probability density function of wt+1 can be written
as
f(wt+1|st = i) =
S∑
j=1
pij · f(wt+1|st+1 = j). (3)
For the implementation of our investment strategies, we make the reasonable assumption that at
the current time t, we are not entirely sure about which regime st is prevailing. However, we do know
the structure and the relevant parameters
Θ = {µt(st),Σt(st),P }, (4)
with P representing the transition matrix.
We must differentiate between three kinds of regime switching probabilities: one-step-ahead,
filtered and smoothed prediction. The one-step-ahead predicted probability uses information as of
11For instance, the volatility feedback model of Turner et al. (1989), regime switching interest rate models as in Ang
and Bekaert (1998) and regime switching VARs as in Sims and Zha (2006).
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time t− 1 to predict the regime probability in time t, whereas the filtered probability uses data as of
t to estimate the likelihood in time t. Therefore, the filtered probability is more accurate compared
to the one-step ahead prediction, but it suffers from a one-period look-ahead bias. Finally, there is
also the smoothed estimate of regime probabilities, which means that we use all data in the entire
sample to estimate the regime probability at time t. We cannot use either filtered or smoothed
probabilities in the real-time forecast. Thus, for our empirical exercise, we rely only on the one-step-
ahead predictions and compute the optimal weights based on the conditional mean and with the help
of the toolbox created by Perlin (2015). In our standard setting, we will use the most straightforward
model specification with two states (S = 2) and a lag of one period, and we refer to this type of
strategy as the Markov switching strategy (MS). In the remainder, we apply a minimum training
period of 60 months to fit the regime switching model. The training period then increases over time,
as there is more history available.
2.4 Strategies over time
To give a comprehensive overview of the strategies, Table 1 shows the acronyms, definitions, and
aims of the different strategies. We distinguish between three kinds of strategies. We start with
the benchmark strategies that include the value-weighted market (MKT), and the ND strategy that
additionally accounts for the factor returns. They both apply no factor timing and are out-of-sample.
Next, there are the perfect foresight strategies with the highest Sharpe ratio (H-SR), the highest
information ratio (H-IR) strategy over time, and the perfect foresight strategy (PF) that invests in
each period in the best strategies as if they would be known before and thus applies timing. As the
PF strategy times the factor weights, the H-SR and H-IR strategy invest with constant weights over
time, but all three strategies have a severe in-sample bias. And third, the timing strategies with the
1M and MS strategies that predict the optimal factor score weights over time.
[Table 1 about here.]
Figure 4 shows the cumulated alpha of the ND, 1M, and MS strategy over time for our example
with the five factors. We find that the ND benchmark strategy generates a positive alpha over the
analyzed data period with respect to the MKT strategy. But, as expected, when we correct the ND
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strategy for the same factor returns HML, RMW, CMA, WML, and BETA including the market
return the alpha drops to 0.03% per month and is statistically insignificant from zero. In contrast,
we find for the 1M and MS strategy highly consistent and significant alphas of 0.51% respectively
0.36% per month, also when we correct for their building blocks. Also, we observe that the MS and
1M strategy show a smaller drawdown in the dot-com bubble and generate stable alphas in the most
recent past. Contrary, the ND strategy starts to flatten in this period. Regarding the H-SR and
H-IR strategies, we find that for the Sharpe ratio it was optimal to put 28.57% for HML, RMW, and
WML, as well as 14.29% for BETA what results in a Sharpe ratio of 0.62.12. Whereas for the relative
point of view to the MKT strategy, a weight of one third on HML, RMW, and WML attains the
highest information ratio of 0.66. We highlight that the optimal solution based on the information
ratio disregards the CMA and BETA factor.
[Figure 4 about here.]
3 Empirical investigation
3.1 Universe
For our analysis, we consider three datasets. The first dataset is the standard universe with all
non-financial NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from the CRSP and Compustat database. The
period ranges from June 1963 to December 2017. For concerns of liquidity, we focus on the companies
above the NYSE median market capitalization. It corresponds to the "Big" portfolio as described
in Fama and French (1993). The second dataset is the MSCI Developed World universe, and the
third the MSCI Emerging Markets universe. We have data on its constituents for the most recent
twenty years from April 1998 to April 2018. Both indices invest in the most liquid large and mid-cap
stocks of the developed respectively emerging markets countries. They cover approximately 85%
of the free float-adjusted market capitalization within each universe. Moreover, the MSCI indices
are the most commonly applied benchmark in delegated asset management. Usually, MSCI Inc.
updates its constituents on a quarterly basis. While the developed and emerging market countries
12The MKT strategy shows a Sharpe ratio of 0.35 over the same period from June 1963 to December 2017
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also change over time, but on a less frequent basis. Also, for the MSCI universes, we only include
non-financials. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the three universes. The MSCI universes
hold on average 1,339 stock for the developed (DM), respectively 648 for the emerging markets (EM)
universe, whereas we observe on average 813 US stocks. Since the US universe starts earlier in 1963
with a small universe of stocks, it holds on average a lower number of constituents compared to
the DM universe. For the same reason, the DM universe also shows for the market capitalization
a higher average market capitalization with USD million 14,234 compared to 7,033 in the US and
2,903 for the EM. The minimum market capitalization for the MSCI universes is close to zero, while
it is USD million 62 for the US dataset. This difference arises because of the construction of the
universes. For instance, in the US we filter each month the stocks above the NYSE median. Thus,
the market capitalization never drops below this median; however, for the MSCI universes, there is
only a quarterly regular rebalancing. Consequently, stocks that drop dramatically in value during a
quarter are kept for a longer period compared to the US analysis. Regarding the average total excess
return above the one-month Treasury bill rate we find similar average monthly total returns for the
US and DM with 0.62 respectively 0.69%, the EM universe generated, on average, high returns of
1.18 for our data period.
[Table 2 about here.]
3.2 Factor sets
For the factors, we start with the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015). We disregard size
since we concentrate on large-caps and the most liquid stocks around the globe only. Also, we include
the momentum factor of Jegadesh and Titman (1993). For the portfolio perspective, DeMiguel
et al. (2018) find that only six out of their 51 analyzed characteristics remain significant. Thus, we
also include the disjunct characteristics of their analysis for our robustness check. To summarize
we concentrate on the value (HML), profitability (RMW), investment (CMA), momentum (WML),
unexpected earnings (SUE), low volatility (LVOL), low beta (BETA), and short-term reversal (REV)
factor. Table 2 overviews the factor definitions and their acronyms. Regarding the factor sets, we
focus on the Fama French factors (FF), the Fama-French including momentum as in Carhart (1997)
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(FFC), the FFC model extended by low volatility and low beta (CLV, CB), and their combination
including both low risk factors (CLVB). For robustness, we check our results also for the optimal
factor set of DeMiguel et al. (2018) (DMNU) that includes the factors RMW, CMA, LVOL, BETA,
SUE, and REV. For an overview, we show on the right of Table 2 the six factor sets from FF to
DMNU and tick the included characteristics. To guarantee that we trade on information that is
known at the rebalancing, we consider an additional data lag of two days for the factors in the MSCI
universes. This additional lag is of importance because we trade Asian, European, and US countries
where the market closes at different time zones, which creates additional implementation delays.
[Table 3 about here.]
3.3 Factor returns and optimal constant weights
For the three universes and six datasets, we discretize the possible factor score weight and calculate
the different strategies over time. For the grid of factors, we set analogous to Section 2 the step size
to 0.5 or x = 2. This choice results in 63, 325, 1,743, and 9,493 different combinations for our factor
sets of three, four, five, respectively six factors. The higher we set x, the finer is the grid and the
higher we expect the accuracy of our method. But due to the curse of dimensionality with a finer
grid, we also obtain higher computational costs. With the choice of x = 2 we are in a coverable
territory, where we balance the accuracy and the computational power required to calculate all the
possible weight combinations over time.13
For the special cases with a weight of plus one or minus one on only one factor that result in the
pure factor portfolios, and the combination with zero weights on all factors that results in the MKT
strategy, we show the detailed summary statistics in Appendix A. For the MKT strategy, we find a
highly consistent Sharpe ratio of 0.345, 0.313 and 0.325 for the US, DM, and EM universe. Also, we
see higher Sharpe ratios for all factor portfolios and among all three universes with the presumably
positive characteristics. Except for HML in the DM and REV in the EM universe, the assumed
dominant factor-strategy led to a lower Sharpe ratio for the analyzed period of twenty years.
In Table 4 we show for each universe the ex post optimal weights in the long-only integrated
13See Section 4.4 for a finer grid size. E.g. for x = 3 we arrive at 75,985 possible combinations for six factors.
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approach. In the left (right) of the table, we show the weights of the strategies with the highest
Sharpe (information) ratio. First, we find that none of the factors obtain a negative weight. Thus,
contrary to DeMiguel et al. (2018), who find in the long-short mixed approach that it can be optimal
to take a short position in the low volatility strategy and a long position in the low beta strategy
to reduce the risk, we cannot observe this kind of long-short hedging in the long-only integrated
approach. Second, we find that the low-risk strategies LVOL and BETA very rarely obtain a positive
weight in the highest information ratio strategies. Thus, in our setting, the low-risk strategies are only
attractive from a Sharpe ratio point of view. Third, we find that the naive diversification strategy
with the three factors HML, RMW, and WML offers the highest information ratio in many of the
US and DM factor sets, even when we include other possible factors. Also, Fama and French (2015)
mention that HML tends to be redundant when they add CMA to the factor set. However, we find
that HML obtains a positive weight in all of the combinations tested, while CMA plays only a minor
role in our setting and is often neglected in the factor sets. This difference can arise because we take
the improved definition of HML as described in Asness and Frazzini (2013) and second rebalance the
portfolio on a monthly bases.14
[Table 4 about here.]
3.4 Timing the factors over time
In order to extract the timing ability of the MS and 1M strategy from Section 2, we regress the return
of the strategies on the multi-factor model including the market and the factors of the factor set. By
controlling for the factors of the factor set, the alpha of the time series regression corresponds to the
timing ability of the strategy. Since Leippold and Rueegg (2018) find that the integrated approach
shows a positive sensitivity to the low-volatility strategy, and to control for other possible additional
factor biases, we also correct the strategies for the eight-factor model which includes the factors MKT,
HML, RMW, CMA, WML, LVOL, SUE, and REV.15
Table 5 shows the alpha coefficient together with the Newey-West t-values for the six factor sets of
14We will see in Section 4.1 that a longer holding period favors the CMA factor.
15We exclude the BETA factor, because LV and BETA are highly correlated with a variance inflation factor of above
nine. However, the results remain the same when LV is replaced by BETA.
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Table 3. We highlight significant alphas at the 95% confidence level in bold. To compute the p-values,
we apply the block-resampling robust alpha test of Leippold and Rüegg (2018).16 The results suggest
that the strategies MS and 1M can significantly time the factors. With an average monthly alpha
of 0.36% (0.38%) with respect to the underlying factor set (with respect to the eight-factor model),
the MS strategy dominates the 1M strategy with a corresponding average alpha of 0.23% (0.23%).
Also, the t-value is higher for the MS strategy with a very high value of 3.83 with respect to the same
factor set of the timing strategy and even 4.22 with respect to the eight-factor model. Thus, the more
sophisticated timing with the Markov switching model creates additional value over time. While the
MS strategy shows significant positive alphas for every factor set for the US and DM universes, we
find positive but insignificant alphas for the EM universe for the FF, FFC, CLV, and CB factor sets.
We highlight that the ND strategy, in general, shows insignificant p-values. However, there are still
a few significant alphas also for this naive diversification strategy. We can explain these significant
values since we conduct multiple tries. Thus, we expect significant values just by luck and refer to
Section 4.3 for a more detailed explanation of the impact of multiple hypothesis adjustments.17 To
conclude, we attribute the MS strategy a significant timing ability that is positive in every analysis
for the three different universes and six factor sets.
[Table 5 about here.]
3.5 Performance analysis
We next analyze the return to risk differences between the MS, 1M, and ND strategy in absolute
terms and from a relative perspective compared to the MKT strategy. We find in absolute terms that
the Sharpe ratio of the MS strategy is on average 0.23 higher compared to the market, while the 1M
strategy shows an improvement of 0.11. Regarding the Calmar ratio, where we divide the annualized
return by the absolute maximum drawdown, we find an average improvement of 0.09 for the MS and
0.05 for the 1M strategy. In relative terms to the ND strategy, we find an information ratio improve-
16The block-resampling method shows a higher statistical power compared to other standard tests for financial time
series (see Lahiri (2003) or Leippold and Rüegg (2018)). For the block size, we apply a value of five since most of the
optimal block sizes lie between one and five with the method of Politis and White (2004) and Patton et al. (2009),
while five results in the highest and thus most conservative p-values.
17With the multiple try adjustment the significant p-values start to become insignificant for the ND strategy. This
behavior is expected since they apply no timing, hence the alpha must be close to zero.
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ment of 0.53 for the MS and 0.10 for the 1M strategy. The relative Calmar ratio, computed as the
annualized alpha divided by the maximum relative drawdown to the market, increases by 0.34 and
0.09 for the MS respectively the 1M strategy. Therefore, we conclude that the MS strategy dominates
the other strategies also in the return to risk dimension and offers an economic meaningful improve-
ment for the investor. For the interested reader we provide the detailed performance summaries for
the different factor sets and universes in Appendix B and Table B.1.
To analyze the statistical significance of the Sharpe ratio difference, we show in Panel A of Table 6
the annual Sharpe ratio difference to the MKT strategy together with the Newey-West t-values. We
highlight significant differences at the 95% confidence level by the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit
and Wolf (2008) in bold. Similar as for the alpha, we find for the MS strategy significant differences
for every analysis in the US and DM universe. Still, for the EM universe, the CLV, CLVB, and
DMNU offer a significant improvement for the Sharpe ratio. Also, the 1M strategy shows consistent
and significant differences for the US universe; however, for the DM and EM, the significance vanishes.
In Panel B of Table 6, we also show the robust hypothesis tests with the information ratio
difference of the MS and 1M strategy. For the MS strategy we find a significant improvement for the
CB, and CLVB factor set in the US and the DMNU factor set in the DM and EM universes. For the
1M strategy, we only find insignificant differences, while they are mostly negative in the EM universe.
In contrast, for the MS strategy, the differences are in any case positive.
We conclude that the MS strategy also dominates the return to risk comparison. After robust
hypothesis tests, we find significant improvement for most of our six factor sets and three universes,
while the 1M strategy shows the most substantial improvement in the US universe.
[Table 6 about here.]
4 Robustness checks
In this section, we concentrate on the dominant MS strategy and provide various robustness checks.
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4.1 Longer holding periods
For our first robustness check, we increase the holding periods to 2, 3, 4, 6, and 12 months. Because
of the longer holding periods, we also increase the frequency of our timing strategies. For example,
when we hold the portfolio for three months, we also compute the perfect foresight strategies with a
holding period of three months.18 Moreover, the inputs to the Markov switching model are quarterly
return series. In this way, we adopt the prediction for the longer holding periods because a longer
holding period impacts the optimal strategies over time. Factors with a high turnover or with a weak
performance for a lower rebalancing frequency obtain lower weights in the perfect foresight strategies
with longer holding periods. When we compare the optimal weights of Table 4 with the optimal
weights with a holding period of six months, we see that momentum, which shows a high turnover,
obtains a low average weight of 6%. Whereas in the one-month analysis it contributed with on average
31% to the optimal weights. Also, SUE and REV obtain significant lower weights, when RMW and
CMA obtain a much higher weight. RMW with an average weight of 39% starts to dominate for the
longer holding period. The increase in the CMA factor can be explained by the decrease of HML of
about the same magnitude. Thus, for the short holding periods HML with the improved definition
of Asness and Frazzini (2013) seems to outperform CMA, as for longer holding periods we find as
suggested by Fama and French (2015) that CMA starts to dominate.
In Figure 5 we provide the mean alpha (a), Sharpe ratio difference to the market (b), and infor-
mation ratio difference to the ND strategy (c) for the holding periods from one to twelve months.
Like Arnott et al. (2018) that finds the strongest results for the one-month holding and formation
period, we see that for our long-term analysis in the US, the monthly alpha decreases from 0.41%
for the one-month holding period to 0.20% for the two-months holding period. However, for two to
twelve months it remains constant. For the DM universe, we find the same decrease of the alpha
from 0.39% in the one-month holding period to 0.21% per month for the two-months holding period.
Still, the alpha increases after that to 0.42% for a one-year holding period. For the EM universe,
the alpha even increases from 0.28% to 0.38% and then remains constant up to a six-months holding
period. For twelve months it decreases again to an average 0.29%. Since we only have 15 years of
18When a stock drops from the universe during the holding period, we set the weight to zero and normalize the
holding weights to one.
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out-of-sample period for the DM and EM universes, a more extended holding period results in only
a few rebalancing over time. Thus, we must be more careful with the interpretation of these results.
We also plot the 95% confidence interval of the average Newey-West standard error over the six factor
sets. We observe that they lie almost in all cases above the zero line. The interested reader finds in
Appendix C and Table C.1 the detailed alphas for each factor set and universe.
For the Sharpe ratio difference and the information ratio difference, we find the same patterns as
for the alpha. Still, the differences are less significant compared to the alpha. However, economic
meaningful with an average improvement of the Sharpe ratio of 0.14, and the information ratio of
0.46 for the holding periods from two to twelve months. Surprisingly, the Sharpe ratio difference for
the EM universe is highly stable, and most of the differences are significantly different from zero at
the 95% confidence interval.19
[Figure 5 about here.]
4.2 Transaction costs and turnover analysis
The average two-way turnover of the strategies with a holding period of one month is 122%, 132%,
and 41% for the MS, 1M, and ND strategy. For the longer holding periods, the turnover decreases
for the MS strategy from 63% for two to 41% for three, 32% for four, 22% for six, and 11% for twelve
months. The 1M strategy shows the same speed of decrease but is always with a factor of 1.05 to 1.08
higher compared to the MS strategy. Thus, besides the better performance numbers, we also favor
the MS strategy due to the lower transaction costs over time. On the other hand, the ND strategy
shows only one-third of the turnover of the MS strategy for the one-month strategy. However, with
the longer holding periods, the ND strategy loses the transaction costs advantage. For the six-months
holding period, we find a turnover of 13%, and for twelve months of 9%, that is close to the turnover
of the MS strategy. Due to the deletions and additions in the universe, also the market has an average
two-way turnover of 1.6%. Thus, we also deduct small transaction costs to the MKT factor when we
19We compute the test statistics based on the robust test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008). We provide the detailed results
of the robust hypothesis testing in Appendix C and Table C.2 for the Sharpe ratio and Table C.3 for the information
ratio.
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next evaluate the impact of transaction costs.20
In order to verify the stability of our results to the high turnover of the timing strategies, we now
apply realistic trading costs to our analysis. We proceed similar as in Leippold and Rueegg (2018)
but start with a 1.5% one-way transaction cost from 1963 to 1975, which is 0.5% higher due to the
high turnover of the timing strategies. After the deregulation of the commission fees in 1975, we
decrease the transaction costs from 1976 to 2018 at an exponential decay with a mean lifetime of
twelve years. Since we find higher transaction costs and exchange fees for the exchanges outside of
the US, we double the transaction costs for the DM universe. For the EM, we apply a multiplier of
six. In this way we arrive at 4 Bps (US), 8 Bps (DM), and 24 Bps (EM) at the end of 2017, which
lies with a small positive margin above the bid-ask spread of index funds within the same universe.21
Also we are close to DeMiguel et al. (2018) that apply transaction costs of 1% in 1980 and 0.35% in
2002 for the largest US companies.22.
As can be seen from Figure 6, for the US from 1968 to 2017, we find that the high transaction
costs at the beginning of our analysis led to negative alphas, Sharpe ratio, and information ratio
differences for holding periods up to three months. Starting from semi-annual holding periods, we
find that the MS timing strategy can create value also after transaction costs. Since we see that the
high transaction costs in the past prevented timing strategies from being effective, we also regard the
more recent time periods starting in December 2002 for the US. We chose this starting point because
the resulting analysis period of 180 months is the same as for the DM and EM universe. In this more
recent analysis, we see that the one-month holding period provides the highest average alpha, Sharpe
ratio and information ratio differences for the US. For the DM universe, we find the three-month,
but also the twelve-months holding period to be superior. Whereas due to the high transaction costs
in the emerging markets, a holding period of six to twelve months shows the highest advantage of
the timing strategies. Ultimately, the overall significance diminishes with transaction costs; however,
we find that only a minority of the analysis shows negative differences in the various performance
20The fact that we disregard transaction costs for the other long-short factors brings an advantage to the benchmark
model.
21The bid-ask spread of index funds protects current investors from subscriptions and redemptions, and thus, is a
valid approximation for the average trading costs.
22Since they also short securities, where transaction costs are a well-kept secret of investment banks, we are confident
that our long-only transaction costs are on the conservative side.
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measures. Only for the three-month holding period in the US, two-months holding period in the DM,
and the one-month holding period in the EM, we find slightly negative average performance numbers.
For a more detailed analysis of the statistical significance across the factor sets, we refer to the next
section and the analysis including transaction costs in Panel B and Panel C of Table 7.
[Figure 6 about here.]
4.3 Multiple hypothesis tests
As outlined by Bailey et al. (2014), it is crucial to control for the number of tries for our out-of-sample
tests. In the recent literature, there exist two common error rates to correct for: the false discovery
rate (FDR) and the more conservative family-wise error rate (FWER).23 The FWER approach of
Romano and Wolf (2005a,b) offers first the advantage to account for the cross-dependence structure
of the strategies.24 Also, the FWER is more suitable for a lower number of hypothesis.25 Since we
obtain with six factor sets and three universes in total 18 tries per holding period, we still have a
low number of hypothesis. For this reason, and to allow for cross-dependence, we apply the multiple
hypothesis adjustments of Romano and Wolf (2016) to the block-bootstrapped t-statistics of the
robust alpha test of Leippold and Rüegg (2018).
[Table 7 about here.]
To account for the dependence structure and to jointly sample the strategies and benchmark
returns, we require connected time series. Consequently, we regard the overlapping period of the
three universes starting in April 2003 and ending in December 2017. We show in Table 7 the resulting
analysis with the single and multiple hypothesis adjusted p-values. We distinguish between three
analysis. In Panel A we find that when we exclude transaction costs and apply a holding period of
one month, the alpha remains highly significant, also when we correct for multiple tries. However,
when we include transaction costs, the significance vanishes with the adjustment for multiple tries.
23See, e.g., Romano et al. (2007) or Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) for a discussion of the differences in the two
metrics.
24We find an average cross-correlation of 0.12 among the six factor sets in the three universes.
25Bajgrowicz and Scaillet (2012) argue that for a high number of strategies, it is favorable to control for the less
restrictive FDR. Because the chance to miss an outperforming strategy is worse in a well-diversified approach compared
to invest in a few false discoveries.
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Since we in the previous section find, that the high transaction costs eliminate the gains in markets
with higher transaction costs, it follows naturally to apply a less frequent rebalancing for markets with
higher transaction costs. Thus, when we regard the analysis in Panel C with a monthly rebalancing
for the US, a quarterly rebalancing for the DM with higher transaction costs, and a six-months
holding period for the EM with the highest fees, we see that the alphas after transaction costs are
economically meaningful with 0.29% per month, but also above the 10% significance level. CB in the
US universe, that shows a monthly alpha of 0.41%, is the only factor set that remains significant at
the 90% confidence level when we correct for transaction costs and multiple tries.
4.4 Further comments on the parameter sensitivity
In our paper, the focus of attention is on a low number of parameters with only a few optimizations
over time. In this way, we keep the computational flexibility to compute the parameter sensitivities.
We first had to define the step size 1/x for the discretization of the weights grid. The choice of x = 2
delivers highly robust results over all tested universes and combinations. When we increase x to three,
we find the same average monthly alpha of 0.36% per month for the one-month holding period as in
Table 5. The second parameter q that defines the lower percentile of the best strategies over time is
set to 70%. Thus, we not only invest in the 30% best stocks for our portfolio construction but also
predict the average weight of the 30% best strategies over time. Also, in the analysis with q = 80, we
find the same average alpha of 0.36% for the MS strategy as in the standard setting. When we set
the parameter higher to the extreme value of q = 100, where we only predict the weight of the best
strategy, the prediction is more prone to estimation errors, which leads to less robust and on average
inferior results.
In tests not reported, we also compute the sector-adjusted performance of our approach. We find
that the average alpha for the multiple tries analysis of the previous section is insignificantly below
the reported alphas. For instance, we find in the industry-adjusted comparison within the three
universes a monthly alpha of 0.31% compared to the 0.34% reported in Panel A of Table 7.
When we intend to reduce transaction costs, we can also apply other portfolio constructions with
restrictions on the turnover. However, when we restricted the turnover over time in our analysis, the
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limitations on trading prevented the timing strategies to place their bets over time. Thus, we find
it optimal to increase the prediction and holding periods, instead of restricting the turnover of the
strategies to adjust for transaction costs.
We also tested other portfolio constructions techniques. However, since the beauty of our approach
is to fix the final portfolio construction and then solve for the optimal weights, an alternative portfolio
construction technique removes this direct link. Thus, we leave further improvements on the portfolio
constructions such as implementing a risk model to the practitioners and concentrate on the standard
model-free value-weights of the top 30% scored stocks.
5 Conclusion
Yes, we can successfully time the factors in a realistic long-only setting. We present a novel framework
to factor timing that relies on the long-only integrated approach to style investing. In contrast to
predicting the factor returns of long-short portfolios, we forecast the optimal weights of the stocks’
factor-characteristics. We show that a Markov switching model with two states and based on the
prior months’ results generates an average alpha of 0.36% per month. The strategy dominates the
performance comparison when we compare it to a strategy that invests in the optimal weights of
the past month. We also find a significantly higher Sharpe ratio relative to the market and an
economic meaningful information ratio improvement of 0.53 in absolute terms compared to the naive
diversification strategy that equal-weights the factors. Our findings support Arnott et al. (2018),
in that we provide further evidence for the high returns of momentum strategies applied to factor
investing.
The timing ability is present among different factor sets including the most common investment
styles. The results are also valid for the highest capitalized stocks within the US, developed and
emerging markets universe. When we increase the holding and forecasting period to up to twelve
months, the timing ability weakens, but is still meaningful and significant. The significance is robust
to the state-of-the art block resampling method of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) and Leippold and Rüegg
(2018). This is even true, when we adjust for multiple tries as suggested by Bailey et al. (2014).
One limitation of the short-term timing strategies are the high turnovers. In markets such as
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the emerging markets or the more distant past, where transaction costs were high, monthly holding
periods were not the optimal choice. When we apply longer holding periods for markets with higher
transaction costs, we find that the Markov switching strategy generates an economical meaningful
alpha of 0.29% per month over the most recent past.
To conclude, there is still the open question, whether beating the market with a successful factor
selection, or only creating additional value once one agreed on a factor set is a source of alpha. We
show that a Markov switching strategy can generate alpha, where the decisions are only based on the
historical returns of the factor characteristics. Hence, we find evidence that the market prices of risk
only adjusted slowly over time and that it was a source of alpha in retrospect.
141
References
Ang, Andrew, and Geert Bekaert, 1998, Regime switches in interest rates, Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics 20, 163–182.
Ang, Andrew, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Xiaoyan Zhang, 2006, The cross-section of
volatility and expected returns, Journal of Finance 61, 259–299.
Arnott, Robert D., Noah Beck, Vitali Kalesnik, and John West, 2016, How can "smart beta" go
horribly wrong?, Technical report, Research Affiliates.
Arnott, Robert D., Mark Clements, Vitali Kalesnik, and Juhani T. Linnainmaa, 2018, Factor mo-
mentum, Available at SSRN 3116974.
Arshanapalli, Bala G., Lorne N. Switzer, and Karim Panju, 2007, Equity-style timing: A multi-style
rotation model for the russell large-cap and small-cap growth and value style indexes, Journal of
Asset Management 8, 9–23.
Asness, Clifford S., 2016, The siren song of factor timing aka "smart beta timing" aka "style timing",
Journal of Portfolio Management 42, 1–6.
Asness, Clifford S., and Andrea Frazzini, 2013, The devil in HML’s details, Journal of Portfolio
Management 39, 49–68.
Asness, Clifford S., Jacques A. Friedman, Robert J. Krail, and John M. Liew, 2000, Style timing:
Value versus growth, Journal of Portfolio Management 26, 50–60.
Asness, Clifford S., Tobias J. Moskowitz, and Lasse Heje Pedersen, 2013, Value and momentum
everywhere, Journal of Finance 68, 929–985.
Bailey, David, and Marcos Lopez de Prado, 2014, The deflated sharpe ratio: Correcting for selection
bias, backtest overfitting and non-normality, Journal of Portfolio Managment 40, 94–107.
Bailey, David H., Jonathan M. Borwein, Marcos L. de Prado, and Qiji J. Zhu, 2014, Pseudomathemat-
ics and financial charlatanism: The effects of backtest over fitting on out-of-sample performance,
Notices of the American Mathematical Society 61, 458–471.
142
Bajgrowicz, Pierre, and Olivier Scaillet, 2012, Technical trading revisited: False discoveries, persis-
tence tests, and transaction costs, Journal of Financial Economics 106, 473–491.
Barroso, Pedro, and Pedro Santa-Clara, 2015, Momentum has its moments, Journal of Financial
Economics 116, 111–120.
Benartzi, Shlomo, and Richard H. Thaler, 2001, Naive diversification strategies in defined contribution
saving plans, American Economic Review 91, 79–98.
Bender, Jennifer, and Taie Wang, 2016, Can the whole be more than the sum of the parts? Bottom-up
versus top-down multifactor portfolio construction, Journal of Portfolio Management 42, 39–50.
Carhart, Mark M., 1997, On persistence in mutual fund performance, Journal of Finance 52, 57–82.
Cochrane, John H., 2011, Presidential address: Discount rates, Journal of Finance 66, 1047–1108.
Cohen, Randolph B., Christopher Polk, and Tuomo Vuolteenaho, 2003, The value spread, Journal of
Finance 58, 609–641.
Cooper, Michael J., Huseyin Gulen, and Michael J. Schill, 2008, Asset growth and the cross-section
of stock returns, Journal of Finance 63, 1609–1651.
DeMiguel, Victor, Lorenzo Garlappi, and Raman Uppal, 2009, Optimal versus naive diversification:
How inefficient is the 1/N portfolio strategy?, Review of Financial Studies 22, 1915–1953.
DeMiguel, Victor, Alberto Martin-Utrera, Francisco J. Nogales, and Raman Uppal, 2018, A portfolio
perspective on the multitude of firm characteristics, CEPR discussion paper DP12417, Centre for
Economic Policy Research.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993, Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2015, A five-factor asset pricing model, Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 116, 1–22.
Fama, Eugene F., and James D. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests,
Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–36.
143
Hamilton, James D., 1989, A new approach to the economic analysis of nonstationary time series and
the business cycle, Econometrica 57, 357–384.
Harvey, Campbell R., Yan Liu, and Heqing Zhu, 2016, ...and the cross-section of expected returns,
Review of Financial Studies 29, 5–68.
Hodges, Philip, Ked Hogan, Justin R. Peterson, and Andrew Ang, 2017, Factor timing with cross-
sectional and time-series predictors, Journal of Portfolio Management 44, 30–43.
Jegadeesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman, 1993, Returns to buying winners and selling losers:
Implications for stock market efficiency, Journal of Finance 48, 65–91.
Jegadesh, Narasimhan, 1990, Evidence of predictable behavior of security returns, Journal of Finance
45, 881–898.
Jegadesh, Narasimhan, and Sheridan Titman, 1993, Returns to buying winners and selling losers:
Implications for stock market efficiency, Journal of Finance 48, 65–91.
Kao, Duen-Li, and Robert D. Shumaker, 1999, Equity style timing, Financial Analysts Journal 55,
37–48.
Lahiri, Soumendra N., 2003, Resampling methods for dependent data (Springer–Verlag).
Ledoit, Olivier, and Michael Wolf, 2008, Robust performance hypothesis testing with the Sharpe
ratio, Journal of Empirical Finance 15, 850–859.
Leippold, Markus, and Harald Lohre, 2012, Data snooping and the global accrual anomaly, Applied
Financial Economics 22, 509–535.
Leippold, Markus, and Roger Rueegg, 2018, The mixed vs the integrated approach to style investing:
Much ado about nothing?, European Financial Management 24, 829–855.
Leippold, Markus, and Roger Rüegg, 2018, Is active investing a zero-sum game?, Available at SSRN
3107904.
Levy, Robert A., 1967, Relative strength as a criterion for investment selection, Journal of Finance
22, 595–610.
144
McLean, David R., and Jeffrey Pontiff, 2016, Does academic research destroy stock return predictabil-
ity?, Journal of Finance 71, 5–32.
Moskowitz, Tobias J., and Mark Grinblatt, 1999, Do industries explain momentum?, Journal of
Finance 54, 1249–1290.
Nalbantov, Georgi, Rob Bauer, and Ida Sprinkhuizen-Kuyper, 2006, Equity style timing using support
vector regressions, Applied Financial Economics 16, 1095–1111.
Novy-Marx, Robert, 2013, The other side of value: The gross profitability premium, Journal of
Financial Economics 108, 1–28.
Patton, Andrew, Dimitris N. Politis, and Halbert White, 2009, Correction to “Automatic block-
length selection for the dependent bootstrap” by D. Politis and H. White, Econometric Reviews
28, 372–375.
Perlin, Marcelo, 2015, MS_Regress-the MATLAB package for Markov regime switching models,
Available at SSRN 1714016.
Politis, Dimitris N., and Halbert White, 2004, Automatic block-length aelection for the dependent
bootstrap, Econometric Reviews 23, 53–70.
Rendleman, Richard, Charles P. Jones, and Henry A. Latane, 1982, Empirical anomalies based on
unexpected earnings and the importance of risk adjustments, Journal of Financial Economics 10,
269–287.
Romano, Joseph P., and Michael Wolf, 2005a, Exact and approximate stepdown methods for multiple
hypothesis testing, Journal of the American Statistical Association 100, 94–108.
Romano, Joseph P., and Michael Wolf, 2005b, Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping,
Econometrica 73, 1237–1282.
Romano, Joseph P., and Michael Wolf, 2016, Efficient computation of adjusted p-values for
resampling-based stepdown multiple testing, Statistics & Probability Letters 113, 38–40.
145
Romano, Joseph P., Michael Wolf, et al., 2007, Control of generalized error rates in multiple testing,
The Annals of Statistics 35, 1378–1408.
Rosenberg, Barr, Kenneth Reid, and Ronald Lanstein, 1985, Persuasive evidence of market ineffi-
ciency, Journal of Portfolio Management 11, 9–16.
Sims, Christopher A., and Tao A. Zha, 2006, Were there regime switches in us monetary policy,
American Economic Review 96, 54–81.
Turner, Christopher M., Richard Startz, and Charles R. Nelson, 1989, A Markov model of het-
eroskedasticity, risk and learning in the stock market, Journal of Financial Economics 25, 3–22.
146
A Factor returns
In this appendix, we provide the summary statistics for the factors presented in Table 3. Contrary
to Fama and French (1993), we rebalance the portfolios every month. However, we apply the same
portfolio construction, when we show the value-weighted return of the best and bottom 30% of the
stocks for the top (left column) and bottom (right column) portfolio in Table A.1. We find for every
factor in the three universes a higher Sharpe ratio for the top compared to the bottom portfolio. The
only exception builds the HML factor in the DM and the REV factor in the EM universe. When we
compare the monthly mean return of HML from June 1926 to April 1998 with the period from April
1998 to April 2018 for the entire US universe including small caps, we find a mean return of monthly
0.45% relative to 0.13%.26 Thus, we explain the low performance of value in the DM universe with
the in general low returns of value for the same period in other universes. Regarding the REV factor
in the EM universe, we observe similar mean returns in the period before and after 1998 for other
universes. Thus, the weak performance only holds for this period and market.
[Table A.1 about here.]
B Detailed performance analysis
This appendix shows the detailed performance analysis of the MS, 1M, and ND strategy in absolute
terms and relative to the MKT strategy. We provide in Table B.1 the summary statistics for the
three universes from Table 2 and the six factor sets from Table 3. We find that the MS strategy
offers the highest Sharpe and Calmar ratios in a clear majority of the comparisons. Except for the
FF factor set in the US, the MS strategy always offers the highest return among the three strategies.
[Table B.1 about here.]
26The long-term factor returns are retrieved from the homepage of Kenneth French.
147
C Detailed results of longer holding period analysis
Table C.1 presents the detailed analysis of the monthly alphas of the MS timing strategy when we
apply longer holding periods to the strategies. The alpha is relative to the factors of the underlying
factor sets. Thus, the alpha represents the pure timing ability of the MS strategy.
[Table C.1 about here.]
Table C.2 reports the detailed analysis of the annualized Sharpe ratio differences of the MS timing
strategy and the MKT strategy when we apply longer holding periods to the strategies.
[Table C.2 about here.]
Table C.2 gives a detailed analysis of the annualized information ratio differences of the MS
timing strategy relative to the ND strategy when we apply longer holding periods to the strategies.
The ND strategy is the natural equal-weighted benchmark when we apply no timing on the factor
characteristics.
[Table C.3 about here.]
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Figure 1: Description of the difference in the long-only mixed and integrated approach to factor
timing
The mixed approach to factor timing that is standard in the literature compared to our long-only integrated
approach to factor timing. We illustrate the different steps that lead to the optimal long-only portfolio with
N = 10 stocks and three factors.
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Figure 2: Optimal weights over time
Optimal weight over time of the best strategy (q = 100) with the dotted line, and the average weight of the
30% best strategies (q = 70) with the dashed line. We show the ex post optimal weight of the three factors
value (HML), profitability (RMW), investment (CMA), momentum (WML), and low beta (BETA) in the US
universe from 1963 to 2017.
150
Figure 3: Alpha over time
The cumulative excess log-return to the market of the perfect foresight strategies that always invest in the
best strategy (PF q = 100) with the dashed line, and in the average weights of the strategies above the
70th percentile (PF q = 70) with the solid line. For comparison, we also plot with the dash-dotted line the
cumulative log-alpha of the strategy that applies the constant weights over time that lead to the highest Sharpe
ratio (H-SR).
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Figure 4: Cumulated alpha of the timing strategies for value and momentum
The cumulative excess log-return to the value-weighted market return (MKT) of the Markov switching strat-
egy (MS) with the solid line, the one-month momentum strategy (1M) with the dotted line, and the naive
diversification strategy (ND) with the dash-dotted line. The analyzed period is from June 1968 to December
2016.
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Figure 5: Alpha, Sharpe ratio, and information ratio difference
Averages among the six factor sets from Table 3 of the alpha relative to the strategies’ factor set (a), the
Sharpe ratio difference to the market (b), and the information ratio difference to the naive diversification
(ND) strategy (c). We distinguish between the three universes from Table 2 with the US from June 1968 to
December 2016, and the MSCI Developed Markets (DM) as well as the MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) from
April 1998 to April 2018. The error bounds are the 95% confidence bounds based on the mean Newey-West
standard error.
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Figure 6: Transaction costs analysis
Averages among the six factor sets from Table 3 for the alpha relative to the strategies’ factor set (a), the
Sharpe ratio difference to the market (b), and the information ratio difference to the naive diversification (ND)
strategy (c). The solid line and confidence bounds include transaction costs, while the dashed line does not
include transaction costs. We distinguish between the three universes from Table 2 with the US from June
1968 to December 2016, and the DM as well as the EM from April 1998 to April 2018. For the US we show
the analysis for the period starting in June 1968 (68-17) and in December 2002 (03-17). The error bounds are
the 95% confidence bounds based on the average Newey-West standard error.
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Table 1: Overview of the strategies
The acronym, the underlying model, the definition, and the aim of the strategies. The last two columns show
if the strategy applies factor timing and if the strategy is out-of-sample.
Acronym Model Definition Aim Factor Out-of
timing sample
MKT Capital Asset Pric-
ing Model
Market-capitalization weighted portfolio Benchmark × X
Factor strategies: Long-only integrated approach based on the
30% highest scored stocks when the score is
built with ...
ND Naive Diversification ... equal weights for each factor Benchmark × X
H-SR Perfect Foresight ... the constant weights over time that show
the highest Sharpe ratio over time.
Illustrative × ×
H-IR Perfect Foresight ... the constant weights over time that show
the highest information ratio over time.
Illustrative × ×
PF Perfect Foresight ... the time-varying weights that show the
highest return for the actual period.
Illustrative X ×
1M Momentum ... the time-varying weights that show the
highest return in the most recent month.
Timing X X
MS Markov Switching ... the prediction of the factor weights by a
two regime Markov switching model.
Timing X X
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Table 2: Summary statistics for the three universes
The average, minimum, and maximum number of stocks, as well as the market capitalization, and total excess
return in percentage above the one-month Treasury bill rate. Also, it shows the start and end date of the
analyzed data period. The universes are all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks above the NYSE median
for the US, and the MSCI Developed Markets (DM) and MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) universe of MSCI
Inc. The market cap for the US is the CRSP market cap and for the MSCI universes the free-float adjusted
market cap by MSCI Inc.
Number Market Cap M USD Monthly Return USD Period
Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Avg Min Max Start Date End Date
US 813 587 1,550 7,033 62 882,332 0.62 -98.30 299.74 June 1963 Dec 2017
DM 1,339 1,093 3,844 14,234 0 924,421 0.69 -100.00 386.48 April 1998 April 2018
EM 648 514 2,337 2,903 0 343,776 1.18 -90.97 453.21 April 1998 April 2018
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Table 3: Factor definitions and authors
Factors’ names in the first, definition in the second, authors with the year of publication in the third, and
acronyms in the fourth column. In headers five to ten to the right of the table, we show the acronyms of the
factor sets and indicate with a X the included characteristics.
Factor Definition Author Acronym F
F
F
F
C
C
LV
C
B
C
LV
B
D
M
N
U
Value Devil definition as defined in Asness and Frazzini
(2013) with the lagged book equity divided by
the market value of the last month
Rosenberg
et al. (1985)
HML X X X X X
Profitability Operating profitability as defined by sales minus
cost of goods sold divided by book equity
Novy-Marx
(2013)
RMW X X X X X X
Investment Inverse annual total book asset growth Cooper et al.
(2008)
CMA X X X X X X
Momentum Total return in US dollar of the past twelve
months excluding the most recent month
Jegadesh
(1990)
WML X X X X
Low volatility Inverse volatility for the most recent 36 months
for the US dataset, and for the most recent 22
days for the MSCI datasets
Ang et al.
(2006)
LVOL X X X
Low beta Inverse estimated beta from monthly returns for
the most recent 36 months against the equal
weighted market return for the US dataset, and
from weekly returns for the most recent 52 weeks
against the MSCI World or Emerging Markets
Index for the MSCI datasets
Fama and
MacBeth
(1973)
BETA X X X
Unexpected
Earnings
Unexpected earnings approximated by the differ-
ence in the yearly change in the operating prof-
itability from the most recent to the past year
Rendleman
et al. (1982)
SUE X
Reversal Inverse total return in US dollar of the past
month
Jegadesh
(1990)
REV X
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Table 4: Optimal constant weights over time
Optimal weights in the long-only integrated approach for the US from 1963 to 2016 (US), the DM from 1998
to 2016, and the EM from 1998 to 2016. In the first column, we show the Sharpe and information ratio for
the highest Sharpe ratio (H-SR) and highest information ratio strategy (H-IR). The rows represent the factor
sets, and the sideway columns the factors from Table 3. The numbers are in percentage.
Panel US: June 1963 to December 2017
H-SR H-IR
SR H
M
L
R
M
W
C
M
A
W
M
L
LV
O
L
B
E
T
A
SU
E
R
E
V
IR H
M
L
R
M
W
C
M
A
W
M
L
LV
O
L
B
E
T
A
SU
E
R
E
V
FF 51.8 40 40 20 – – – – – 40.9 33 67 0 – – – – –
C 58.6 40 20 0 40 – – – – 65.5 33 33 0 33 – – – –
CLV 58.6 40 20 0 40 0 – – – 65.5 33 33 0 33 0 – – –
CBETA 61.8 29 29 0 29 – 14 – – 65.5 33 33 0 33 – 0 – –
CLVBETA 61.8 29 29 0 29 0 14 – – 65.5 33 33 0 33 0 0 – –
DMNU 54.5 – 14 29 – 0 29 0 29 44.7 – 33 0 – 0 0 33 33
Panel DM: April 1998 to April 2018
H-SR H-IR
SR H
M
L
R
M
W
C
M
A
W
M
L
LV
O
L
B
E
T
A
SU
E
R
E
V
IR H
M
L
R
M
W
C
M
A
W
M
L
LV
O
L
B
E
T
A
SU
E
R
E
V
FF 52.1 33 33 33 – – – – – 52.2 40 40 20 – – – – –
C 55.0 33 33 17 17 – – – – 64.1 33 33 0 33 – – – –
CLV 62.9 14 14 14 29 29 – – – 64.1 33 33 0 33 0 – – –
CBETA 64.2 22 22 22 11 – 22 – – 64.1 33 33 0 33 – 0 – –
CLVBETA 66.8 20 20 10 20 10 20 – – 64.1 33 33 0 33 0 0 – –
DMNU 62.3 – 29 0 – 14 29 0 29 64.2 – 50 0 – 0 0 25 25
Panel EM: April 1998 to April 2018
H-SR H-IR
SR H
M
L
R
M
W
C
M
A
W
M
L
LV
O
L
B
E
T
A
SU
E
R
E
V
IR H
M
L
R
M
W
C
M
A
W
M
L
LV
O
L
B
E
T
A
SU
E
R
E
V
FF 54.8 17 33 17 33 – – – – 55.4 50 25 0 25 – – – –
C 59.9 17 17 0 33 33 – – – 73.1 25 0 0 50 25 – – –
CLV 61.0 17 17 0 33 – 33 – – 82.7 33 17 17 17 – 17 – –
CBETA 68.5 29 14 0 29 14 14 – – 73.5 25 0 0 50 25 0 – –
CLVBETA 71.6 – 33 0 – 17 33 17 0 82.7 – 50 0 – 0 0 25 25
DMNU 67.8 21 27 7 32 21 27 17 0 65.3 33 26 3 35 17 6 25 25
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Table 5: Out-of-sample timing ability
Monthly alphas in percentage of the Markov switching (MS), the momentum (1M) and the naive diversification
(ND) strategies together with the Newey West t-value and a bandwidth of 4∗ (T/100)(2/9) in italics for the six
factor models from FF to DMNU of Table 3 and the three universes from Table 2 with the US from June 1968
to December 2017, and DM as well as EM from April 2003 to April 2018. For the Markov switching model,
we put an initial learning period of 5 years. We show in Panel A the alphas relative to the factors in the
factor model including MKT and in Panel B the alphas relative to the factor model including the uncorrelated
factors MKT, HML, RMW, CMA, WML, LVOL, SUE, and REV. We highlight significant alphas below the
5% significance level by the robust alpha test of Leippold and Rüegg (2018) in bold. In the bottom of the
table, we provide the Panels’ averages.
Panel A: Relative to the strategies’ underlying factor model
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
US 0.33 0.36 0.03 0.28 0.30 0.00 0.41 0.32 0.02 0.51 0.36 0.03 0.51 0.32 0.02 0.45 0.33 0.03
5.32 5.97 1.04 4.66 4.13 0.07 5.24 3.84 0.76 7.52 4.41 1.28 6.44 3.66 0.72 5.65 4.93 1.60
DM 0.28 0.24 0.07 0.35 0.25 −.02 0.41 0.30 0.08 0.34 0.28 0.06 0.38 0.30 0.05 0.58 0.31 0.07
3.85 3.00 1.72 3.22 1.84 0.51 3.99 2.01 2.42 3.09 1.77 1.85 3.01 1.91 1.91 4.62 3.36 1.93
EM 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.07 −.04 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.25 0.11 0.19 0.50 0.12 0.18 0.42 −.15 0.06
1.26 1.13 0.59 0.89 0.58 0.78 1.85 0.68 0.05 1.61 0.75 3.70 3.44 0.68 2.86 3.27 1.01 1.03
Panel B: Relative to the eight-factors model
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
US 0.39 0.42 0.03 0.32 0.38 0.00 0.46 0.43 0.02 0.56 0.46 0.04 0.57 0.43 0.03 0.48 0.37 0.04
6.98 8.10 1.23 5.32 6.29 0.13 5.84 6.53 0.78 8.12 7.14 1.37 7.16 6.57 1.04 5.95 5.38 1.90
DM 0.28 0.24 0.06 0.35 0.25 −.01 0.41 0.29 0.08 0.34 0.28 0.09 0.39 0.32 0.08 0.57 0.30 0.09
4.39 3.44 1.66 3.89 2.56 0.46 4.03 2.67 2.36 4.10 2.83 1.93 3.30 2.91 1.84 4.52 3.27 2.12
EM 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.14 −.01 −.04 0.25 −.01 0.01 0.22 0.02 0.25 0.49 0.00 0.23 0.43 −.16 0.12
1.07 0.56 0.92 1.13 0.08 0.78 1.76 0.08 0.13 1.60 0.14 3.59 3.50 0.00 2.95 3.25 1.01 1.56
Averages:
Panel A MS 1M ND Panel B MS 1M ND
Alpha 0.36 0.23 0.05 Alpha 0.38 0.23 0.07
t-value 3.83 2.54 1.38 t-value 4.22 3.31 1.49
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Table 6: Out-of-sample robust Sharpe ratio and information ratio test
Annual Sharpe ratio difference to the MKT strategy (Panel A), and the annual information ratio difference to
the ND strategy (Panel B) together with the Newey West t-statistics and a bandwith of 4 ∗ (T/100)(2/9) in
italics of the MS, 1M and ND strategies from Table 1. We distinguish between the three universes US, DM,
and EM from Table 2 and the six factor sets FF to DMNU from Table 3. We highlight in bold significant
differences with the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008) below the 5% significance level. In the
bottom of the table, we provide the Panels’ averages.
Panel A: Sharpe ratio difference to the MKT strategy
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
US 0.24 0.26 0.17 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.31 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.13 0.18
4.28 4.95 2.87 4.91 3.68 3.33 3.38 2.92 3.65 5.09 3.40 3.46 4.72 2.67 3.23 2.94 1.82 2.98
DM 0.20 0.16 0.05 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.23 0.11 0.20 0.26 0.11 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.45 0.21 0.23
3.03 2.04 0.84 3.02 0.73 0.98 3.26 0.80 2.43 2.59 0.84 2.31 1.22 0.93 2.10 3.41 1.48 2.15
EM 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.02 0.14 0.17 0.02 0.29 0.26 0.03 0.31 0.24 −.08 0.16
1.75 0.37 0.09 1.53 0.18 1.17 2.15 0.25 2.19 1.83 0.20 3.66 3.86 0.30 3.75 2.97 0.68 1.84
Panel B: Information ratio difference to the ND strategy
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
US 0.30 0.34 – 0.29 0.12 – 0.38 0.22 – 0.53 0.23 – 0.58 0.26 – 0.46 0.21 –
1.69 1.89 – 1.84 0.73 – 1.68 1.21 – 2.55 1.33 – 2.76 1.40 – 1.82 0.99 –
DM 0.44 0.23 – 0.59 0.13 – 0.74 0.15 – 0.56 0.22 – 0.61 0.38 – 0.96 0.39 –
1.56 0.77 – 1.76 0.34 – 1.86 0.35 – 1.53 0.56 – 1.38 0.91 – 2.55 1.03 –
EM 0.51 0.09 – 0.27 −.21 – 0.48 −.08 – 0.09 −.47 – 0.67 −.25 – 1.05 −.21 –
1.31 0.24 – 0.80 0.53 – 1.33 0.22 – 0.25 1.16 – 1.93 0.61 – 2.58 0.58 –
Averages:
Panel A MS 1M ND Panel B MS 1M
Diff SR 0.23 0.11 0.18 Diff IR 0.53 0.10
t-value 3.11 1.57 2.39 t-value 1.73 0.82
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Table 7: Multiple Tries Over Time
Monthly alpha in percentage of the Markov switching (MS) strategy (Alpha), the single hypothesis p-value
of the robust alpha test of Leippold and Rüegg (2018) (Pval), and the multiple hypothesis adjusted p-value
by the method of Romano and Wolf (2016) (Padj) that controls the FWER. In Panel A we show the analysis
for a holding period of one month, in Panel B for a holding period of one month including transaction costs,
and in Panel C for a monthly holding period for the US, a quarterly holding period for the DM, and a six-
months holding period for the EM. In each Panel, we show the results for the six factor sets FF to DMNU
from Table 3. The analysis period is from April 2003 to December 2017. We highlight significant multiple
hypothesis adjusted alphas below the 5% (10%) significance level in bold (italics).
Panel A: Excluding transaction costs (monthly holding period)
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM
Alpha 0.28 0.27 0.12 0.16 0.34 0.11 0.44 0.42 0.28 0.51 0.33 0.25 0.42 0.37 0.51 0.39 0.59 0.41
Pval 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.09 0.02 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Padj 0.04 0.04 0.45 0.33 0.08 0.45 0.02 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.08 0.34 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.08
Panel B: Including transaction costs (monthly holding period)
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM
Alpha 0.19 0.08 −.37 0.07 0.16 −.39 0.35 0.20 −.34 0.41 0.13 −.35 0.33 0.16 −.07 0.28 0.37 −.24
Pval 0.02 0.33 0.01 0.43 0.24 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.33 0.10 0.01 0.24 0.68 0.05 0.02 0.11
Padj 0.31 0.73 0.17 0.73 0.64 0.19 0.10 0.48 0.48 0.02 0.73 0.50 0.10 0.71 0.73 0.33 0.18 0.51
Panel C: Including transaction costs (US monthly, DM quarterly, EM half-yearly holding period)
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM
Alpha 0.19 0.15 0.28 0.07 0.25 0.33 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.41 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.28 0.32 0.35
Pval 0.03 0.12 0.08 0.43 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.12
Padj 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.43 0.29 0.34 0.15 0.34 0.31 0.05 0.10 0.34 0.15 0.14 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.34
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Table A.1: Factor performance
Annualized mean (Ret), annualized standard deviation (Std), Sharpe ratio (SR), as well as minimum (Min)
and maximum (Max) monthly return of the factor portfolios. The columns show first the market (MKT)
strategy and the top (left) and bottom (right) portfolio of the eight factors from Table 3. We show the returns
for the three universes US, DM, and EM from Table 2. The numbers are in percentage.
Panel US: June 1963 to December 2017
MKT HML RMW CMA WML LVOL BETA SUE REV
Ret 5.2 6.5 4.5 6.4 3.7 6.1 4.7 8.0 3.6 5.4 4.7 5.5 4.0 5.9 4.9 6.4 3.5
Std 15.1 14.7 16.5 15.2 16.2 13.8 17.7 17.6 17.8 12.3 23.5 12.2 23.6 15.1 15.4 18.5 16.2
SR 34.5 44.1 27.4 42.2 22.7 44.2 26.3 45.3 20.3 43.6 19.9 44.9 17.0 39.1 31.8 34.6 21.9
Min 22.3 18.9 24.2 22.8 23.0 19.5 24.5 26.0 20.2 17.8 29.7 15.8 27.9 23.3 20.4 23.9 24.4
Max 16.4 22.6 21.1 17.9 14.6 15.0 21.1 20.0 25.0 15.3 23.0 18.9 25.2 18.0 15.7 21.7 17.8
Panel DM: April 1998 to April 2018
MKT HML RMW CMA WML LVOL BETA SUE REV
Ret 4.6 5.7 4.7 6.1 2.6 6.1 4.0 6.8 2.7 5.4 3.0 4.7 2.8 5.0 4.7 4.9 3.0
Std 14.8 18.2 14.5 13.7 16.1 14.3 17.3 15.7 20.6 11.5 23.1 10.7 22.9 15.9 15.5 18.5 15.9
SR 31.3 31.6 32.5 44.6 16.4 42.7 23.3 43.0 12.9 47.4 13.1 44.3 12.1 31.6 30.2 26.3 18.7
Min 17.2 21.9 15.5 14.9 19.3 15.6 21.3 15.8 23.0 13.1 26.3 13.1 26.0 17.9 18.8 26.1 16.0
Max 10.1 19.0 10.8 9.7 11.7 10.6 14.0 17.8 26.8 8.1 19.3 7.5 18.9 10.9 12.1 18.2 17.1
Panel EM: April 1998 to April 2018
MKT HML RMW CMA WML LVOL BETA SUE REV
Ret 7.7 10.6 8.0 10.4 5.0 8.6 7.5 11.4 4.3 8.1 6.2 8.6 5.5 8.9 6.5 8.4 8.5
Std 23.5 29.2 22.7 22.9 26.0 24.7 24.8 24.4 29.1 19.6 30.8 17.4 30.9 24.7 24.2 26.1 23.7
SR 32.5 36.2 35.2 45.4 19.3 34.8 30.1 46.6 14.9 41.5 20.3 49.4 17.7 36.2 26.7 32.1 35.8
Min 29.4 38.3 25.6 27.2 35.4 25.9 30.2 27.6 35.3 29.8 34.2 19.9 38.1 31.0 30.4 30.5 25.8
Max 16.7 28.7 16.5 19.9 20.0 25.2 20.6 16.2 28.2 13.7 23.3 14.3 19.9 21.2 19.0 22.0 20.6
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Table B.1: Out-of-sample performance analysis
Excess return (Ret), standard deviation (Std), maximum drawdown (MD), Sharpe ratio (SR), Calmar ratio
(CR), as well as the relative return (Rel), tracking error (TE), relative maximum drawdown (RD), information
ratio (IR) and relative Calmar ratio to the market (CRr) of the Markov switching (MS), momentum (1M) and
naive diversification (ND) strategies. The factor models and universes are the same as in Table 5. We also
highlight the return of the market in the header of the Panels. The numbers are annualized and in percentage.
Panel US: MKT with Ret 5.0, SR 32.6, CR 9.0
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
Ret 9.0 9.2 7.2 9.2 8.9 7.6 9.6 8.9 7.1 10.7 9.3 7.6 10.8 8.8 6.9 9.7 8.0 6.6
SR 56.6 58.7 50.0 58.2 54.5 51.8 52.6 51.8 54.4 63.6 55.6 57.5 60.7 50.6 54.2 53.1 45.3 50.4
CR 16.9 20.2 14.6 19.5 18.8 16.5 14.7 17.3 16.2 20.2 20.0 17.5 20.4 17.8 14.9 15.4 12.2 13.4
Rel 3.9 4.1 1.9 4.1 3.8 2.2 4.7 3.8 1.6 5.6 4.2 2.0 5.8 3.7 1.3 4.9 3.0 1.0
IR 62.9 67.2 32.8 71.1 53.2 41.6 63.2 47.6 25.3 82.0 52.1 29.2 76.9 44.7 18.9 63.5 38.6 17.6
CRr 23.6 26.0 5.1 32.6 24.8 10.7 16.8 21.7 4.9 31.6 23.4 5.9 34.5 17.7 3.6 16.1 9.9 3.3
Panel DM: MKT with Ret 8.2, SR 60.5, CR 16.7
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
Ret 11.6 10.6 9.4 12.1 10.5 9.1 12.9 10.9 9.4 11.9 10.8 9.2 12.2 11.3 8.9 14.5 11.3 9.1
SR 80.8 76.9 65.6 84.9 68.3 67.6 83.7 71.0 80.9 86.3 71.7 82.1 73.4 73.8 84.5 105.7 81.2 83.2
CR 25.8 22.9 18.9 27.7 21.1 19.7 27.8 21.8 22.3 28.5 21.7 22.6 25.1 22.7 21.9 40.5 26.9 22.8
Rel 3.4 2.4 1.2 3.9 2.3 0.9 4.9 2.7 0.9 3.6 2.6 0.6 4.2 3.0 0.2 6.2 3.0 0.5
IR 79.5 59.1 35.8 83.4 37.4 24.2 97.2 38.3 23.5 69.4 36.1 13.7 65.1 41.5 3.7 105.9 48.6 9.7
CRr 43.6 30.1 14.3 59.6 21.9 10.4 72.5 24.1 9.3 48.7 14.6 4.0 39.4 23.6 1.2 58.4 33.2 3.6
Panel EM: MKT with Ret 10.2, SR 48.3, CR 16.8
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND MS 1M ND
Ret 13.2 11.1 10.7 14.0 11.3 12.2 14.6 11.4 12.0 14.5 10.8 14.2 17.3 11.2 13.5 16.8 8.6 11.0
SR 60.5 51.1 49.1 61.3 49.8 56.0 63.8 50.8 62.6 65.0 50.3 77.3 74.8 51.6 78.8 72.6 40.8 64.1
CR 20.7 17.2 18.6 21.9 17.5 19.6 22.3 17.9 21.2 21.6 17.0 26.7 27.8 18.0 27.1 28.0 13.6 21.2
Rel 3.0 0.9 0.4 4.0 1.2 1.9 4.6 1.1 1.2 4.2 0.3 3.3 7.3 0.8 2.3 6.8 −1.9 −0.2
IR 56.5 14.8 5.9 64.3 17.1 37.8 69.6 13.9 21.9 60.3 4.4 50.9 100.5 9.1 33.7 101.0 −24.8 −3.6
CRr 34.3 5.2 1.7 16.6 7.9 13.4 31.5 5.9 7.9 21.6 1.5 21.3 96.2 4.1 13.5 62.1 −6.8 −1.1
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Table C.1: MS strategy’s timing ability over different holding periods
Monthly alpha in percentage and the Newey-West t-value with a bandwidth of 4∗ (T/100)(2/9) in italics of the
Markov switching strategy (MS) relative to the strategies’ underlying factor model. In Panel A we distinguish
between the three universes US, DM, and EM from Table 2 and the six factor sets FF to DMNU from Table 3.
We highlight in bold significant alphas with the robust alpha test of Leippold and Rüegg (2018) below the 5%
significance level. In Panel B we provide the averages among the three universes.
Panel A: Relative to the strategies’ underlying factor model
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM
1 0.33 0.28 0.13 0.28 0.35 0.11 0.41 0.41 0.27 0.51 0.34 0.25 0.51 0.38 0.50 0.45 0.58 0.42
5.32 3.85 1.26 4.66 3.22 0.89 5.24 3.99 1.85 7.52 3.09 1.61 6.44 3.01 3.44 5.65 4.62 3.27
2 0.16 0.21 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.37 0.23 0.25 0.51 0.17 0.21 0.36 0.29 0.23 0.38 0.18 0.18 0.34
2.35 2.13 3.02 2.66 2.22 3.25 2.84 1.96 4.14 2.51 1.65 2.06 3.34 2.04 2.60 3.28 1.78 2.41
3 0.05 0.23 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.25 0.17 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.40 0.62 0.21 0.41 0.50 0.19 0.39 0.44
0.77 2.80 1.58 1.84 3.43 1.77 2.34 2.56 1.15 2.73 4.17 4.47 2.72 3.96 3.80 3.51 3.35 4.55
4 0.10 0.11 0.26 0.05 0.18 0.39 0.22 0.16 0.43 0.10 0.04 0.38 0.26 0.09 0.40 0.20 0.30 0.43
1.83 1.31 2.36 0.84 2.44 2.46 3.24 1.97 2.62 1.50 0.30 2.24 3.13 0.83 2.22 2.61 2.43 2.68
6 0.11 0.19 0.36 0.15 0.10 0.41 0.24 0.14 0.39 0.15 0.27 0.44 0.25 0.32 0.46 0.25 0.18 0.42
1.95 2.42 2.63 2.10 1.55 2.55 3.85 1.62 2.86 1.96 2.30 2.95 3.99 3.56 2.93 3.70 2.21 2.59
12 0.15 0.29 0.13 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.20 0.43 0.30 0.33 0.51 0.29 0.15 0.50 0.30 0.11 0.45 0.42
2.34 4.37 1.10 3.84 3.32 1.94 2.85 4.19 1.69 4.49 4.27 2.03 2.34 3.56 1.76 2.02 4.22 2.87
Panel B: Averages across the universes
US DM EM
1 2 3 4 6 12 1 2 3 4 6 12 1 2 3 4 6 12
0.41 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.39 0.21 0.34 0.14 0.20 0.42 0.28 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.41 0.29
5.81 2.83 2.32 2.19 2.92 2.98 3.63 1.96 3.38 1.54 2.28 3.99 2.05 2.91 2.89 2.43 2.75 1.90
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Table C.2: MS strategy’s Sharpe ratio differences to the market across different holding periods
Annualized Sharpe ratio difference and the Newey-West t-value with a bandwidth of 4 ∗ (T/100)(2/9) in italics
of the Markov switching strategy (MS) relative to the strategies’ underlying factor model. In Panel A we
distinguish between the three universes US, DM, and EM from Table 2 and the six factor sets FF to DMNU
from Table 3. We highlight in bold significant alphas by the robust Sharpe ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf (2008)
below the 5% significance level. In Panel B we provide the averages among the three universes.
Panel A: Sharpe ratio difference compared to the MKT strategy
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM
1 0.24 0.20 0.12 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.31 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.13 0.26 0.21 0.45 0.24
4.28 3.03 1.75 4.91 3.02 1.53 3.38 3.26 2.15 5.09 2.59 1.83 4.72 1.22 3.86 2.94 3.41 2.97
2 0.14 0.09 0.23 0.18 0.07 0.23 0.13 0.07 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.21 0.16 0.04 0.21 −.03 −.04 0.16
2.89 0.85 3.56 3.27 0.88 2.84 2.41 0.65 3.33 0.91 1.08 2.34 2.85 0.45 2.72 0.66 0.39 2.07
3 0.02 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.12 0.20 0.28 0.03 0.16 0.20 −.03 0.19 0.24
0.38 2.27 1.66 2.36 2.06 1.97 0.97 0.63 1.33 1.95 2.08 3.68 0.50 1.76 2.44 0.63 1.59 3.69
4 0.13 0.04 0.18 0.09 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.03 0.15 0.06 −.03 0.14 0.10 −.03 0.16 −.02 0.07 0.25
2.46 0.57 2.23 1.77 1.84 2.08 2.04 0.29 1.78 1.30 0.27 1.95 1.63 0.30 1.70 0.38 0.69 2.15
6 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.30
1.18 1.38 1.47 1.93 0.97 1.89 1.54 0.54 1.77 2.15 0.33 2.02 1.23 1.64 2.51 2.32 1.67 4.68
12 0.17 0.29 0.07 0.25 0.28 0.22 0.10 0.34 0.18 0.16 0.39 0.25 0.05 0.43 0.31 −.07 0.41 0.30
2.78 4.31 1.07 4.05 2.69 2.90 1.64 3.39 1.63 3.14 3.05 3.25 0.98 3.05 3.32 1.36 4.23 3.94
Panel B: Averages across the universes
US DM EM
1 2 3 4 6 12 1 2 3 4 6 12 1 2 3 4 6 12
0.25 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.25 0.06 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.36 0.18 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.22
4.22 2.17 1.13 1.60 1.72 2.33 2.76 0.71 1.73 0.66 1.09 3.45 2.35 2.81 2.46 1.98 2.39 2.69
165
Table C.3: MS strategy’s information ratio difference to the naive diversification strategy across
different holding periods
Annualized Information ratio difference and the Newey-West t-value with a bandwidth of 4 ∗ (T/100)(2/9) in
italics of the Markov switching strategy (MS) relative to the naive diversification strategy (ND). In Panel A we
distinguish between the three universes US, DM, and EM from Table 2 and the six factor sets FF to DMNU
from Table 3. We highlight in bold significant alphas by the robust information ratio test of Ledoit and Wolf
(2008) below the 5% significance level. In Panel B we provide the averages among the three universes.
Panel A: Information ratio difference compared to the ND strategy
FF FFC CLV CB CLVB DMNU
US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM US DM EM
1 0.30 0.44 0.51 0.29 0.59 0.27 0.38 0.74 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.09 0.58 0.61 0.67 0.46 0.96 1.05
1.69 1.56 1.31 1.84 1.76 0.80 1.68 1.86 1.33 2.55 1.53 0.25 2.76 1.38 1.93 1.82 2.55 2.58
2 0.11 0.07 0.76 0.11 0.30 0.49 0.26 0.35 1.00 0.07 0.52 0.37 0.38 0.53 0.69 0.05 0.47 0.96
0.69 0.20 1.98 0.64 0.93 1.29 1.08 0.77 2.60 0.27 1.22 0.93 1.66 1.18 1.80 0.18 0.76 2.15
3 −.20 0.56 0.26 0.11 0.59 0.19 0.17 0.48 0.13 0.29 0.84 0.51 0.24 0.83 0.58 0.16 0.79 0.86
0.91 1.53 0.72 0.61 1.64 0.45 0.64 1.04 0.37 1.14 2.12 1.35 0.92 1.84 1.21 0.62 1.70 2.29
4 0.08 0.12 0.48 −.06 0.72 0.36 0.29 0.59 0.63 0.18 0.36 0.24 0.37 0.48 0.50 0.17 0.62 0.96
0.46 0.33 1.21 0.29 2.03 0.95 1.18 1.05 1.46 0.74 0.61 0.65 1.41 0.90 1.29 0.61 1.12 2.30
6 −.07 0.33 0.30 0.10 0.40 0.42 0.29 0.44 0.47 0.31 0.48 0.09 0.35 0.90 0.33 0.41 0.67 0.96
0.30 1.08 0.92 0.50 1.43 1.26 1.13 0.89 1.26 1.42 1.02 0.25 1.29 1.97 0.95 1.93 1.77 2.77
12 0.18 1.01 0.51 0.34 0.93 0.50 0.35 1.22 0.49 0.47 1.00 0.43 0.29 1.15 0.60 0.06 1.35 1.05
0.99 2.49 1.28 1.95 2.74 1.34 1.37 3.25 1.50 2.05 2.81 1.43 1.14 3.03 2.13 0.23 3.55 3.06
Panel B: Averages across the universes
US DM EM
1 2 3 4 6 12 1 2 3 4 6 12 1 2 3 4 6 12
0.42 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.65 0.37 0.68 0.48 0.53 1.11 0.51 0.71 0.42 0.53 0.43 0.60
2.05 0.75 0.81 0.78 1.10 1.29 1.77 0.84 1.65 1.01 1.36 2.98 1.36 1.79 1.06 1.31 1.23 1.79
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